Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: Nomination and Appointment of Judicial Candidates in the WTO Appellate Body

Scholars have increasingly theorized, and debated, the decision by states to create and delegate authority to international courts, as well as the subsequent autonomy and behavior of those courts, with principal–agent and trusteeship models disagreeing on the nature and extent of states’ influence on international judges. This article formulates and tests a set of principal–agent hypotheses about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, member states are able use their powers of judicial nomination and appointment to influence the endogenous preferences of international judges. The empirical analysis surveys the record of all judicial appointments to the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization over a 15-year period. We present a view of an AB appointment process that, far from representing a pure search for expertise, is deeply politicized and offers member-state principals opportunities to influence AB members ex ante and possibly ex post. We further demonstrate that the AB nomination process has become progressively more politicized over time as member states, responding to earlier and controversial AB decisions, became far more concerned about judicial activism and more interested in the substantive opinions of AB candidates, systematically championing candidates whose views on key issues most closely approached their own, and opposing candidates perceived to be activist or biased against their substantive preferences. Although specific to the WTO, our theory and findings have implications for the judicial politics of a large variety of global and regional international courts and tribunals.

A neural marker of costly punishment behavior

Human readiness to incur personal costs to punish norm violators is a key force in the maintenance of social norms. The willingness to punish is, however, characterized by vast individual heterogeneity that is poorly understood. In fact, this heterogeneity has so far defied explanations in terms of individual-level demographic or psychological variables. Here, we use resting electroencephalography, a stable measure of individual differences in cortical activity, to show that a highly specific neural marker--baseline cortical activity in the right prefrontal cortex--predicts individuals' punishment behavior. The analysis of task-independent individual variation in cortical baseline activity provides a new window into the neurobiology of decision making by bringing dispositional neural markers to the forefront of the analysis.

What Makes a Family Firm Innovative? CEO Risk-Taking Propensity and the Organizational Context of Family Firms

Investigating the new product portfolio innovativeness of family firms connects two important topics that have recently received considerable attention in innovation and family firm research. First, new product portfolio innovativeness has been identified as a critical determinant of firm performance. Second, research on family firms has focused on the questions of if and why family firms are more or less innovative than other organizational forms. Research investigating the innovativeness of family firms has often applied a risk-oriented perspective by identifying socioemotional wealth (SEW) as the main reference that determines firm behavior. Thus, prior research has mainly focused on the organizational context to predict innovation-related family firm behavior and neglected the impact of preferences and the behavior of the chief executive officer (CEO), which have both been shown to affect firm outcomes. Hence, this study aims to extend the previous research by introducing the CEO's disposition to organizational context variables to explain the new product portfolio innovativeness of small and medium-sized family firms. Specifically, this study explores how the organizational context (i.e., ownership by top management team [TMT] family members and generation in charge of the family firm) of family firms interacts with CEO risk-taking propensity to affect new product portfolio innovativeness. Using a sample of 114 German CEOs of small and medium-sized family firms operating in manufacturing industries, the results show that CEO risk-taking propensity has a positive effect on new product portfolio innovativeness. Moreover, the analyses show that the organizational context of family firms impacts the relationship between CEO risk-taking propensity and new product portfolio innovativeness. Specifically, the relationship between CEO risk-taking propensity and new product portfolio innovativeness is weaker if levels of ownership by TMT family members are high (high SEW). Additionally, the effect of CEO risk-taking propensity on new product portfolio innovativeness is stronger in family firms at earlier generational stages (high SEW). This result suggests that if SEW is a strong reference, family firm-specific characteristics can affect individual dispositions and, in turn, the behaviors of executives. Therefore, this study helps extend the knowledge on the determinants of new product portfolio innovativeness of family firms by considering an individual CEO preference and the organizational context variables of family firms simultaneously.

How political economies affect immigrants' socio-economic incorporation. A comparative analysis of immigrants’ poverty risks across advanced industrialised countries

Immigration and the resulting increasing ethnic diversity have become an important characteristic of advanced industrialised countries. At the same time, the majority of the countries in question are confronted with structural transformation such as deindustrialisation and changes in family structures as well as economic downturn, which limit the capacities of nation-states in addressing rising inequality and supporting those individuals at the margins of the society. This paper addresses both issues, immigration and inequality, by focusing on immigrants’ socio-economic incorporation into the receiving societies of advanced industrialised countries. The aim of this paper is to explain cross-national variation in immigrants’ poverty risks. Drawing on the political economy as well as the migration literature, the paper develops a theoretical framework that considers how the impact of the national labour market and welfare system on immigrants’ poverty risks is moderated by the integration policies, which regulate immigrants’ access to the labour market and social programs (or immigrants’ economic and social rights). The empirical analysis draws on income surveys as well as a newly collected data set on economic and social rights of immigrants in 19 advanced industrialised countries, including European countries as well as Australia, and North America, for the year 2007. As the results from multilevel analysis show, integration policies concerning immigrants’ access to the labour market and social programs can partly explain cross-national variations in immigrants’ poverty risks. In line with the hypothesis, stricter labour market regulations such as minimum wage setting reduce immigrants’ poverty risks stronger in countries where they are granted easier access to the labour market. However, concerning the impact of more generous social programs the reductive poverty effect is stronger in countries with less inclusive access of immigrants to social programs. The paper concludes by discussing possible explanations for this puzzling finding.

Economic benefits and costs of Sustainable Land Management Technologies: An analysis of WOCAT's global data

Perceived profitability is a key factor in explaining farmers' decision to adopt or not adopt sustainable land management (SLM) technologies. Despite this importance, relatively little is known about the economics of SLM. This paper contributes to the literature by analysing data on costs and perceived cost/benefit ratios of SLM technologies. Data are taken from the World Overview of Conservation Approaches and Technologies technology database and cover 363 case studies conducted in a variety of countries between 1990 and 2012. Based on an in-depth descriptive analysis, we determine what costs accrue to local stakeholders and assess perceived short-term and long-term cost/benefit ratios. Our results show that a large majority of the technologies in our sample are perceived as being profitable: 73% were perceived to have a positive or at least neutral cost/benefit ratio in the short term, while 97% were perceived to have a positive or very positive cost/benefit ratio in the long term. An additional empirical analysis confirms that economic factors are key determinants of land users' decisions to adopt or not adopt SLM technologies. We conclude that a wide range of existing SLM practices generate considerable benefits not only for land users, but for other stakeholders as well. High initial investment costs associated with some practices may, however, constitute a barrier to their adoption; short-term support for land users can help to promote these practices where appropriate.

Enabling knowledge creation through outsiders: towards a push model of open innovation

Open innovation is increasingly being adopted in business and describes a situation in which firms exchange ideas and knowledge with external participants, such as customers, suppliers, partner firms, and universities. This article extends the concept of open innovation with a push model of open innovation: knowledge is voluntarily created outside a firm by individuals and organisations who proceed to push knowledge into a firm’s open innovation project. For empirical analysis, we examine source code and newsgroup data on the Eclipse Development Platform. We find that outsiders invest as much in the firm’s project as the founding firm itself. Based on the insights from Eclipse, we develop four propositions: ‘preemptive generosity’ of a firm, ‘continuous commitment’, ‘adaptive governance structure’, and ‘low entry barrier’ are contexts that enable the push model of open innovation.

Koproduktion von Wissen in der Entwicklung des Biolandbaus - Einflüsse von Marginalisierung, Anerkennung und Markt

The empirical analysis of the historical development of transdisciplinary co-production of knowledge (CPK) in organic agriculture (OA) in Switzerland has revealed three distinct phases. The initial phase shows various characteristics of transdisciplinary CPK and a high importance of experiential knowledge. The 2nd and 3rd phases involve an in-creasing segregation of farmers’, extension agents’, and scientists’ knowledge, caused by internal and external impacts, i.e. foundation of independent research institutions, changes in agriculture policy, and new market strategies. These developments strikingly represent an ambiguous trend: the growing societal and political recognition of OA and the increasing market, which are positive achievements, are associated by a gradual loss of very precious forms of CPK. A successful re-establishment of CPK processes and re-integration of experiential knowledge would help to resolve this dilemma and thus improve future research in OA and sustainability research in general.

Political Efficacy and Voter Turnouts in East and West Germany

This article asks if voters' participation in federal elections is lower in the new Länder (East Germany) than in the old Länder (West Germany). It is assumed that voters in the new Länder are less convinced they can influence politics by voting. Using the perspective of cognitive psychology the article stresses differences in individual interpretations of the election context among citizens of both the new and old Länder. Furthermore, it is argued that the strength of the expected influence by voting depends on the structure and direction of individuals' beliefs in their competence and control as well as their belief in causality and self-efficacy. These beliefs may differ among voters in the new and old Länder. For empirical analysis, the article uses data from the German General Social Survey 1998.

Intergenerationale Mobilität im Lebensverlauf oder: Ist der öffentliche Dienst ein Mobilitätskanal zwischen Generationen?

Aus der Lebensverlaufsperspektive wird die intergenerationale Mobilität von Männern und Frauen in den Kohorten 1929-31, 1939-41 und 1949-51 untersucht. In welchem Umfang hat die Expansion des öffentlichen Dienstes Mobilitätschancen eröffnet? Inwieweit hat der öffentliche Dienst als Sonderstruktur im Gegensatz zur Privatwirtschaft seine Funktion als "Mobilitätskanal" ausgeweitet? Modifizieren für den öffentlichen Dienst charakteristische institutionelle Regelungen der Rekrutierung und Allokation von Arbeitskräften diese Funktion? Für empirische Analysen wurden Längsschnittdaten des Lebensverlaufsprojekts am Berliner Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung herangezogen. Zunehmende herkunftsbedingte und bildungsmäßige Ungleichheit bestimmen einen Großteil der Chancen intergenerationaler Mobilität. Die Ausdehnung der Staatsbeschäftigung hat dazu geführt, daß in der Kohortenabfolge vor allem die Berufsanfänger aufstiegen, die in der Lage waren, in den öffentlichen Dienst einzutreten. Das Nachholen beim Berufseinstieg verpaßter Aufstiege ist kaum möglich, und dies gelingt auch nicht durch die Beschäftigung im öffentlichen Dienst. Für die Wahrscheinlichkeit intergenerationaler Aufstiege im Berufsverlauf gibt es keine sektorspezifischen Unterschiede. Staatsbeschäftigte unterliegen aufgrund der Besitzstandswahrung einem deutlich geringeren Abstiegsrisiko als privatwirtschaftlich Beschäftigte. Der Staatssektor hat seine Funktion als Aufstiegskanal für Berufsanfänger ausgeweitet und garantiert seinen langfristig Beschäftigten die erreichte Statuslage. Damit ist der öffentliche Dienst ein weiteres Strukturprinzip sozialer Ungleichheit.

Die Bildungsexpansion in der Schweiz und ihre Folgen. Eine empirische Analyse des Wandels der Bildungsbeteiligung und Bildungsungleichheiten mit den Daten der Schweizer Volkszählungen 1970, 1980, 1990 und 2000

In this contribution the correlation of educational expansion and social inequality of educational opportunities (IEO) for social classes and gender has been investigated for Switzerland in the twentieth century. The empirical analysis is focused on the thesis of persistent inequalities claimed by Shavit and Blossfeld. For testing this thesis, data of the Swiss census in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 has been utilized. First of all, it is found for Switzerland that the moderate educational expansion has been carried out by the succession of birth cohorts. Secondly, this process has led to decreasing IEO. However, after 1990, for the individuals younger than 22 years we have witnessed an increase of social inequalities in becoming eligible for university training. Overall, in favour of disadvantaged social classes, there is a decrease in IEO since the start of educational expansion in the 1950s. Therefore, the thesis of persistent inequalities has been not confirmed for Switzerland.

Public service motivation and performance: a critical perspective

Purpose – A growing body of literature points to the importance of public service motivation (PSM) for the performance of public organizations. The purpose of this paper is to assess the method predominantly used for studying this linkage by comparing the findings it yields without and with a correction suggested by Brewer (2006), which removes the common-method bias arising from employee-specific response tendencies. Design/methodology/approach – First, the authors conduct a systematic review of published empirical research on the effects of PSM on performance and show that all studies found have been conducted at the individual level. Performance indicators in all but three studies were obtained by surveying the same employees who were also asked about their PSM. Second, the authors conduct an empirical analysis. Using survey data from 240 organizational units within the Swiss federal government, the paper compares results from an individual-level analysis (comparable to existing research) to two analyses where the data are aggregated to the organizational level, one without and one with the correction for common-method bias suggested by Brewer (2006). Findings – Looking at the Attraction to Policy-Making dimension of PSM, there is an interesting contrast: While this variable is positively correlated with performance in both the individual-level analysis and the aggregated data analysis without the correction for common-method bias, it is not statistically associated with performance in the aggregated data analysis with the correction. Originality/value – The analysis is the first to assess the robustness of the performance-PSM linkage to a correction for common-method bias. The findings place the validity of at least one part of the individual-level linkage between PSM and performance into question.

An indicator framework for assessing livelihood resilience in the context of social–ecological dynamics

Livelihood resilience draws attention to the factors and processes that keep livelihoods functioning despite change and thus enriches the livelihood approach which puts people, their differential capabilities to cope with shocks and how to reduce poverty and improve adaptive capacity at the centre of analysis. However, the few studies addressing resilience from a livelihood perspective take different approaches and focus only on some dimensions of livelihoods. This paper presents a framework that can be used for a comprehensive empirical analysis of livelihood resilience. We use a concept of resilience that considers agency as well as structure. A review of both theoretical and empirical literature related to livelihoods and resilience served as the basis to integrate the perspectives. The paper identifies the attributes and indicators of the three dimensions of resilience, namely, buffer capacity, self-organisation and capacity for learning. The framework has not yet been systematically tested; however, potentials and limitations of the components of the framework are explored and discussed by drawing on empirical examples from literature on farming systems. Besides providing a basis for applying the resilience concept in livelihood-oriented research, the framework offers a way to communicate with practitioners on identifying and improving the factors that build resilience. It can thus serve as a tool for monitoring the effectiveness of policies and practices aimed at building livelihood resilience.

The relationship between competencies acquired through Swiss academic sports science courses and the job requirements

In view of the changes in and growing variety of sports-related occupations, it is highly relevant for educational institutions 10 to know how well the educational contents of their sport science courses meet the professional requirements. This study analyses the relationship between the competencies acquired through academic sports science courses and the requirements of the relevant jobs in Switzerland. The data for this empirical analysis were drawn from a sample of n = 1054 graduates of different academic sport science programmes at all eight Swiss universities. The results show that academic sport science courses primarily communicate sports-specific expertise and practical sports skills. On the other hand, most graduates consider that the acquisition of interdisciplinary competencies plays a comparatively minor role in sport science education, even though these competencies are felt to be an important requirement in a variety of work-related environments and challenges.

Explora: Infrastructure for Scaling Up Software Visualisation to Corpora

Visualisation provides good support for software analysis. It copes with the intangible nature of software by providing concrete representations of it. By reducing the complexity of software, visualisations are especially useful when dealing with large amounts of code. One domain that usually deals with large amounts of source code data is empirical analysis. Although there are many tools for analysis and visualisation, they do not cope well software corpora. In this paper we present Explora, an infrastructure that is specifically targeted at visualising corpora. We report on early results when conducting a sample analysis on Smalltalk and Java corpora.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.