Experimental Characterization and Quantification of Cement-Bentonite Interaction using Core Infiltration Techniques Coupled with X-ray Tomography

Deep geological storage of radioactive waste foresees cementitious materials as reinforcement of tunnels and as backfill. Bentonite is proposed to enclose spent fuel canisters and as drift seals. Sand/bentonite (s/b) is foreseen as backfill material of access galleries or as drift seals. The emplacement of cementitious material next to clay material generates an enormous chemical gradient in pore-water composition that drives diffusive solute transport. Laboratory studies and reactive transport modeling predicted significant mineral alteration at and near interfaces, mainly resulting in a decrease of porosity in bentonite. The goal of this thesis was to characterize and quantify the cement/bentonite interactions both spatially and temporally in laboratory experiments. A newly developed mobile X-ray transparent core infiltration device was used to perform X-ray computed tomography (CT) scans without interruption of running experiments. CT scans allowed tracking the evolution of the reaction plume and changes in core volume/diameter/density during the experiments. In total 4 core infiltration experiments were carried out for this study with the compacted and saturated cores consisting of MX-80 bentonite and sand/MX-80 bentonite mixture (s/b; 65/35%). Two different high-pH cementitious pore-fluids were infiltrated: a young (early) ordinary Portland cement pore-fluid (APWOPC; K+–Na+–OH-; pH 13.4; ionic strength 0.28 mol/kg) and a young ‘low-pH’ ESDRED shotcrete pore-fluid (APWESDRED; Ca2+–Na+–K+–formate; pH 11.4; ionic strength 0.11 mol/kg). The experiments lasted between 1 and 2 years. In both bentonite experiments, the hydraulic conductivity was strongly reduced after switching to high-pH fluids, changing eventually from an advective to a diffusion-dominated transport regime. The reduction was mainly induced by mineral precipitation and possibly partly also by high ionic strength pore-fluids. Both bentonite cores showed a volume reduction and a resulting transient flow in which pore-water was squeezed out during high-pH infiltration. The outflow chemistry was characterized by a high ionic strength, while chloride in the initial pore water got replaced as main anionic charge carrier by sulfate, originating from gypsum dissolution. The chemistry of the high-pH fluids got strongly buffered by the bentonite, consuming hydroxide and in case of APWESDRED also formate. Hydroxide got consumed by mineral reactions (saponite and possibly talc and brucite precipitation), while formate being affected by bacterial degradation. Post-mortem analysis showed reaction zones near the inlet of the bentonite core, characterized by calcium and magnesium enrichment, consisting predominately of calcite and saponite, respectively. Silica got enriched in the outflow, indicating dissolution of silicate-minerals, identified as preferentially cristobalite. In s/b, infiltration of APWOPC reduced the hydraulic conductivity strongly, while APWESDRED infiltration had no effect. The reduction was mainly induced by mineral precipitation and probably partly also by high ionic strength pore-fluids. Not clear is why the observed mineral precipitates in the APWESDRED experiment had no effect on the fluid flow. Both s/b cores showed a volume expansion along with decreasing ionic strengths of the outflow, due to mineral reactions or in case of APWESDRED infiltration also mediated by microbiological activity, consuming hydroxide and formate, respectively. The chemistry of the high-pH fluids got strongly buffered by the s/b. In the case of APWESDRED infiltration, formate reached the outflow only for a short time, followed by enrichment in acetate, indicating most likely biological activity. This was in agreement to post-mortem analysis of the core, observing black spots on the inflow surface, while the sample had a rotten-egg smell indicative of some sulfate reduction. Post-mortem analysis showed further in both cores a Ca-enrichment in the first 10 mm of the core due to calcite precipitation. Mg-enrichment was only observed in the APWOPC experiment, originating from newly formed saponite. Silica got enriched in the outflow of both experiments, indicating dissolution of silicate-minerals, identified in the OPC experiment as cristobalite. The experiments attested an effective buffering capacity for bentonite and s/b, a progressing coupled hydraulic-chemical sealing process and also the preservation of the physical integrity of the interface region in this setup with a total pressure boundary condition on the core sample. No complete pore-clogging was observed but the hydraulic conductivity got rather strongly reduced in 3 experiments, explained by clogging of the intergranular porosity (macroporosity). Such a drop in hydraulic conductivity may impact the saturation time of the buffer in a nuclear waste repository, although the processes and geometry will be more complex in repository situation.

A new Time-Of-Flight Mass Spectrometer (TOF-MS) for noble gas analysis

Noble gas analysis in early solar system materials, which can provide valuable information about early solar system processes and timescales, are very challenging because of extremely low noble gas concentrations (ppt). We therefore developed a new compact sized (33 cm length, 7.2cm diameter, 1.3 L internal volume) Time-of-Flight (TOF) noble gas mass spectrometer for high sensitivity. We call it as Edel Gas Time-of-flight (EGT) mass spectrometer. The instrument uses electron impact ionization coupled to an ion trap, which allows us to ionize and measure all noble gas isotopes. Using a reflectron set-up improves the mass resolution. In addition, the reflectron set-up also enables some extra focusing. The detection is via MCPs and the signals are processed either via ADC or TDC systems. The objective of this work is to understand the newly developed Time-Of-Flight (TOF) mass spectrometer for noble gas analysis in presolar grains of the meteorites. Chapter 1 briefly introduces the basic idea and importance of the instrument. The physics relevant to time-of-flight mass spectrometry technique is discussed in the Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 will present the oxidation technique of nanodiamonds of the presolar grains by using copper oxide. Chapter 4 will present the details about EGT data analysis software. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will explain the details about EGT design and operation. Finally, the performance results will be presented and discussed in the Chapter 7, and whole work is summarized in Chapter 8 and also outlook of the future work is given.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.