Carbon-related Border Adjustment and WTO Law

By expounding the legal foundations of border tax adjustments in international trade regulation, this book lays out the scope and limitations within which border carbon adjustments need to operate. The author examines the extent to which countries can lawfully impose border adjustment measures in relation to the carbon footprint of products on importation and exportation. In doing so, she provides a thorough analysis of the provisions of the WTO Agreement applicable to border carbon adjustments, offers a comprehensive review of relevant case law and engages with the extensive literature on the subject. Given the probability of conflict with non-discrimination rules of the GATT and uncertainty over justification of different designs of carbon-related border adjustment schemes under the exceptions of GATT Article XX, the book argues for a negotiated solution and discusses the possibility of the use of border carbon adjustments under preferential trade agreements.

Do WTO rules improve or impair the right to food?

The global food crisis of 2007–08 seems to be forgotten. Media attention at the time focused on food riots in Haiti and Mozambique, while world leaders and more than a dozen international organizations gathered for several food summits, calling for immediate relief measures. But not a single government seems to remember its obligations under the Right to Food (R2F) which the United Nations (UN) had enshrined back in 1948. Today we have to acknowledge that the R2F still lacks an adequate response under the present multilateral rules and disciplines applying to food production and trade. This chapter examines the present rules and disciplines under the AoA and of those contemplated in the Doha Development Round. Here we find that despite claims to the contrary they contribute precious little to the R2F. Some of the present rules, or the lack thereof, can even act as disincentives for global and national food security. Various forms of production and export subsidies, food aid abuse and export restrictions, are still WTO-legal, with few remedies available to food insecure developing countries. This amounts to a violation of their R2F obligations by many WTO Members.

Can the World Trade Organization Ensure that International Food Aid is Genuine?

The Doha Round negotiation mandate proposes to minimise trade distortions and commercial displacement under the cover of international food aid, without preventing genuine food aid from reaching people in need. This paper presents problematic aspects of food aid for trade and competition, an overview of the international governance of food aid, and the present rules on food aid embodied in Article 10.4 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. The latest available Draft Modalities for Agriculture (December 2008) are seen as an only halfway successful implementation of the Doha mandate. A new text with better targeted disciplines and a political food aid commitment as part of the Doha Round Final Act are proposed in the conclusions.

The World Trade Organization - Law, Practice and Policy, 3rd edition

The WTO is one of the most important intergovernmental organizations in the world, yet the way in which it functions as an organization and the scope of its authority and power are still poorly understood. This comprehensively revised new edition of the acclaimed work by an outstanding team of WTO law specialists provides a complete overview of the law and practice of the WTO.

Dominance, Competition, Compromise or Consensus? Explaining Decision-Making Structures

The previous chapter uncovered important differences between decision-making structures across the 11 processes investigated by this study. As we have noted, both historically and in much contemporary literature, the Swiss political system has been described as highly consensual. And yet, when we focus on differences between decision-making structures across different policy domains, important elements appear that point toward a more conflictual style of decision-making. Both when there is a power balance between coalitions and in the presence of a dominant coalition, coalition interactions are conflictual in the majority of cases. Based on the descriptive account of these differences in Chapter 4, the present chapter studies the conditions under which given decision-making structures emerge. Under which circumstances are actors able to form a dominant coalition, and which conditions lead to a situation where power is more evenly balanced between coalitions? Which conditions lead actors to develop a conflictual rather than a consensual type of interaction? Answering these questions can give us some indication of the factors responsible for different types of decision-making structures.