Building up and sharing knowledge for better decision making on soil and water conservation in a changing mountain environment - the WOCAT experience

For successful implementation of any soil and water conservation (SWC) or sustainable land management practice, it is essential to have a proper understanding of the natural and human environment in which these practices are applied. This understanding should be based on comprehensive information concerning the application of the technologies and not solely on the technological details. The World Overview of Conservation Approaches and Technologies (WOCAT) is documenting and evaluating SWC practices worldwide, following a standardised methodology that facilitates exchange and comparison of experiences. Notwithstanding this standardisation, WOCAT allows flexible use of its outputs, adapted to different users and different environments. WOCAT offers a valuable tool for evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of SWC practices and their potential for application in other areas. Besides collecting a wealth of information, gaps in available information are also exposed, showing the need for more research in those fields. Several key issues for development- oriented research have been identified and are being addressed in collaboration with a research programme for mitigating syndromes of global change.

From Personal Network to Institution Building: The Lifanyuan and the Formalization of Manchu-Mongol Relations

The Qing emperors, who ruled over China from 1644-1911, managed to bring large parts of Inner Asia under their control and extended the territory of China to an unprecedented degree. This paper maintains that the political technique of patronage with its formalized language, its emphasis on gift exchange and expressions of courtesy is a useful concept for explaining the integration of Inner Asian confederations into the empire. By re-interpreting the obligations of gift exchange, the Qing transformed the network of personal relationships, which had to be reinforced and consolidated permanently into a system with clearly defined rules. In this process of formalization, the Lifanyuan, the Court for the Administration of the Outer Regions, played a key role. While in the early years of the dynasty, it was responsible for collecting and disseminating information concerning the various patronage relationships with Inner Asian leaders, over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries its efforts were directed at standardizing and streamlining the contacts between ethnic minorities and the state. Through the Lifanyuan, the rules and principles of patronage were maintained in a modified form even in the later part of the dynasty, when the Qing exercised control in the outer regions more directly. The paper provides an explanation for the longevity and cohesiveness of the multi-ethnic Qing empire. Based on recently published Manchu and Mongolian language archival material and the Maussian concept of gift exchange the study sheds new light on the changing self-conception of the Qing emperors.

Soil and land information: How to support decision-making?

Soils are fundamental to ensuring water, energy and food security. Within the context of sus- tainable food production, it is important to share knowledge on existing and emerging tech- nologies that support land and soil monitoring. Technologies, such as remote sensing, mobile soil testing, and digital soil mapping, have the potential to identify degraded and non- /little-responsive soils, and may also provide a basis for programmes targeting the protection and rehabilitation of soils. In the absence of such information, crop production assessments are often not based on the spatio-temporal variability in soil characteristics. In addition, uncertain- ties in soil information systems are notable and build up when predictions are used for monitor- ing soil properties or biophysical modelling. Consequently, interpretations of model-based results have to be done cautiously. As such they provide a scientific, but not always manage- able, basis for farmers and/or policymakers. In general, the key incentives for stakeholders to aim for sustainable management of soils and more resilient food systems are complex at farm as well as higher levels. The same is true of drivers of soil degradation. The decision- making process aimed at sustainable soil management, be that at farm or higher level, also in- volves other goals and objectives valued by stakeholders, e.g. land governance, improved envi- ronmental quality, climate change adaptation and mitigation etc. In this dialogue session we will share ideas on recent developments in the discourse on soils, their functions and the role of soil and land information in enhancing food system resilience.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Dissolution-Precipitation in Porous Media: Experiments and Modelling

The evolution of porosity due to dissolution/precipitation processes of minerals and the associated change of transport parameters are of major interest for natural geological environments and engineered underground structures. We designed a reproducible and fast to conduct 2D experiment, which is flexible enough to investigate several process couplings implemented in the numerical code OpenGeosys-GEM (OGS-GEM). We investigated advective-diffusive transport of solutes, effect of liquid phase density on advective transport, and kinetically controlled dissolution/precipitation reactions causing porosity changes. In addition, the system allowed to investigate the influence of microscopic (pore scale) processes on macroscopic (continuum scale) transport. A Plexiglas tank of dimension 10 × 10 cm was filled with a 1 cm thick reactive layer consisting of a bimodal grain size distribution of celestite (SrSO4) crystals, sandwiched between two layers of sand. A barium chloride solution was injected into the tank causing an asymmetric flow field to develop. As the barium chloride reached the celestite region, dissolution of celestite was initiated and barite precipitated. Due to the higher molar volume of barite, its precipitation caused a porosity decrease and thus also a decrease in the permeability of the porous medium. The change of flow in space and time was observed via injection of conservative tracers and analysis of effluents. In addition, an extensive post-mortem analysis of the reacted medium was conducted. We could successfully model the flow (with and without fluid density effects) and the transport of conservative tracers with a (continuum scale) reactive transport model. The prediction of the reactive experiments initially failed. Only the inclusion of information from post-mortem analysis gave a satisfactory match for the case where the flow field changed due to dissolution/precipitation reactions. We concentrated on the refinement of post-mortem analysis and the investigation of the dissolution/precipitation mechanisms at the pore scale. Our analytical techniques combined scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and synchrotron X-ray micro-diffraction/micro-fluorescence performed at the XAS beamline (Swiss Light Source). The newly formed phases include an epitaxial growth of barite micro-crystals on large celestite crystals (epitaxial growth) and a nano-crystalline barite phase (resulting from the dissolution of small celestite crystals) with residues of celestite crystals in the pore interstices. Classical nucleation theory, using well-established and estimated parameters describing barite precipitation, was applied to explain the mineralogical changes occurring in our system. Our pore scale investigation showed limits of the continuum scale reactive transport model. Although kinetic effects were implemented by fixing two distinct rates for the dissolution of large and small celestite crystals, instantaneous precipitation of barite was assumed as soon as oversaturation occurred. Precipitation kinetics, passivation of large celestite crystals and metastability of supersaturated solutions, i.e. the conditions under which nucleation cannot occur despite high supersaturation, were neglected. These results will be used to develop a pore scale model that describes precipitation and dissolution of crystals at the pore scale for various transport and chemical conditions. Pore scale modelling can be used to parameterize constitutive equations to introduce pore-scale corrections into macroscopic (continuum) reactive transport models. Microscopic understanding of the system is fundamental for modelling from the pore to the continuum scale.

Validation of the Swiss methane emission inventory by atmospheric observations and inverse modelling

Atmospheric inverse modelling has the potential to provide observation-based estimates of greenhouse gas emissions at the country scale, thereby allowing for an independent validation of national emission inventories. Here, we present a regional-scale inverse modelling study to quantify the emissions of methane (CH₄) from Switzerland, making use of the newly established CarboCount-CH measurement network and a high-resolution Lagrangian transport model. In our reference inversion, prior emissions were taken from the "bottom-up" Swiss Greenhouse Gas Inventory (SGHGI) as published by the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment in 2014 for the year 2012. Overall we estimate national CH₄ emissions to be 196 ± 18 Gg yr⁻¹ for the year 2013 (1σ uncertainty). This result is in close agreement with the recently revised SGHGI estimate of 206 ± 33 Gg yr⁻¹ as reported in 2015 for the year 2012. Results from sensitivity inversions using alternative prior emissions, uncertainty covariance settings, large-scale background mole fractions, two different inverse algorithms (Bayesian and extended Kalman filter), and two different transport models confirm the robustness and independent character of our estimate. According to the latest SGHGI estimate the main CH₄ source categories in Switzerland are agriculture (78 %), waste handling (15 %) and natural gas distribution and combustion (6 %). The spatial distribution and seasonal variability of our posterior emissions suggest an overestimation of agricultural CH₄ emissions by 10 to 20 % in the most recent SGHGI, which is likely due to an overestimation of emissions from manure handling. Urban areas do not appear as emission hotspots in our posterior results, suggesting that leakages from natural gas distribution are only a minor source of CH₄ in Switzerland. This is consistent with rather low emissions of 8.4 Gg yr⁻¹ reported by the SGHGI but inconsistent with the much higher value of 32 Gg yr⁻¹ implied by the EDGARv4.2 inventory for this sector. Increased CH₄ emissions (up to 30 % compared to the prior) were deduced for the north-eastern parts of Switzerland. This feature was common to most sensitivity inversions, which is a strong indicator that it is a real feature and not an artefact of the transport model and the inversion system. However, it was not possible to assign an unambiguous source process to the region. The observations of the CarboCount-CH network provided invaluable and independent information for the validation of the national bottom-up inventory. Similar systems need to be sustained to provide independent monitoring of future climate agreements.