Dog Bite Injuries: Primary and Secondary Emergency Department Presentations-A Retrospective Cohort Study

Dog bites in humans are a complex problem, embracing both public health and animal welfare. The primary aim of this study is to examine primary and secondary presentations related to dog bite injuries in adults. Methods. We retrospectively assessed all adult patients admitted with a dog bite injury to the Emergency Department of Bern University Hospital. Results. A total of 431 patients were eligible for the study. Forty-nine (11.4%) of all patients were admitted with secondary presentations. Bites to the hands were most common (177, 41.1%). All patients (47, 100%) with secondary presentations were admitted because of signs of infection. The median time since the dog bite was 3.8 days (SD 3.9, range 1–21). Thirty-one patients had already been treated with antibiotic; coamoxicillin was the most common primary antibiotic therapy (27/47 patients, 57.4%). Patients with injuries to the hand were at increased risk of secondary presentations (OR 2.08, 95% CI 1.21–3.55, < 0.006). Conclusion. Dog bite injuries to the hands are a major problem. They often lead to infectious complications. Immediate antibiotic therapy should carefully be evaluated for each patient.

Best practice in transdisciplinary research - Swiss td-award Winners 2013

Transdisciplinary research plays an increasing role in topics of societal relevance and impact. The td-net of the Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences awards innovative transdisciplinary research every other year. The last td-award was given in 2013. This special focus of GAIA features the six prize-winning projects, presenting short summaries of their work. Explaining its selection in the following introduction, the Jury of the td-net honours the awardees, and puts their work into a global perspective.

Inseparable, incapable, or invisible: Why public organizations award no-bid contracts

No-bid contracting is a highly prevalent practice in public procurement of technology services. Alt-hough no-bid contracting is a substantial problem since it reduces competition and welfare, the litera-ture lacks theoretical explanations and empirical tests for why public organizations award no-bid con-tracts. In this paper, we propose three theoretical explanations for no-bid contracting, drawing on transaction cost economics, organizational learning, and institutional theory. We also present how we test these explanations using a comprehensive sample of public procurement transactions. We expect to contribute theoretical explanations for no-bid contracting and practical implications for policy-makers.