Krise, Kritik, Kontingenz: Prolegomena zu einer neuen Poetik der Gemeinschaft

Contingency is the third term that inevitably accompanies crisis and critique. Traditionally, community has been conceived as one of the means to overcome contingency. Taking its cue from the recent work of Roberto Esposito on community and its strategies of immunization, and taking into account that globalization has led to new, contingent forms of community, the essay argues for a new poetics of community conceived as metonymic. The members of a community thus understood share nothing else but the sheer space of their coexistence. Such an approach, I argue, avoids the pitfalls of exclusion that any community conceived of as metaphoric – that is, as sharing a third element – necessarily implies.

Decision strategies for policy decisions under uncertainties: The case of mitigation measures addressing methane emissions from ruminants

Decision strategies aim at enabling reasonable decisions in cases of uncertain policy decision problems which do not meet the conditions for applying standard decision theory. This paper focuses on decision strategies that account for uncertainties by deciding whether a proposed list of policy options should be accepted or revised (scope strategies) and whether to decide now or later (timing strategies). They can be used in participatory approaches to structure the decision process. As a basis, we propose to classify the broad range of uncertainties affecting policy decision problems along two dimensions, source of uncertainty (incomplete information, inherent indeterminacy and unreliable information) and location of uncertainty (information about policy options, outcomes and values). Decision strategies encompass multiple and vague criteria to be deliberated in application. As an example, we discuss which decision strategies may account for the uncertainties related to nutritive technologies that aim at reducing methane (CH4) emissions from ruminants as a means of mitigating climate change, limiting our discussion to published scientific information. These considerations not only speak in favour of revising rather than accepting the discussed list of options, but also in favour of active postponement or semi-closure of decision-making rather than closure or passive postponement.

Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering

Taking Carnap’s classic exposition as a starting point, this paper develops a pragmatic account of the method of explication, defends it against a range of challenges and proposes a detailed recipe for the practice of explicating. It is then argued that confusions are involved in characterizing explications as definitions, and in advocating precising definitions as an alternative to explications. Explication is better characterized as conceptual re-engineering for theoretical purposes, in contrast to conceptual re-engineering for other purposes and improving exactness for purely practical reasons. Finally, three limitations which call for further development of the method of explication are discussed.

Primitive ontology and quantum state in the GRW matter density theory

The paper explains in what sense the GRW matter density theory (GRWm) is a primitive ontology theory of quantum mechanics and why, thus conceived, the standard objections against the GRW formalism do not apply to GRWm. We consider the different options for conceiving the quantum state in GRWm and argue that dispositionalism is the most attractive one.

Expanding Our Grasp: Causal Knowledge and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives

I argue that scientific realism, insofar as it is only committed to those scientific posits of which we have causal knowledge, is immune to Kyle Stanford’s argument from unconceived alternatives. This causal strategy (previously introduced, but not worked out in detail, by Anjan Chakravartty) is shown not to repeat the shortcomings of previous realist responses to Stanford’s argument. Furthermore, I show that the notion of causal knowledge underlying it can be made sufficiently precise by means of conceptual tools recently introduced into the debate on scientific realism. Finally, I apply this strategy to the case of Jean Perrin’s experimental work on the atomic hypothesis, disputing Stanford’s claim that the problem of unconceived alternatives invalidates a realist interpretation of this historical episode.