Climate Change and International Law. Exploring the Linkages Between Human Rights, Environment, Trade and Investment

Mapping the relevant principles and norms of international law, the paper discusses scientific evidence and identifies current legal foundations of climate change mitigation adaptation and communication in international environmental law, human rights protection and international trade regulation in WTO law. It briefly discusses the evolution and architecture of relevant multilateral environmental agreements, in particular the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. It discusses the potential role of human rights in identifying pertinent goals and values of mitigation and adaptation and eventually turns to principles and rules of international trade regulation and investment protection which are likely to be of crucial importance should the advent of a new multilateral agreement fail to materialize. The economic and legal relevance of rules on tariffs, border tax adjustment and subsidies, services and intellectual property and investment law are discussed in relation to the production, supply and use of energy. Moreover, lessons from trade negotiations may be drawn for negotiations of future environmental instruments. The paper offers a survey of the main interacting areas of public international law and discusses the intricate interaction of all these components informing climate change mitigation, adaptation and communication in international law in light of an emerging doctrine of multilayered governance. It seeks to contribute to greater coherence of what today is highly fragmented and rarely discussed in an overall context. The paper argues that trade regulation will be of critical importance in assessing domestic policies and potential trade remedies offer powerful incentives for all nations alike to participate in a multilateral framework defining appropriate goals and principles.

Is there a ‚Depth versus Participation‘ Dilemma in International Cooperation?

Much of the International Relations literature assumes that there is a “depth versus participation” dilemma in international politics: shallower international agreements attract more countries and greater depth is associated with less participation. We argue that this conjecture is too simple and probably misleading because the depth of any given cooperative effort is in fact multidimensional. This multidimensionality manifests itself in the design characteristics of international agreements: in particular, the specificity of obligations, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, dispute settlement mechanisms, positive incentives (assistance), and organizational structures (secretariats). We theorize that the first three of these design characteristics have negative and the latter three have positive effects on participation in international cooperative efforts. Our empirical testing of these claims relies on a dataset that covers more than 200 global environmental treaties. We find a participation-limiting effect for the specificity of obligations, but not for monitoring and enforcement. In contrast, we observe that assistance provisions in treaties have a significant and substantial positive effect on participation. Similarly, dispute settlement mechanisms tend to promote treaty participation. The main implication of our study is that countries do not appear to stay away from agreements with monitoring and enforcement provisions, but that the inclusion of positive incentives and dispute settlement mechanisms can promote international cooperation. In other words, our findings suggest that policymakers do not necessarily need to water down global treaties in order to obtain more participation.

Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: Nomination and Appointment of Judicial Candidates in the WTO Appellate Body

Scholars have increasingly theorized, and debated, the decision by states to create and delegate authority to international courts, as well as the subsequent autonomy and behavior of those courts, with principal–agent and trusteeship models disagreeing on the nature and extent of states’ influence on international judges. This article formulates and tests a set of principal–agent hypotheses about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, member states are able use their powers of judicial nomination and appointment to influence the endogenous preferences of international judges. The empirical analysis surveys the record of all judicial appointments to the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization over a 15-year period. We present a view of an AB appointment process that, far from representing a pure search for expertise, is deeply politicized and offers member-state principals opportunities to influence AB members ex ante and possibly ex post. We further demonstrate that the AB nomination process has become progressively more politicized over time as member states, responding to earlier and controversial AB decisions, became far more concerned about judicial activism and more interested in the substantive opinions of AB candidates, systematically championing candidates whose views on key issues most closely approached their own, and opposing candidates perceived to be activist or biased against their substantive preferences. Although specific to the WTO, our theory and findings have implications for the judicial politics of a large variety of global and regional international courts and tribunals.

The Design of International Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Dataset

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have been proliferating for the last twenty years. A large literature has studied various aspects of this phenomenon. Until recently, however, many large-N studies have paid only scant attention to variation across PTAs in terms of content and design. Our contribution to this literature is a new dataset on the design of trade agreements that is the most comprehensive in terms of both variables coded and agreements covered. We illustrate the dataset’s usefulness in re-visiting the questions if and to what extent PTAs impact trade flows. The analysis shows that on average PTAs increase trade flows, but that this effect is largely driven by deep agreements. In addition, we provide evidence that provisions that tackle behind-the-border regulation matter for trade flows. The dataset’s contribution is not limited to the PTA literature, however. Broader debates on topics such as institutional design and the legalization of international relations will also benefit from the novel data.

The International Law of Culture : Prospects and Challenges

This is a conference review of an event on the international law of culture, which took place in late May 2012 at the University of Göttingen, Germany. The review provides context to it considering the complex landscape of international initiatives of hard and soft law nature, which address culture and their impact on the environment, where cultural rights are to be exercised.

Book Review: Protection of Cultural Diversity from a European and International Perspective

A review of the volume of collected essays edited by Hildegard Schneider and Peter van den Bossche (Intersentia 2008), which looks at diverse implications of the recently adopted UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity and discusses these from European and international law perspectives.

International Regulation of Postal Communications

The article provides a concise overview of the rules applicable to postal communications at the international level. Particular attention is paid to the regulations of the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as the relationship between the two. Outlook on possible future developments accounting for the rapid technological advances and the liberalisation of markets wraps the analysis up. This is a 2010 update that takes into consideration the changes made in the UPU acts in 2008, as well as the latest developments in the WTO's Doha Round negotiations.