Dopaminergic modulation of rapid reality adaptation in thinking

Dopamine has long held a prominent role in the interpretation of schizophrenia and other psychoses. Clinical studies on confabulation and disorientation, disorders marked by a confusion of reality in thinking, indicated that the ability to keep thinking in phase with reality depends on a process suppressing the interference of upcoming memories that do not refer to ongoing reality. A host of animal studies and a recent clinical study suggested that this suppression might correspond to the phasic inhibition of dopaminergic neurons in response to the absence of expected outcomes. In this study, we tested healthy subjects with a difficult version of a memory paradigm on which confabulating patients had failed. Subjects participated in three test sessions, in which they received in double-blind, randomized fashion L-dopa, risperidone, or placebo. We found that l-dopa, in comparison with risperidone, impaired performance in a highly specific way, which corresponded to the pattern of patients with reality confusion. Specifically, they had an increase of false positive responses, while overall memory performance and reaction times were unaffected. We conclude that dopaminergic transmission influences the ability to rapidly adapt thinking to ongoing reality.

What was I thinking? Eye-tracking experiments underscore the bias that architecture exerts on nuclear grading in prostate cancer

We previously reported that nuclear grade assignment of prostate carcinomas is subject to a cognitive bias induced by the tumor architecture. Here, we asked whether this bias is mediated by the non-conscious selection of nuclei that "match the expectation" induced by the inadvertent glance at the tumor architecture. 20 pathologists were asked to grade nuclei in high power fields of 20 prostate carcinomas displayed on a computer screen. Unknown to the pathologists, each carcinoma was shown twice, once before a background of a low grade, tubule-rich carcinoma and once before the background of a high grade, solid carcinoma. Eye tracking allowed to identify which nuclei the pathologists fixated during the 8 second projection period. For all 20 pathologists, nuclear grade assignment was significantly biased by tumor architecture. Pathologists tended to fixate on bigger, darker, and more irregular nuclei when those were projected before kigh grade, solid carcinomas than before low grade, tubule-rich carcinomas (and vice versa). However, the morphometric differences of the selected nuclei accounted for only 11% of the architecture-induced bias, suggesting that it can only to a small part be explained by the unconscious fixation on nuclei that "match the expectation". In conclusion, selection of « matching nuclei » represents an unconscious effort to vindicate the gravitation of nuclear grades towards the tumor architecture.

An update in thinking about nonorganic voice disorders

OBJECTIVE: To describe and evaluate psychosocial factors in nonorganic voice disorders (NVDs). Nonorganic voice disorders are presumed to be the result of increased muscular tension that is caused to varying extents by vocal misuse and emotional stress. It is therefore necessary to include both of these in the diagnosis and treatment of patients with voice disorders. DESIGN: Clinical survey. SETTING: Academic tertiary referral center. PATIENTS: To evaluate psychosocial factors in NVDs, a sample of 74 patients with NVDs was examined psychologically using the Giessen Test and Picture Frustration Test. The results were compared with a control group of 19 patients with an organic dysphonia (vocal cord paralysis). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Six scales of the Giessen Test (social response, dominance, control, underlying mood, permeability, and social potency), 3 reaction types of the Picture Frustration Test (obstacle dominance, ego defense, and need persistence), and 3 aggression categories of the Picture Frustration Test (extrapunitivity, intropunitivity, and impunitivity). RESULTS: The most striking significant difference between the 2 groups was that in conflict situations, patients with NVDs sought a quick solution or expected other people to provide one, which prevented them from understanding the underlying causes of the conflict. CONCLUSIONS: Only if the psychosocial aspects are taken into account can patients with NVD be offered a therapy that treats the causes of the voice disorder. It must be decided individually whether and when a voice training approach or a more psychological-psychotherapeutical approach is preferable.

Brain electric microstates and momentary conscious mind states as building blocks of spontaneous thinking: I. Visual imagery and abstract thoughts

Prompted reports of recall of spontaneous, conscious experiences were collected in a no-input, no-task, no-response paradigm (30 random prompts to each of 13 healthy volunteers). The mentation reports were classified into visual imagery and abstract thought. Spontaneous 19-channel brain electric activity (EEG) was continuously recorded, viewed as series of momentary spatial distributions (maps) of the brain electric field and segmented into microstates, i.e. into time segments characterized by quasi-stable landscapes of potential distribution maps which showed varying durations in the sub-second range. Microstate segmentation used a data-driven strategy. Different microstates, i.e. different brain electric landscapes must have been generated by activity of different neural assemblies and therefore are hypothesized to constitute different functions. The two types of reported experiences were associated with significantly different microstates (mean duration 121 ms) immediately preceding the prompts; these microstates showed, across subjects, for abstract thought (compared to visual imagery) a shift of the electric gravity center to the left and a clockwise rotation of the field axis. Contrariwise, the microstates 2 s before the prompt did not differ between the two types of experiences. The results support the hypothesis that different microstates of the brain as recognized in its electric field implement different conscious, reportable mind states, i.e. different classes (types) of thoughts (mentations); thus, the microstates might be candidates for the `atoms of thought'.

Action crisis and cost–benefit thinking: A cognitive analysis of a goal-disengagement phase

The present research is based on the notion that disengagement from goals is not a discrete event but a process (Klinger, 1975). A critical phase in this process is when difficulties and setbacks in striving for a goal accumulate. This critical phase is termed here as an action crisis. Given the profound effects that people's thoughts have on their self-regulatory efficiency, it is essential to understand the cognitive correlates of an action crisis. In two experimental lab and two correlational field studies, the hypothesis that goal-related costs and benefits become cognitively highly accessible during an action crisis was tested and supported. Participants who were experiencing an action crisis in such diverse goal areas as intimate relationships, sports, and university studies, thought about goal-related costs and benefits more intensively and frequently in comparison to participants who were not in an action crisis. In an incidental learning task they recognized more of cost–benefit-items and less of implementation-items than the control group. Results are interpreted in terms of action phase specific mindsets (Gollwitzer, 1990, 2012).

Do untrustworthy faces facilitate the recognition of antonyms? A critical analysis of thinking the opposite under distrust

Distrust should automatically activate a "thinking the opposite". Thus, according to Schul, Mayo and Burnstein (2004), subjects detect antonyms of adjectives faster when confronted with untrustworthy rather than trustworthy faces. We conducted four experiments within their paradigm to test whether the response latency of detecting antonyms remains stable. We introduced the following changes: the paradigm was applied with and without an induction phase, faces were culturally adapted, the stimuli were presented according more to priming rules, and the canonicity of antonyms was controlled. Results show that the response latency of detecting antonyms is difficult to predict. Even if faces are culturally adapted and priming rules are applied more strictly, response latency depends on whether the induction phase is applied and on the canonicity of antonyms rather than on the trustworthiness of faces. In general, this paradigm seems not to be appropriate to test thinking the opposite under distrust.