The meanings of pasture in resource degradation negotiations: Evidence from post-socialist rural Kyrgyzstan

Pasture use in the Kyrgyz Republic has changed significantly as a result of fundamental political, economic, and societal changes following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent changes in people’s livelihoods. Government institutions criticize current land use patterns as unsustainable and the cause of degradation. But at the local level, pasture quality is rarely seen as a major problem. This article uses a qualitative approach to examine the tension between these views and addresses current land use practices and related narratives about pasture degradation in rural Kyrgyzstan. By focusing on meanings ascribed to pastures, it shows how people closely relate current practices to the experiences and value systems of the Soviet period and to changing identities emerging in the post-Soviet transformation process. It argues that proper understanding of resource degradation issues requires adequate consideration of the context of meaning constructed by local resource users when they make sense of their environment.

The EU’s Choice of Regulatory Venues for Trade Negotiations: A Tale of Agency Power?

This article focuses on the EU’s strategy for choosing regulatory venues to negotiate trade agreements. It analyses the existence of a clear venue hierarchy since the late 1990s and the recent change leading to a blurring of any clear preference for using bilateral, inter-regional or multilateral settings. The article challenges domestic explanations of the EU’s choice of venue, stressing the autonomy of the Commission as a major factor. Using a principal-agent framework, it shows that the Commission’s agenda-setting powers, the existence of interest divergence among principals (e.g. Member States, business groups) and the multi-level system facilitate agency.

European Union Meets South Korea: Bureaucratic Interests, Exporter Discrimination and the Negotiations of Trade Agreements

Who in the European Union drives the process of pursuing bilateral trade negotiations? In contrast to societal explanations, this article develops a novel argument as to how the European Commission manages the process and uses its position in strategic ways to pursue its interests. Rooted in principal–agent theory, the article discusses agent preferences and theorizes the conditions under which the agent sets specific focal points and interacts strategically with principals and third parties. The argument is discussed with case study evidence drawn from the first trade agreement concluded and ratified since the EU Commission announced its new strategy in 2006: the EU–South Korea trade agreement

Persistent Deadlock in Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Case of Doha

The history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations is full of anecdotes on missed deadlines, failed ministerial conferences, and brinkmanship situations. Tactics such as walking away from the table or sleep-depriving night sessions are legendary in the context of attempting to overcome impasse in negotiations. This article traces and explains the recurrent deadlock in the Doha Round negotiations. It identifies four structural/contextual factors – ideas, institutions, interests, and information – as necessary for understanding and anticipating potential deadlocks. The article also offers a definition of deadlock, and discusses a set of factors highlighted in the international relations literature that explain the existence and persistence of deadlock. With the help of game theory, it then illustrates the challenges faced by actors during trade negotiations. The article concludes by outlining two general scenarios for the Doha Development Agenda and discusses their implications for the World Trade Organization.

Saving the Australian War Effort in 1916? The Significance and Impact of Global Climatic Conditions and Pests on William Morris Hughes’ Negotiations with the British Government

Taking up the thesis of Dipesh Chakrabarty (2009) that human history (including cultural history) on the one hand and natural history on the other must be brought into conversation more than has been done so in the past, this presentation will focus more closely on the significance and the impact of global climatic conditions and pests on the negotiations that Australian Prime Minister William Morris Hughes carried on with the British government between March and November 1916. Whereas Australia had been able to sell most of its produce in 1914 and 1915 the situation looked more serious in 1916, not least due to the growing shortage in shipping. It was therefore imperative for the Australian government to find a way to solve this problem, not least because it wanted to keep up its own war effort at the pace it had been going so far. In this context intentions to make or press ahead with a contribution to a war perceived to be more total those of the past interacted with natural phenomena such as the declining harvest in many parts of the world in 1916 as a consequence of climatic conditions as well as pests in many parts of the world.

The effect of superiors' exogenous constraints on budget negotiations

In a world characterized by increasing pressure from financial and product markets, the question of how exogenous constraints affect internal coordination and control processes has become increasingly important. This experiment investigates how two exogenous constraints that superiors can face in budget negotiation settings, increased opportunity costs and financial pressure to meet unit targets, affect budget negotiations and subordinate effort. The results show that both constraints induce more cooperation, but in different ways. Financial pressure on the superior leads to more cooperative negotiation behavior by superiors and subordinates than increased opportunity costs. Specifically, subordinates do not take advantage of the superior's increased financial pressure to enforce lower budgets. After negotiation, both constraints strongly mitigate the negative effects of superior budget imposition on subordinate effort because exogenous constraints eliminate the effect of procedural fairness considerations on subordinate effort.