On the geometry of the spin-statistics connection in quantum mechanics

The Spin-Statistics theorem states that the statistics of a system of identical particles is determined by their spin: Particles of integer spin are Bosons (i.e. obey Bose-Einstein statistics), whereas particles of half-integer spin are Fermions (i.e. obey Fermi-Dirac statistics). Since the original proof by Fierz and Pauli, it has been known that the connection between Spin and Statistics follows from the general principles of relativistic Quantum Field Theory. In spite of this, there are different approaches to Spin-Statistics and it is not clear whether the theorem holds under assumptions that are different, and even less restrictive, than the usual ones (e.g. Lorentz-covariance). Additionally, in Quantum Mechanics there is a deep relation between indistinguishabilty and the geometry of the configuration space. This is clearly illustrated by Gibbs' paradox. Therefore, for many years efforts have been made in order to find a geometric proof of the connection between Spin and Statistics. Recently, various proposals have been put forward, in which an attempt is made to derive the Spin-Statistics connection from assumptions different from the ones used in the relativistic, quantum field theoretic proofs. Among these, there is the one due to Berry and Robbins (BR), based on the postulation of a certain single-valuedness condition, that has caused a renewed interest in the problem. In the present thesis, we consider the problem of indistinguishability in Quantum Mechanics from a geometric-algebraic point of view. An approach is developed to study configuration spaces Q having a finite fundamental group, that allows us to describe different geometric structures of Q in terms of spaces of functions on the universal cover of Q. In particular, it is shown that the space of complex continuous functions over the universal cover of Q admits a decomposition into C(Q)-submodules, labelled by the irreducible representations of the fundamental group of Q, that can be interpreted as the spaces of sections of certain flat vector bundles over Q. With this technique, various results pertaining to the problem of quantum indistinguishability are reproduced in a clear and systematic way. Our method is also used in order to give a global formulation of the BR construction. As a result of this analysis, it is found that the single-valuedness condition of BR is inconsistent. Additionally, a proposal aiming at establishing the Fermi-Bose alternative, within our approach, is made.

The structuring body : a critical study in the description & explanation of perceptual experience

The aims of the dissertation are to find the right description of the structure of perceptual experience and to explore the ways in which the structure of the body might serve to explain it. In the first two parts, I articulate and defend the claim that perceptual experience seems direct and the claim that its objects seem real. I defend these claims as integral parts of a coherent metaphysically neutral conception of perceptual experience. Sense-datum theorists, certain influential perceptual psychologists, and early modern philosophers (most notably Berkeley) all disputed the claim that perceptual experience seems direct. In Part I, I argue that the grounds on which they did so were poor. The aim is then, in Part II, to give a proper appreciation of the distinctive intentionality of perceptual experience whilst remaining metaphysically neutral. I do so by drawing on the early work of Edmund Husserl, providing a characterisation of the perceptual experience of objects as real, qua mind-independent particulars. In Part III, I explore two possible explanations of the structure characterising the intentionality of perceptual experience, both of which accord a distinctive explanatory role to the body. On one account, perceptual experience is structured by an implicit pre-reflective consciousness of oneself as a body engaged in perceptual activity. An alternative account makes no appeal to the metaphysically laden concept of a bodily self. It seeks to explain the structure of perceptual experience by appeal to anticipation of the structural constraints of the body. I develop this alternative by highlighting the conceptual and empirical basis for the idea that a first-order structural affordance relation holds between a bodily agent and certain properties of its body. I then close with a discussion of the shared background assumptions that ought to inform disputes over whether the body itself (in addition to its representation) ought to serve as an explanans in such an account.