The study of a novel zinc finger gene cluster TZF and a genomic region flanking the histone H 4 replacement gene H 4 r of Drosophila melanogaster

Part I : A zinc finger gene Tzf1 was cloned in the earlier work of the lab by screening a ë-DASH2 cDNA expression library with an anti-Rat SC antibody. A ë-DASH2 genomic DNA library and cosmid lawrist 4 genomic DNA library were screened with the cDNA fragment of Tzf1 to determine the genomic organization of Tzf1. Another putative zinc finger gene Tzf2 was found about 700 bp upstream of Tzf1.RACE experiment was carried out for both genes to establish the whole length cDNA. The cDNA sequences of Tzf and Tzf2 were used to search the Flybase (Version Nov, 2000). They correspond to two genes found in the Flybase, CG4413 and CG4936. The CG4413 transcript seems to be a splicing variant of Tzf transcripts. Another two zinc finger genes Tzf3 and Tzf4 were discovered in silico. They are located 300 bp away from Tzf and Tzf2, and a non-tandem cluster was formed by the four genes. All four genes encode proteins with a very similar modular structure, since they all have five C2H2 type zinc fingers at their c-terminal ends. This is the most compact zinc finger protein gene cluster found in Drosophila melanogaster.Part II: 34,056 bp insert of the cosmid 19G11

A dictionary of modular threefolds

The thesis deals with the modularity conjecture for three-dimensional Calabi-Yau varieties. This is a generalization of the work of A. Wiles and others on modularity of elliptic curves. Modularity connects the number of points on varieties with coefficients of certain modular forms. In chapter 1 we collect the basics on arithmetic on Calabi-Yau manifolds, including general modularity results and strategies for modularity proofs. In chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 we investigate examples of modular Calabi-Yau threefolds, including all examples occurring in the literature and many new ones. Double octics, i.e. Double coverings of projective 3-space branched along an octic surface, are studied in detail. In chapter 6 we deal with examples connected with the same modular forms. According to the Tate conjecture there should be correspondences between them. Many correspondences are constructed explicitly. We finish by formulating conjectures on the occurring newforms, especially their levels. In the appendices we compile tables of coefficients of weight 2 and weight 4 newforms and many examples of double octics.

The structuring body : a critical study in the description & explanation of perceptual experience

The aims of the dissertation are to find the right description of the structure of perceptual experience and to explore the ways in which the structure of the body might serve to explain it. In the first two parts, I articulate and defend the claim that perceptual experience seems direct and the claim that its objects seem real. I defend these claims as integral parts of a coherent metaphysically neutral conception of perceptual experience. Sense-datum theorists, certain influential perceptual psychologists, and early modern philosophers (most notably Berkeley) all disputed the claim that perceptual experience seems direct. In Part I, I argue that the grounds on which they did so were poor. The aim is then, in Part II, to give a proper appreciation of the distinctive intentionality of perceptual experience whilst remaining metaphysically neutral. I do so by drawing on the early work of Edmund Husserl, providing a characterisation of the perceptual experience of objects as real, qua mind-independent particulars. In Part III, I explore two possible explanations of the structure characterising the intentionality of perceptual experience, both of which accord a distinctive explanatory role to the body. On one account, perceptual experience is structured by an implicit pre-reflective consciousness of oneself as a body engaged in perceptual activity. An alternative account makes no appeal to the metaphysically laden concept of a bodily self. It seeks to explain the structure of perceptual experience by appeal to anticipation of the structural constraints of the body. I develop this alternative by highlighting the conceptual and empirical basis for the idea that a first-order structural affordance relation holds between a bodily agent and certain properties of its body. I then close with a discussion of the shared background assumptions that ought to inform disputes over whether the body itself (in addition to its representation) ought to serve as an explanans in such an account.