Reparation and enforcement of judgments : a comparative analysis of the European and Inter-American human rights systems

The inter-American human rights system has been conceived following the example of the European system under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) before it was modified by Protocol No 11. However, two important differences exist. First, the authority of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to order reparation has been strictly limited by the principle of subsidiarity. Thus, the ECtHR's main function is to determine whether the ECHR has been violated. Beyond the declaratory effect of its judgments, according to Article 41 ECHR, it may only "afford just satisfaction to the injured party". The powers of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) were conceived in a much broader fashion in Article 63 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), giving the Court the authority to order a variety of individual and general measures aimed at obtaining restitutio in integrum. The first main part of this thesis shows how both Courts have developed their reparation practice and examines the advantages and disadvantages of each approach. Secondly, the ECtHR's rather limited reparation powers have, interestingly, been combined with an elaborate implementation system that includes several of the Council of Europe's organs, principally the Committee of Ministers. In the Inter-American System, no dedicated mechanism was implemented to oversee compliance with the IACtHR's judgments. The ACHR limits itself to inviting the Court to point out in its annual reports the cases that have not been complied with and to propose measures to be adopted by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States. The General Assembly, however, hardly ever took action. The IACtHR has therefore filled this gap by developing a proper procedure to oversee compliance with its judgments. Both the European and the American solutions to ensure compliance are presented and compared in the second main part of this thesis. Finally, based on the results of both main parts, a comparative analysis of the reparation practice and the execution results in both human rights systems is being provided, aimed at developing proposals for the improvement of the functioning of either human rights protection system.

Conceptual and normative issues of memory enhancement

Our growing understanding of human mind and cognition and the development of neurotechnology has triggered debate around cognitive enhancement in neuroethics. The dissertation examines the normative issues of memory enhancement, and focuses on two issues: (1) the distinction between memory treatment and enhancement; and (2) how the issue of authenticity concerns memory interventions, including memory treatments and enhancements. rnThe first part consists of a conceptual analysis of the concepts required for normative considerations. First, the representational nature and the function of memory are discussed. Memory is regarded as a special form of self-representation resulting from a constructive processes. Next, the concepts of selfhood, personhood, and identity are examined and a conceptual tool—the autobiographical self-model (ASM)—is introduced. An ASM is a collection of mental representations of the system’s relations with its past and potential future states. Third, the debate between objectivist and constructivist views of health are considered. I argue for a phenomenological account of health, which is based on the primacy of illness and negative utilitarianism.rnThe second part presents a synthesis of the relevant normative issues based on the conceptual tools developed. I argue that memory enhancement can be distinguished from memory treatment using a demarcation regarding the existence of memory-related suffering. That is, memory enhancements are, under standard circumstances and without any unwilling suffering or potential suffering resulting from the alteration of memory functions, interventions that aim to manipulate memory function based on the self-interests of the individual. I then consider the issue of authenticity, namely whether memory intervention or enhancement endangers “one’s true self”. By analyzing two conceptions of authenticity—authenticity as self-discovery and authenticity as self-creation, I propose that authenticity should be understood in terms of the satisfaction of the functional constraints of an ASM—synchronic coherence, diachronic coherence, and global veridicality. This framework provides clearer criteria for considering the relevant concerns and allows us to examine the moral values of authenticity. rn