On The Timing of Default Losses: When and Why?

At the light of what happened in 2010 and 2011, a lot of European countries founded themselves in a difficult position where all the credit rating agencies were downgrading debt states. Problem of solvency and guarantees on the states' bond were perceived as too risky for a Monetary Union as Europe is. Fear of a contagion from Greece as well was threatening the other countries as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland; while Germany and France asked for a division between risky and riskless bond in order to feel more safe. Our paper gets inspiration by Roch and Uhlig (2011), it refers to the Argentinian case examined by Arellano (2008) and examine possible interventions as monetization or bailout as proposed by Cole and Kehoe (2000). We propose a model in which a state defaults and cannot repay a fraction of the old bond; but contrary to Roch and Uhlig that where considering a one-time cost of default we consider default as an accumulation of losses, perceived as unpaid fractions of the old debts. Our contributions to literature is that default immediately imply that economy faces a bad period and, accumulating losses, government will be worse-off. We studied a function for this accumulation of debt period by period, in order to get an idea of the magnitude of this waste of resources that economy will face when experiences a default. Our thesis is that bailouts just postpone the day of reckoning (Roch, Uhlig); so it's better to default before accumulate a lot of debts. What Europe need now is the introduction of new reforms in a controlled default where the Eurozone will be saved in its whole integrity and a state could fail with the future promise of a resurrection. As experience show us, governments are not interested into reducing debts since there are ECB interventions. That clearly create a distortion between countries in the same monetary union, giving to the states just an illusion about their future debtor position.