Essays on the political economy of European integration

Recently, a rising interest in political and economic integration/disintegration issues has been developed in the political economy field. This growing strand of literature partly draws on traditional issues of fiscal federalism and optimum public good provision and focuses on a trade-off between the benefits of centralization, arising from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of harmonizing policies as a consequence of the increased heterogeneity of individual preferences in an international union or in a country composed of at least two regions. This thesis stems from this strand of literature and aims to shed some light on two highly relevant aspects of the political economy of European integration. The first concerns the role of public opinion in the integration process; more precisely, how economic benefits and costs of integration shape citizens' support for European Union (EU) membership. The second is the allocation of policy competences among different levels of government: European, national and regional. Chapter 1 introduces the topics developed in this thesis by reviewing the main recent theoretical developments in the political economy analysis of integration processes. It is structured as follows. First, it briefly surveys a few relevant articles on economic theories of integration and disintegration processes (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina et al. 2000, Casella and Feinstein 2002) and discusses their relevance for the study of the impact of economic benefits and costs on public opinion attitude towards the EU. Subsequently, it explores the links existing between such political economy literature and theories of fiscal federalism, especially with regard to normative considerations concerning the optimal allocation of competences in a union. Chapter 2 firstly proposes a model of citizens’ support for membership of international unions, with explicit reference to the EU; subsequently it tests the model on a panel of EU countries. What are the factors that influence public opinion support for the European Union (EU)? In international relations theory, the idea that citizens' support for the EU depends on material benefits deriving from integration, i.e. whether European integration makes individuals economically better off (utilitarian support), has been common since the 1970s, but has never been the subject of a formal treatment (Hix 2005). A small number of studies in the 1990s have investigated econometrically the link between national economic performance and mass support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Kalthenthaler 1996), but only making informal assumptions. The main aim of Chapter 2 is thus to propose and test our model with a view to providing a more complete and theoretically grounded picture of public support for the EU. Following theories of utilitarian support, we assume that citizens are in favour of membership if they receive economic benefits from it. To develop this idea, we propose a simple political economic model drawing on the recent economic literature on integration and disintegration processes. The basic element is the existence of a trade-off between the benefits of centralisation and the costs of harmonising policies in presence of heterogeneous preferences among countries. The approach we follow is that of the recent literature on the political economy of international unions and the unification or break-up of nations (Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina and Wacziarg 1999, Alesina et al. 2001, 2005a, to mention only the relevant). The general perspective is that unification provides returns to scale in the provision of public goods, but reduces each member state’s ability to determine its most favoured bundle of public goods. In the simple model presented in Chapter 2, support for membership of the union is increasing in the union’s average income and in the loss of efficiency stemming from being outside the union, and decreasing in a country’s average income, while increasing heterogeneity of preferences among countries points to a reduced scope of the union. Afterwards we empirically test the model with data on the EU; more precisely, we perform an econometric analysis employing a panel of member countries over time. The second part of Chapter 2 thus tries to answer the following question: does public opinion support for the EU really depend on economic factors? The findings are broadly consistent with our theoretical expectations: the conditions of the national economy, differences in income among member states and heterogeneity of preferences shape citizens’ attitude towards their country’s membership of the EU. Consequently, this analysis offers some interesting policy implications for the present debate about ratification of the European Constitution and, more generally, about how the EU could act in order to gain more support from the European public. Citizens in many member states are called to express their opinion in national referenda, which may well end up in rejection of the Constitution, as recently happened in France and the Netherlands, triggering a European-wide political crisis. These events show that nowadays understanding public attitude towards the EU is not only of academic interest, but has a strong relevance for policy-making too. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the link between European integration and regional autonomy in Italy. Over the last few decades, the double tendency towards supranationalism and regional autonomy, which has characterised some European States, has taken a very interesting form in this country, because Italy, besides being one of the founding members of the EU, also implemented a process of decentralisation during the 1970s, further strengthened by a constitutional reform in 2001. Moreover, the issue of the allocation of competences among the EU, the Member States and the regions is now especially topical. The process leading to the drafting of European Constitution (even if then it has not come into force) has attracted much attention from a constitutional political economy perspective both on a normative and positive point of view (Breuss and Eller 2004, Mueller 2005). The Italian parliament has recently passed a new thorough constitutional reform, still to be approved by citizens in a referendum, which includes, among other things, the so called “devolution”, i.e. granting the regions exclusive competence in public health care, education and local police. Following and extending the methodology proposed in a recent influential article by Alesina et al. (2005b), which only concentrated on the EU activity (treaties, legislation, and European Court of Justice’s rulings), we develop a set of quantitative indicators measuring the intensity of the legislative activity of the Italian State, the EU and the Italian regions from 1973 to 2005 in a large number of policy categories. By doing so, we seek to answer the following broad questions. Are European and regional legislations substitutes for state laws? To what extent are the competences attributed by the European treaties or the Italian Constitution actually exerted in the various policy areas? Is their exertion consistent with the normative recommendations from the economic literature about their optimum allocation among different levels of government? The main results show that, first, there seems to be a certain substitutability between EU and national legislations (even if not a very strong one), but not between regional and national ones. Second, the EU concentrates its legislative activity mainly in international trade and agriculture, whilst social policy is where the regions and the State (which is also the main actor in foreign policy) are more active. Third, at least two levels of government (in some cases all of them) are significantly involved in the legislative activity in many sectors, even where the rationale for that is, at best, very questionable, indicating that they actually share a larger number of policy tasks than that suggested by the economic theory. It appears therefore that an excessive number of competences are actually shared among different levels of government. From an economic perspective, it may well be recommended that some competences be shared, but only when the balance between scale or spillover effects and heterogeneity of preferences suggests so. When, on the contrary, too many levels of government are involved in a certain policy area, the distinction between their different responsibilities easily becomes unnecessarily blurred. This may not only leads to a slower and inefficient policy-making process, but also risks to make it too complicate to understand for citizens, who, on the contrary, should be able to know who is really responsible for a certain policy when they vote in national,local or European elections or in referenda on national or European constitutional issues.

'Defending the rights'. An integrated model of collective action for "public water" in Italy

In many communities, supplying water for the people is a huge task and the fact that this essential service can be carried out by the private sector respecting the right to water, is a debated issue. This dissertation investigates the mechanisms through which a 'perceived rights violation' - which represents a specific form of perceived injustice which derives from the violation of absolute moral principles – can promote collective action. Indeed, literature on morality and collective action suggests that even if many people apparently sustain high moral principles (like human rights), only a minority decides to act in order to defend them. Taking advantage of the political situation in Italy, and the recent mobilization for "public water" we hypothesized that, because of its "sacred value", the perceived violation of the right to water facilitates identification with the social movement and activism. Through five studies adopting qualitative and quantitative methods, we confirmed our hypotheses demonstrating that the perceived violation of the right to water can sustain activism and it can influence vote intentions at the referendum for 'public water'. This path to collective action coexists with other 'classical' predictors of collective action, like instrumental factors (personal advantages, efficacy beliefs) and anger. The perceived rights violation can derive both from personal values (i.e. universalism) and external factors (i.e. a mobilization campaign). Furthermore, we demonstrated that it is possible to enhance the perceived violation of the right to water and anger through a specifically designed communication campaign. The final chapter summarizes the main findings and discusses the results, suggesting some innovative line of research for collective action literature.

Reti socievoli: l’impatto dei social networks nella costruzione dello spazio pubblico

La tesi si è consolidata nell’analisi dell’impatto dei social networks nella costruzione dello spazio pubblico, nella sfera di osservazione che è la rete e il web2.0. Osservando che il paradigma della società civile si sia modificato. Ridefinendo immagini e immaginari e forme di autorappresentazione sui new media (Castells, 2010). Nel presupposto che lo spazio pubblico “non è mai una realtà precostituita” (Innerarity, 2008) ma si muove all’interno di reti che generano e garantiscono socievolezza. Nell’obiettivo di capire cosa è spazio pubblico. Civic engagement che si rafforza in spazi simbolici (Sassen, 2008), nodi d’incontro significativi. Ivi cittadini-consumatori avanzano corresponsabilmente le proprie istanze per la debacle nei governi.. Cultura partecipativa che prende mossa da un nuovo senso civico mediato che si esprime nelle “virtù” del consumo critico. Portando la politica sul mercato. Cultura civica autoattualizzata alla ricerca di soluzioni alle crisi degli ultimi anni. Potere di una comunicazione che riduce il mondo ad un “villaggio globale” e mettono in relazione i pubblici connessi in spazi e tempi differenti, dando origine ad azioni collettive come nel caso degli Indignados, di Occupy Wall Street o di Rai per una notte. Emerge un (ri)pensare la citizenship secondo due paradigmi (Bennett,2008): l’uno orientato al governo attraverso i partiti, modello “Dutiful Citizenship”; l’altro, modello “Self Actualizing Citizenship” per cui i pubblici attivi seguono news ed eventi, percepiscono un minor obbligo nel governo, il voto è meno significativo per (s)fiducia nei media e nei politici. Mercato e società civile si muovono per il bene comune e una nuova “felicità”. La partecipazione si costituisce in consumerismo politico all’interno di reti in cui si sviluppano azioni individuali attraverso il social networking e scelte di consumo responsabile. Partendo dall’etnografia digitale, si è definito il modello “4 C”: Conoscenza > Coadesione > Co-partecipazione > Corresposabilità (azioni collettive) > Cultura-bility.

Deleghe di voto e acquisto del controllo nelle societa' quotate

A fronte dal recepimento del direttiva SHR nel nostro ordinamento, realizzato dal d.lgs. 27/2010, il presente lavoro si propone anzitutto di analizzare l'attuale ruolo della delega di voto - sollecitata e non - per poi verificare quale sia l'interesse concretamente sotteso a un voto così esercitato, con particolare attenzione alla sollecitazione di deleghe di voto, oggi destinata espressamente (per la prevalente dottrina) a consentire al promotore il perseguimento di interessi propri. Le considerazioni riguardo all'interesse concretamente sotteso al voto esercitato per delega portano a vagliarne la rilevanza ai fini della nozione di controllo, ex art. 2359 c.c., la quale esclude espressamente dai voti rilevanti esclusivamente quelli esercitati "per conto terzi", e non, dunque, anche quelli esercitati nell'interesse proprio da un soggetto non titolare della partecipazione. Viene quindi affrontata la principale critica ad un controllo raggiunto per tale via e, più in generale, attraverso una delle varie forme di dissociazione tra titolarità della partecipazione e legittimazione all'esercizio del voto ad essa relativo, ovvero la apparente mancanza di stabilità. Considerando tuttavia che ogni ipotesi di controllo c.d. di fatto per definizione non gode di stabilità se non si scelga di ammettere una valutazione di tale requisito necessariamente prognostica ed ex ante, si giunge alla conclusione che la fattispecie di un controllo acquisito tramite sollecitazione di deleghe si distingue da altre ipotesi di controllo di fatto esclusivamente per la maggiore difficoltà dell'accertamento in fatto del requisito della stabilità. Si affronta infine la possibilità di garantire il diritto di exit (ovvero una tutela risarcitoria) del socio di minoranza che veda modificate le condizioni di rischio del proprio investimento a causa di una modifica del soggetto controllante derivante da sollecitazione di deleghe, tramite applicazione diretta della disciplina OPA ovvero riconducendo la fattispecie all'art. 2497quater, lett. d, ove ne ricorrano i presupposti.

La partecipazione popolare nell'esperienza dei referendum comunali

I Comuni incarnano idealmente delle piazze in cui il dibattito politico può svilupparsi in assenza di particolari filtri ed intermediazioni, con un rapporto diretto tra cittadini ed istituzioni. Essi costituiscono uno snodo di centrale importanza nell'esercizio della sovranità popolare e, al contempo, sono terreno fertile per la sperimentazione di modelli di partecipazione democratica. Prendendo come punto di vista l'esperienza dei Comuni italiani, si è scelto di focalizzare l'attenzione su uno degli strumenti “istituzionali” – nonché uno tra i più tradizionali – di partecipazione popolare, ovvero il referendum, nelle diverse forme ed accezioni che rientrano nel campo semantico di tale espressione. Questa è generalmente impiegata per indicare tutte quelle votazioni popolari non elettive su questioni politicamente rilevanti, formulate attraverso un quesito con due o più risposte alternative tra loro. L'analisi della disciplina legislativa degli istituti di partecipazione negli enti locali e lo studio delle disposizioni statutarie e regolamentari previste dai singoli Comuni, nonché le informazioni raccolte da alcuni casi di studio, rappresentano, in questo contesto, l'occasione per indagare le caratteristiche peculiari dell'istituto referendario, la sua effettività ed il suo impatto sulla forma di governo. In particolare, si è verificata positivamente la compatibilità del referendum, classificato dalla prevalente dottrina come istituto di democrazia diretta, con le forme attuali di democrazia rappresentativa. Si è tentato, altresì, un accostamento ai concetti di democrazia partecipativa e deliberativa, evidenziando come manchi del tutto, nel procedimento referendario (che pure è dotato di massima inclusività) un momento di confronto “deliberativo”. Il raffronto tra le esperienze riscontrate nei diversi Comuni ha consentito, inoltre, di ricercare le cause di alcuni aspetti critici (scarsa affluenza, mancata trasformazione del voto in decisioni politiche, aumento del conflitto) e, al contempo, di individuarne possibili soluzioni, tracciate sulla scorta delle migliori pratiche rilevate.

Law, Informal Institutions and Trust: an Experimental Perspective

This dissertation has studied how legal and non-legal mechanisms affect the levels of trust and trustworthiness in an economy, and whether and when subtle psychological factors are crucial for establishing trust and even for recovering trust from a breach of contract. The first Chapter has addressed the question of whether formal legal enforcement crowds out or crowds in the amount of trust in a society. We find that formal legal mechanisms, especially formal contracts backed by a powerful authority, normally undermine trust except when they are perceived as legitimate, or when there are no strong social norms of fairness (i.e. the population in a society is considerably heterogeneous), or when the environment in which repeated commercial relationships take place becomes highly uncertain. The second Chapter has examined whether the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment institution can help a society coordinate on an efficient outcome, characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness. The experimental results show that the endogenous introduction of collective punishment by means of a majority-voting rule does not significantly improve coordination on the efficient equilibrium. Not all subjects seem to be able to anticipate the change in behavior induced by the introduction of the mechanism, and a majority of them vote against it. The third Chapter has explored whether high-trustors adapt their behavior in response to others’ trustworthiness or untrustworthiness more quickly, which in turn supports them to maintain higher default expectations of others’ trustworthiness relative to low-trustors. Our experimental results reveal that high-trustors are better than low-trustors at predicting others’ trustworthiness because they are less susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and thereby have a higher willingness to acquire the valuable information about their partner’s actions.