Export Supply Chain Organization and Food Safety and Quality Standards: a case study of the Moroccan Fruit and Vegetable Sector

Agri-food supply chains extend beyond national boundaries, partially facilitated by a policy environment that encourages more liberal international trade. Rising concentration within the downstream sector has driven a shift towards “buyer-driven” global value chains (GVCs) extending internationally with global sourcing and the emergence of multinational key economic players that compete with increase emphasis on product quality attributes. Agri-food systems are thus increasingly governed by a range of inter-related public and private standards, both of which are becoming a priori mandatory, especially in supply chains for high-value and quality-differentiated agri-food products and tend to strongly affect upstream agricultural practices, firms’ internal organization and strategic behaviour and to shape the food chain organization. Notably, increasing attention has been given to the impact of SPS measures on agri-food trade and notably on developing countries’ export performance. Food and agricultural trade is the vital link in the mutual dependency of the global trade system and developing countries. Hence, developing countries derive a substantial portion of their income from food and agricultural trade. In Morocco, fruit and vegetable (especially fresh) are the primary agricultural export. Because of the labor intensity, this sector (especially citrus and tomato) is particularly important in terms of income and employment generation, especially for the female laborers hired in the farms and packing houses. Hence, the emergence of agricultural and agrifood product safety issues and the subsequent tightening of market requirements have challenged mutual gains due to the lack of technical and financial capacities of most developing countries.

Essays in Industrial Organization

This dissertation comprises four essays on the topic of industrial organization and environmental economics. The first essay investigates the profitability of horizontal mergers of firms with price adjustments. We take a differential game approach and both the open-loop as well as the closed-loop equlibria are considered. In the second essay, using the same approach as the first one, we study the profitability of horizontal merger of firms where the demand function is nonlinear. We take into consideration the open-loop equilibrium. The third essay studies the profitability of exogenous output constraint in a differential game model with price dynamics under the feedback strategies. The fourth essay investigates a second-best trade agreement between two countries when pollution spillovers are asymmetric to examine the strategic behavior of governments in using pollution taxes and tariffs under trade liberalization.

Essays in industrial organization

The thesis consists in three papers that investigate two debated topics in industrial organization (in particular in competition policy) through formal models based on game-theory. The first paper deals with potential effects of conglomerate mergers among leading brands in facilitating foreclosure of new suppliers through the retailing channel. The two remaining papers analyze antitrust policy with respect to monopolization of markets of spare parts and aftermarkets by monopolistic equipment manufacturers.

Three essays in industrial organization

This dissertation comprises three essays on the topic of industrial organization. The first essay considers how different intellectual property systems can affect the incentives to invest in R&D when innovation is cumulative. I introduce a distinction between plain and sophisticated technological knowledge, which plays a crucial role in determining how different appropriability rules affect the incentives to innovate. I argue that the positive effect of weak intellectual property regimes on the sharing of intermediate technological knowledge vanishes when technological knowledge is sophisticated, as is likely to be the case in many high tech industries. The second essay analyzes a two-sided market for news where advertisers may pay a media outlet to conceal negative information on the quality of their own product (paying positive to avoid negative) and/or to disclose negative information on the quality of their competitors products (paying positive to go negative). It is shown that whether advertisers have negative consequences on the accuracy of media reports or not, ultimately depends on the extent of correlation among advertisers products. The third essay considers the role of social learning in the diffusion of a new technology. A population of agents can choose between two risky technologies: an old one for which they know the expected outcome, and a new one for which they have only a prior. Different environments are confronted. In the benchmark case agents are isolated and can perform costly experiments to infer the quality of the new technology. In the other cases agents are settled in a network and can observe the outcomes of neighbors. We observe that in expectations the quality of the new technology may be overestimated when there is a network spread of information.

Essays in Industrial Organization and Information Technology

Chapter 1 studies how consumers’ switching costs affect the pricing and profits of firms competing in two-sided markets such as Apple and Google in the smartphone market. When two-sided markets are dynamic – rather than merely static – I show that switching costs lower the first-period price if network externalities are strong, which is in contrast to what has been found in one-sided markets. By contrast, switching costs soften price competition in the initial period if network externalities are weak and consumers are more patient than the platforms. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first-period price on the other side. Chapter 2 examines firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while competition mitigates them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand correlation and the cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap, the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the relationship becomes negative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis also sheds light on some policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing. Chapter 3 develops a theory of sequential investments in cybersecurity. The regulator can use safety standards and liability rules to increase security. I show that the joint use of an optimal standard and a full liability rule leads to underinvestment ex ante and overinvestment ex post. Instead, switching to a partial liability rule can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that to improve security, the regulator should encourage not only firms, but also consumers to invest in security.

All'origine dello squilibrio di potere negoziale della parte agricola nella food supply chain: il caso della suinicoltura in Emilia-Romagna

Il settore suinicolo ricopre un ruolo rilevante nel contesto nazionale, con ricadute economiche e sociali di primaria importanza in varie regioni. Tuttavia da alcuni anni il settore si trova in crisi a causa dell’instabilità dei mercati internazionali, dello scarso coordinamento tra gli attori della filiera, della progressiva riduzione della redditività dei prodotti trasformati a Denominazione di Origine, della mancata valorizzazione dei tagli di carne fresca, nonché della difficoltà di aggredire i mercati esteri. Altre criticità riguardano la distribuzione del valore lungo la filiera e la scarsa efficacia delle politiche di coordinamento finora adottate. L'obiettivo della ricerca è quello di identificare gli elementi che possono garantire maggiore equilibrio di potere negoziale tra allevatori suinicoli e macellatori rispetto alla situazione attuale: verificati gli elementi critici che caratterizzano la relazione commerciale tra allevatori e macellatori, si avanzano alcune proposte operative utili al superamento delle fratture tra la componente agricola e quella dei macelli in Emilia Romagna. La struttura della tesi è la seguente: (capitolo 1) si descrive il quadro economico del settore suinicolo a livello internazionale e nazionale. Successivamente (capitolo 2) si passano in rassegna le teorie economiche utili a comprendere le ragioni alla base del malfunzionamento dei rapporti tra gli attori della filiera agroalimentare, mentre nel terzo capitolo è richiamato il quadro normativo comunitario, nazionale e regionale all’interno del quale tali relazioni si configurano. Nel quarto capitolo si elabora un modello interpretativo al fine di spiegare le fratture che oggi contraddistinguono le relazioni in essere tra gli attori della filiera: il “modello delle fratture”. Alla luce di questa concettualizzazione è stata svolta un’indagine diretta svolta presso gli operatori aderenti all’Organizzazione Interprofessionale del Gran Suino Italiano, i cui risultati hanno consentito di valutare l’efficacia del modello interpretativo e di fornire indicazioni migliorative della strategia di governance delle relazioni tra allevatori e macellatori.

Essays in Environmental Economics

This dissertation comprises four essays on the topic of environmental economics and industrial organization. In the first essay, we develop a two-country world differential game model with a polluting firm in each country to investigate the equilibrium of the game between firms when they decide to trade or not and to see under which conditions social welfare coincides with the market equilibrium. In the second essay, we built a model where firms strategically choose whether to participate in an auction/lottery to attain pollution permits, or instead invest in green R&D, to show that, somewhat counterintuitively, a desirable side effect of the auction is in fact that of fostering environmental R&D in an admissible range of the model parameters. The third essay investigates a second-best trade agreement between two countries when pollution spillovers are asymmetric to examine the strategic behavior of governments in using pollution taxes and tariffs under trade liberalization. The fouth essay studies the profitability of exogenous output constraint in a differential game model with price dynamics under the feedback strategies.