Essays on Information Economics

This thesis consists of three essays on information economics. I explore how information is strategically communicated or designed by senders who aim to influence the decisions of a receiver. In the first chapter, I study a cheap talk game between two imperfectly informed experts and a decision maker. The experts receive noisy signals about the state and sequentially communicate the relevant information to the decision maker. I refine the self-serving belief system under uncertainty and Ι characterise the most informative equilibrium that might arise in such environments.In the second chapter, I consider the case where a decision maker seeks advice from a biased expert who cares also about establishing a reputation of being competent. The expert has the incentives to misreport her information but she faces a trade-off between the gain from misrepresentation and the potential reputation loss. I show that the equilibrium is fully-revealing if the expert is not too biased and not too highly reputable. If there is competition between two experts the information transmission is always improved. However, in cases where the experts are more than two the result is ambiguous, and it depends on the players’ prior belief over states.In the last chapter, I consider a model of strategic communication where a privately and imperfectly informed sender can persuade a receiver. The sender may receive favorable or unfavorable private information about her preferred state. I describe two ways that are adopted in real life situations and theoretically improve equilibrium informativeness given sender's private information. First, a policy that suggests symmetry constraints to the experiments' choice. Second, an approval strategy characterised by a low precision threshold where the receiver will accept the sender with a positive probability and a higher one where the sender will be accepted with certainty.

Essays in Empirical Political Economics

This thesis takes two perspectives on political institutions. From the one side, it examines the long-run effects of institutions on cultural values. From the other side, I study strategic communication, and its determinants, of politicians, a pivotal actor inside those institutions. The first chapter provides evidence for the legacy of feudalism - a set of labor coercion and migration restrictions -, on interpersonal distrust. I combining administrative data on the feudal system in the Prussian Empire (1816 – 1849) with the geo-localized survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (1980 – 2020). I show that areas with strong historical exposure to feudalism have lower levels of inter-personal trust today, by means of OLS- and mover specifications. The second chapter builds a novel dataset that includes the Twitter handles of 18,000+ politicians and 61+ million tweets from 2008 – 2021 from all levels of government. I find substantial partisan differences in Twitter adoption, Twitter activity and audience engagement. I use established tools to measure ideological polarization to provide evidence that online-polarization follows similar trends to offline-polarization, at comparable magnitude and reaches unprecedented heights in 2018 and 2021. I develop a new tool to demonstrate a marked increase in affective polarization. The third chapter tests whether politicians disseminate distortive messages when exposed to bad news. Specifically, I study the diffusion of misleading communication from pro-gun politicians in the aftermath of mass shootings. I exploit the random timing of mass shootings and analyze half a million tweets between 2010 – 2020 in an event-study design. I develop and apply state-of-the-art text analysis tools to show that pro- gun politicians seek to decrease the salience of the mass shooting through distraction and try to alter voters’ belief formation through misrepresenting the causes of the mass shootings.

Radio frequency communication and fault detection for railway signalling

The continuous and swift progression of both wireless and wired communication technologies in today's world owes its success to the foundational systems established earlier. These systems serve as the building blocks that enable the enhancement of services to cater to evolving requirements. Studying the vulnerabilities of previously designed systems and their current usage leads to the development of new communication technologies replacing the old ones such as GSM-R in the railway field. The current industrial research has a specific focus on finding an appropriate telecommunication solution for railway communications that will replace the GSM-R standard which will be switched off in the next years. Various standardization organizations are currently exploring and designing a radiofrequency technology based standard solution to serve railway communications in the form of FRMCS (Future Railway Mobile Communication System) to substitute the current GSM-R. Bearing on this topic, the primary strategic objective of the research is to assess the feasibility to leverage on the current public network technologies such as LTE to cater to mission and safety critical communication for low density lines. The research aims to identify the constraints, define a service level agreement with telecom operators, and establish the necessary implementations to make the system as reliable as possible over an open and public network, while considering safety and cybersecurity aspects. The LTE infrastructure would be utilized to transmit the vital data for the communication of a railway system and to gather and transmit all the field measurements to the control room for maintenance purposes. Given the significance of maintenance activities in the railway sector, the ongoing research includes the implementation of a machine learning algorithm to detect railway equipment faults, reducing time and human analysis errors due to the large volume of measurements from the field.