Essays in Macroecometrics: methodological aspects and empirical applications

In the first chapter, I develop a panel no-cointegration test which extends Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001)'s bounds test to the panel framework by considering the individual regressions in a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) system. This allows to take into account unobserved common factors that contemporaneously affect all the units of the panel and provides, at the same time, unit-specific test statistics. Moreover, the approach is particularly suited when the number of individuals of the panel is small relatively to the number of time series observations. I develop the algorithm to implement the test and I use Monte Carlo simulation to analyze the properties of the test. The small sample properties of the test are remarkable, compared to its single equation counterpart. I illustrate the use of the test through a test of Purchasing Power Parity in a panel of EU15 countries. In the second chapter of my PhD thesis, I verify the Expectation Hypothesis of the Term Structure in the repurchasing agreements (repo) market with a new testing approach. I consider an "inexact" formulation of the EHTS, which models a time-varying component in the risk premia and I treat the interest rates as a non-stationary cointegrated system. The effect of the heteroskedasticity is controlled by means of testing procedures (bootstrap and heteroskedasticity correction) which are robust to variance and covariance shifts over time. I fi#nd that the long-run implications of EHTS are verified. A rolling window analysis clarifies that the EHTS is only rejected in periods of turbulence of #financial markets. The third chapter introduces the Stata command "bootrank" which implements the bootstrap likelihood ratio rank test algorithm developed by Cavaliere et al. (2012). The command is illustrated through an empirical application on the term structure of interest rates in the US.

Essays in Health Economics

In the first chapter we develop a theoretical model investigating food consumption and body weight with a novel assumption regarding human caloric expenditure (i.e. metabolism), in order to investigate why individuals can be rationally trapped in an excessive weight equilibrium and why they struggle to lose weight even when offered incentives for weight-loss. This assumption allows the theoretical model to have multiple equilibria and to provide an explanation for why losing weight is so difficult even in the presence of incentives, without relying on rational addiction, time-inconsistency preferences or bounded rationality. In addition to this result we are able to characterize under which circumstances a temporary incentive can create a persistent weight loss. In the second chapter we investigate the possible contributions that social norms and peer effects had on the spread of obesity. In recent literature peer effects and social norms have been characterized as important pathways for the biological and behavioral spread of body weight, along with decreased food prices and physical activity. We add to this literature by proposing a novel concept of social norm related to what we define as social distortion in weight perception. The theoretical model shows that, in equilibrium, the effect of an increase in peers' weight on i's weight is unrelated to health concerns while it is mainly associated with social concerns. Using regional data from England we prove that such social component is significant in influencing individual weight. In the last chapter we investigate the relationship between body weight and employment probability. Using a semi-parametric regression we show that men and women employment probability do not follow a linear relationship with body mass index (BMI) but rather an inverted U-shaped one, peaking at a BMI way over the clinical threshold for overweight.