Essays on firm efficiency with imperfectly competitive input markets: an empirical analysis

In the thesis I exploit an empirical analysis on firm'’s productivity. I relate the efficiency at plant level with the input market features and I suggest an estimation technique for production function that takes into account firm'’s liquidity constraints. The main results are three. When I consider services as inputs for manufacturing firm’'s production process, I find that more competition in service sector affects positively plant’s productivity and export decision. Secondly liquidity constraints are important for the calculation of firm'’s productivity because they are a second source of firm's heterogeneity. Third liquidity constraints are important for firm'’s internationalization

Non-Linear Pricing in Imperfectly Competitive Markets

This thesis is dedicated to the analysis of non-linear pricing in oligopoly. Non-linear pricing is a fairly predominant practice in most real markets, mostly characterized by some amount of competition. The sophistication of pricing practices has increased in the latest decades due to the technological advances that have allowed companies to gather more and more data on consumers preferences. The first essay of the thesis highlights the main characteristics of oligopolistic non-linear pricing. Non-linear pricing is a special case of price discrimination. The theory of price discrimination has to be modified in presence of oligopoly: in particular, a crucial role is played by the competitive externality that implies that product differentiation is closely related to the possibility of discriminating. The essay reviews the theory of competitive non-linear pricing by starting from its foundations, mechanism design under common agency. The different approaches to model non-linear pricing are then reviewed. In particular, the difference between price and quantity competition is highlighted. Finally, the close link between non-linear pricing and the recent developments in the theory of vertical differentiation is explored. The second essay shows how the effects of non-linear pricing are determined by the relationship between the demand and the technological structure of the market. The chapter focuses on a model in which firms supply a homogeneous product in two different sizes. Information about consumers' reservation prices is incomplete and the production technology is characterized by size economies. The model provides insights on the size of the products that one finds in the market. Four equilibrium regions are identified depending on the relative intensity of size economies with respect to consumers' evaluation of the good. Regions for which the product is supplied in a single unit or in several different sizes or in only a very large one. Both the private and social desirability of non-linear pricing varies across different equilibrium regions. The third essay considers the broadband internet market. Non discriminatory issues seem the core of the recent debate on the opportunity or not of regulating the internet. One of the main questions posed is whether the telecom companies, owning the networks constituting the internet, should be allowed to offer quality-contingent contracts to content providers. The aim of this essay is to analyze the issue through a stylized two-sided market model of the web that highlights the effects of such a discrimination over quality, prices and participation to the internet of providers and final users. An overall welfare comparison is proposed, concluding that the final effects of regulation crucially depend on both the technology and preferences of agents.

Committed to reform? Pragmatic antitrust enforcement in electricity markets

This thesis is a collection of essays about the instrumental use of commitment decisions to facilitate the completion of the European internal electricity market. European policy can shape markets in many ways, two most evident being regulation and competition enforcement. The interplay between these two instruments attracts a lot of scholarly attention. One of the major concerns in the competition vs. regulation debate is the instrumental use of competition rules. It has been observed that competition enforcement is triggered not only as a response to an anticompetitive harm occurring in the market, but that it sometimes becomes a powerful tool in the European Commission’s hands to pursue regulatory goals. This thesis looks for examples of such instrumentalisation in the context of electricity markets and finds that the Commission is very pragmatic in using all the possible instruments it has at hand to push forward its project of creating the internal electricity market. This includes regulation, competition enforcement and all sorts of political pressure. To the extent that commitment decisions accelerate sector-specific regulation and overcome political deadlocks, they contribute to the Commission’s energy policy goals. However, instrumentalisation of competition rules comes at a certain cost to competition policy, energy policy and, most importantly, to electricity markets themselves. Markets might be negatively affected either indirectly, by application of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inadequate commitments in individual cases. Concluding, commitment decisions generally contributed to achieving the policy objectives of the internal electricity market, but their use for that purpose does not come without cost. Given that this cost is ultimately borne by the internal electricity market, the Commission should take a more balanced approach to the instrumental use of commitment decisions so that it does not do more harm than good.

Educational mismathc in Italian an European labour markets (starting from the UK)

The present doctoral thesis is structured as a collection of three essays. The first essay, “SOC(HE)-Italy: a classification for graduate occupations” presents the conceptual basis, the construction, the validation and the application to the Italian labour force of the occupational classification termed SOC(HE)-Italy. I have developed this classification under the supervision of Kate Purcell during my period as a visiting research student at the Warwick Institute for Emplyment Research. This classification links the constituent tasks and duties of a particular job to the relevant knowledge and skills imparted via Higher Education (HE). It is based onto the SOC(HE)2010, an occupational classification first proposed by Kate Purcell in 2013, but differently constructed. In the second essay “Assessing the incidence and wage effects of overeducation among Italian graduates using a new measure for educational requirements” I utilize this classification to build a valid and reliable measure for job requirements. The lack of an unbiased measure for this dimension constitutes one of the major constraints to achieve a generally accepted measurement of overeducation. Estimations of overeducation incidence and wage effects are run onto AlmaLaurea data from the survey on graduates career paths. I have written this essay and obtained these estimates benefiting of the help and guidance of Giovanni Guidetti and Giulio Pedrini. The third and last essay titled “Overeducation in the Italian labour market: clarifying the concepts and addressing the measurement error problem” addresses a number of theoretical issues concerning the concepts of educational mismatch and overeducation. Using Istat data from RCFL survey I run estimates of the ORU model for the whole Italian labour force. In my knowledge, this is the first time ever such model is estimated on such population. In addition, I adopt the new measure of overeducation based onto the SOC(HE)-Italy classification.