Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

Strategie di sviluppo sostenibile: studio e applicazione della metodologia di analisi degli scenari in campo agro-ambientale

L’obiettivo del lavoro svolto nell’ambito del ciclo di dottorato è stato quello dell’applicazione della metodologia di analisi degli scenari, nell’ottica dello studio e applicazione di un metodo di analisi integrato e multidisciplinare che consenta individuare strategie di sviluppo sostenibile in relazione alla questione indagata. Lo studio sviluppato nel corso del dottorato è stato impostato su presupposti forniti dalla Regione Toscana (in entrambi i casi di studio trattati), che ha finanziato, attraverso la sua Agenzia Regionale per lo Sviluppo e Innovazione in ambito Agricolo (ARSIA), due Progetti di ricerca volti all’individuazione di strategie di sviluppo sostenibile concernenti due tematiche di particolare interesse in ambito regionale: lo sviluppo di coltivazioni non-food (biocarburanti, biomasse da energia, biopolimeri, biolubrificanti, fibre vegetali, coloranti naturali, fitofarmaci di origine vegetale) e la valutazione della possibilità di coesistenza tra colture convenzionali (non Geneticamente Modificate) e colture GM, in relazione alla Raccomandazione della Commissione 2003/556/CE che afferma che deve essere garantita la coesistenza tra colture transgeniche, convenzionali e biologiche, ovvero che devono essere presenti le condizioni per cui ciascun metodo di coltivazione possa poter essere adottato e praticato in UE. La sostenibilità delle situazioni studiate è stata valutata fornendo informazioni non solo per la situazioni attuali, ma anche per possibili evoluzioni future, così come richiesto dai principi dello sviluppo sostenibile. A tal proposito, occorre applicare metodologie di analisi che consentano di poter identificare obiettivi strategici in funzione dei cambiamenti che potrebbero essere registrati, in corrispondenza dell’evolversi delle diverse situazioni nel tempo. La metodologia di analisi in grado di soddisfare questi requisiti può essere identificata nell’analisi di scenario (scenario analysis), che si configura come uno strumento di analisi strategica in grado di riassumere numerose informazioni e dati riferiti agli attori, agli obiettivi, agli strumenti, alle cause ed agli effetti indotti da un cambiamento che potrebbe essere provocato da uno o più fattori contemplati nel corso dell’analisi. Questo metodo di analisi rappresenta un’importante strumento di ausilio alla definizione di politiche e strategie, che si rende particolarmente utile nel campo della public choice, come dimostrato dalle applicazioni presentate nel corso del lavoro.

Fighting corruption with pyramids: A Law and Economics approach to combating corruption in post-socialist countries

Corruption is, in the last two decades, considered as one of the biggest problems within the international community, which harms not only a particular state or society but the whole world. The discussion on corruption in law and economics approach is mainly run under the veil of Public choice theory and principal-agent model. Based on this approach the strong international initiatives taken by the UN, the OECD and the Council of Europe, provided various measures and tools in order to support and guide countries in their combat against corruption. These anti-corruption policies created a repression -prevention-transparency model for corruption combat. Applying this model, countries around the world adopted anti-corruption strategies as part of their legal rules. Nevertheless, the recent researches on the effects of this move show non impressive results. Critics argue that “one size does not fit all” because the institutional setting of countries around the world varies. Among the countries which experience problems of corruption, even though they follow the dominant anti-corruption trends, are transitional, post-socialist countries. To this group belong the countries which are emerging from centrally planned to an open market economy. The socialist past left traces on institutional setting, mentality of the individuals and their interrelation, particularly in the domain of public administration. If the idiosyncrasy of these countries is taken into account the suggestion in this thesis is that in public administration in post-socialist countries, instead of dominant anti-corruption scheme repression-prevention-transparency, corruption combat should be improved through the implementation of a new one, structure-conduct-performance. The implementation of this model is based on three regulatory pyramids: anti-corruption, disciplinary anti-corruption and criminal anti-corruption pyramid. This approach asks public administration itself to engage in corruption combat, leaving criminal justice system as the ultimate weapon, used only for the very harmful misdeeds.

Social Welfare and Behavioral Public Policies

In this work I discuss several key aspects of welfare economics and policy analysis and I propose two original contributions to the growing field of behavioral public policymaking. After providing a historical perspective of welfare economics and an overview of policy analysis processes in the introductory chapter, in chapter 2 I discuss a debated issue of policymaking, the choice of the social welfare function. I contribute to this debate by proposing an original methodological contribution based on the analysis of the quantitative relationship among different social welfare functional forms commonly used by policy analysts. In chapter 3 I then discuss a behavioral policy to contrast indirect tax evasion based on the use of lotteries. I show that the predictions of my model based on non-expected utility are consistent with observed, and so far unexplained, empirical evidence of the policy success. Finally, in chapter 4 I investigate by mean of a laboratory experiment the effects of social influence on the individual likelihood to engage in altruistic punishment. I show that bystanders’ decision to engage in punishment is influenced by the punishment behavior of their peers and I suggest ways to enact behavioral policies that exploit this finding.