Fighting corruption with pyramids: A Law and Economics approach to combating corruption in post-socialist countries

Corruption is, in the last two decades, considered as one of the biggest problems within the international community, which harms not only a particular state or society but the whole world. The discussion on corruption in law and economics approach is mainly run under the veil of Public choice theory and principal-agent model. Based on this approach the strong international initiatives taken by the UN, the OECD and the Council of Europe, provided various measures and tools in order to support and guide countries in their combat against corruption. These anti-corruption policies created a repression -prevention-transparency model for corruption combat. Applying this model, countries around the world adopted anti-corruption strategies as part of their legal rules. Nevertheless, the recent researches on the effects of this move show non impressive results. Critics argue that “one size does not fit all” because the institutional setting of countries around the world varies. Among the countries which experience problems of corruption, even though they follow the dominant anti-corruption trends, are transitional, post-socialist countries. To this group belong the countries which are emerging from centrally planned to an open market economy. The socialist past left traces on institutional setting, mentality of the individuals and their interrelation, particularly in the domain of public administration. If the idiosyncrasy of these countries is taken into account the suggestion in this thesis is that in public administration in post-socialist countries, instead of dominant anti-corruption scheme repression-prevention-transparency, corruption combat should be improved through the implementation of a new one, structure-conduct-performance. The implementation of this model is based on three regulatory pyramids: anti-corruption, disciplinary anti-corruption and criminal anti-corruption pyramid. This approach asks public administration itself to engage in corruption combat, leaving criminal justice system as the ultimate weapon, used only for the very harmful misdeeds.

Multi-Principal Agency and the Compliance with Professional Guidelines in Health Systems: Economic and Regulatory Perspectives

Amid the trend of rising health expenditure in developed economies, changing the healthcare delivery models is an important point of action for service regulators to contain this trend. Such a change is mostly induced by either financial incentives or regulatory tools issued by the regulators and targeting service providers and patients. This creates a tripartite interaction between service regulators, professionals, and patients that manifests a multi-principal agent relationship, in which professionals are agents to two principals: regulators and patients. This thesis is concerned with such a multi-principal agent relationship in healthcare and attempts to investigate the determinants of the (non-)compliance to regulatory tools in light of this tripartite relationship. In addition, the thesis provides insights into the different institutional, economic, and regulatory settings, which govern the multi-principal agent relationship in healthcare in different countries. Furthermore, the thesis provides and empirically tests a conceptual framework of the possible determinants of (non-)compliance by physicians to regulatory tools issued by the regulator. The main findings of the thesis are first, in a multi-principal agent setting, the utilization of financial incentives to align the objectives of professionals and the regulator is important but not the only solution. This finding is based on the heterogeneity in the financial incentives provided to professionals in different health markets, which does not provide a one-size-fits-all model of financial incentives to influence clinical decisions. Second, soft law tools as clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) are important tools to mitigate the problems of the multi-principal agent setting in health markets as they reduce information asymmetries while preserving the autonomy of professionals. Third, CPGs are complex and heterogeneous and so are the determinants of (non-)compliance to them. Fourth, CPGs work but under conditions. Factors such as intra-professional competition between service providers or practitioners might lead to non-compliance to CPGs – if CPGs are likely to reduce the professional’s utility. Finally, different degrees of soft law mandate have different effects on providers’ compliance. Generally, the stronger the mandate, the stronger the compliance, however, even with a strong mandate, drivers such as intra-professional competition and co-management of patients by different professionals affected the (non-)compliance.

Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

Essays in nonlinear pricing and rent seeking

This thesis consists of three self-contained essays on nonlinear pricing and rent-seeking. In the first chapter of the thesis, I provide new theoretical insights about non-linear pricing in monopoly and common agency by combining the principal-agent framework with other-regarding preferences. I introduce a new theoretical model that separately characterizes status-seeker and inequity-averse buyers. I show how the buyer’s optimal choice of quality and market inefficiency change when the buyer has other-regarding preferences. In the second chapter, I find the optimal productive rent-seeking and sabotaging efforts when the prize is endogenous. I show that due to the existence of endogeneity, sabotaging the productive rent-seeking efforts causes sabotaging the endogenous part of the prize, which can affect the rent-seeking efforts. Moreover, I introduce social preferences into my model and characterize symmetric productive rent-seeking and sabotaging efforts. In the last chapter, I propose a new theoretical model regarding information disclosure with Bayesian persuasion in rent-seeking contests when the efforts are productive. I show that under one-sided incomplete information, information disclosure decision depends on both the marginal costs of efforts and the marginal benefit of aggregate exerted effort. I find that since the efforts are productive and add a positive surplus on the fixed rent, my model narrows down the conditions for the information disclosure compared to the exogenous model. Under the two-sided incomplete information case, I observe that there is a non-monotone relationship between optimal effort and posterior beliefs. Thus, it might be difficult to conclude whether a contest organizer should disclose any information to contestants.

Argumentation and artifacts for intelligent multi-agent systems

Reasoning under uncertainty is a human capacity that in software system is necessary and often hidden. Argumentation theory and logic make explicit non-monotonic information in order to enable automatic forms of reasoning under uncertainty. In human organization Distributed Cognition and Activity Theory explain how artifacts are fundamental in all cognitive process. Then, in this thesis we search to understand the use of cognitive artifacts in an new argumentation framework for an agent-based artificial society.

Coordination and Control of Autonomous Mobile Robots Swarms by using Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm and Consensus Theory

This thesis presents some different techniques designed to drive a swarm of robots in an a-priori unknown environment in order to move the group from a starting area to a final one avoiding obstacles. The presented techniques are based on two different theories used alone or in combination: Swarm Intelligence (SI) and Graph Theory. Both theories are based on the study of interactions between different entities (also called agents or units) in Multi- Agent Systems (MAS). The first one belongs to the Artificial Intelligence context and the second one to the Distributed Systems context. These theories, each one from its own point of view, exploit the emergent behaviour that comes from the interactive work of the entities, in order to achieve a common goal. The features of flexibility and adaptability of the swarm have been exploited with the aim to overcome and to minimize difficulties and problems that can affect one or more units of the group, having minimal impact to the whole group and to the common main target. Another aim of this work is to show the importance of the information shared between the units of the group, such as the communication topology, because it helps to maintain the environmental information, detected by each single agent, updated among the swarm. Swarm Intelligence has been applied to the presented technique, through the Particle Swarm Optimization algorithm (PSO), taking advantage of its features as a navigation system. The Graph Theory has been applied by exploiting Consensus and the application of the agreement protocol with the aim to maintain the units in a desired and controlled formation. This approach has been followed in order to conserve the power of PSO and to control part of its random behaviour with a distributed control algorithm like Consensus.

On the effect of confounding in linear regression models: an approach based on the theory of quadratic forms

The main topic of this thesis is confounding in linear regression models. It arises when a relationship between an observed process, the covariate, and an outcome process, the response, is influenced by an unmeasured process, the confounder, associated with both. Consequently, the estimators for the regression coefficients of the measured covariates might be severely biased, less efficient and characterized by misleading interpretations. Confounding is an issue when the primary target of the work is the estimation of the regression parameters. The central point of the dissertation is the evaluation of the sampling properties of parameter estimators. This work aims to extend the spatial confounding framework to general structured settings and to understand the behaviour of confounding as a function of the data generating process structure parameters in several scenarios focusing on the joint covariate-confounder structure. In line with the spatial statistics literature, our purpose is to quantify the sampling properties of the regression coefficient estimators and, in turn, to identify the most prominent quantities depending on the generative mechanism impacting confounding. Once the sampling properties of the estimator conditionally on the covariate process are derived as ratios of dependent quadratic forms in Gaussian random variables, we provide an analytic expression of the marginal sampling properties of the estimator using Carlson’s R function. Additionally, we propose a representative quantity for the magnitude of confounding as a proxy of the bias, its first-order Laplace approximation. To conclude, we work under several frameworks considering spatial and temporal data with specific assumptions regarding the covariance and cross-covariance functions used to generate the processes involved. This study allows us to claim that the variability of the confounder-covariate interaction and of the covariate plays the most relevant role in determining the principal marker of the magnitude of confounding.