Politiche di sviluppo e questione etnica. La cooperazione italiana IN Bosnia Erzegovina

The globalization process of the last twenty years has changed the world through international flows of people, policies and practices. International cooperation to development is a part of that process and brought International Organizations (IOs) and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) from the West to the rest of the world. In my thesis I analyze the Italian NGOs that worked in Bosnia Herzegovina (BH) to understand which development projects they realized and how they faced the ethnic issue that characterized BH. I consider the relation shaped between Italian NGOs and Bosnian civil society as an object of ethnic interests. In BH, once part of former Yugoslavia, the transition from the communist regime to a democratic country has not been completed. BH’s social conditions are characterized by strong ethnic divisions. The legacy of the early 1990s crisis was a phenomenon of ethnic identities created before the war and that still endure today. The Dayton Peace Agreement signed in 1995 granted the peace and reinforced the inter-ethnic hate between the newly recognized three principal ethnicities: Serbs, Croats and Bosniak. Through the new constitution, the institutions were characterized by division at every level, from the top to the bottom of society. Besides it was the first constitution ever written and signed outside the own country; that was the root of the state of exception that characterized BH. Thus ethnic identities culture survived through the international political involvement. At the same time ethnic groups that dominated the political debate clashed with the international organization’s democratic purpose to build a multicultural and democratic state. Ethnic and also religious differences were the instruments for a national statement that might cause the transition and development projects failure. Fifteen years later social fragmentation was still present and it established an atmosphere of daily cultural violence. Civil society suffered this condition and attended to recreate the ethnic fragmentation in every day life. Some cities became physically divided and other cities don’t tolerated the minority presence. In rural areas, the division was more explicit, from village to village, without integration. In my speech, the anthropology for development – the derivative study from applied anthropology – constitutes the point of view that I used to understand how ethnic identities still influenced the development process in BH. I done ethnographic research about the Italian cooperation for development projects that were working there in 2007. The target of research were the Italian NGOs that created a relation with Bosnian civil society; they were almost twenty divided in four main field of competences: institutional building, education, agriculture and democratization. I assumed that NGOs work needed a deep study because the bottom of society is the place where people could really change their representation and behavior. Italian NGOs operated in BH with the aim of creating sustainable development. They found cultural barricade that both institutions and civil society erected when development projects have been applied. Ethnic and religious differences were stressed to maintain boundaries and fragmented power. Thus NGOs tried to negotiate development projects by social integration. I found that NGOs worked among ethnic groups by pursuing a new integration. They often gained success among people; civil society was ready to accept development projects and overcome differences. On the other hand NGOs have been limited by political level that sustained the ethnic talk and by their representation of Bosnian issue. Thus development policies have been impeded by ethnic issue and by cooperation practices established on a top down perspective. Paradoxically, since international community has approved the political ethnic division within DPA, then the willing of development followed by funding NGOs cooperation projects was not completely successful.

1963-1968. Dall'avvento dell'amministrazione di Lyndon B. Johnson al Trattato di Non-Proliferazione. gli Stati Uniti, la Francia, la NATO e l'Europa agli esordi della distensione. Storia di una "non-crisi" transatlantica e della riorganizzazione dell'Alleanza.

The aim of this proposal is to explain the paradigm of the American foreign policy during the Johnson Administration, especially toward Europe, within the NATO framework, and toward URSS, in the context of the détente, just emerged during the decade of the sixties. During that period, after the passing of the J. F. Kennedy, President L. B. Johnson inherited a complex and very high-powered world politics, which wanted to get a new phase off the ground in the transatlantic relations and share the burden of the Cold war with a refractory Europe. Known as the grand design, it was a policy that needed the support of the allies and a clear purpose which appealed to the Europeans. At first, President Johnson detected in the problem of the nuclear sharing the good deal to make with the NATO allies. At the same time, he understood that the United States needed to reassert their leadeship within the new stage of relations with the Soviet Union. Soon, the “transatlantic bargain” became something not so easy to dealt with. The Federal Germany wanted to say a word in the nuclear affairs and, why not, put the finger on the trigger of the atlantic nuclear weapons. URSS, on the other hand, wanted to keep Germany down. The other allies did not want to share the onus of the defense of Europe, at most the responsability for the use of the weapons and, at least, to participate in the decision-making process. France, which wanted to detach herself from the policy of the United States and regained a world role, added difficulties to the manage of this course of action. Through the years of the Johnson’s office, the divergences of the policies placed by his advisers to gain the goal put the American foreign policy in deep water. The withdrawal of France from the organization but not from the Alliance, give Washington a chance to carry out his goal. The development of a clear-cut disarm policy leaded the Johnson’s administration to the core of the matter. The Non-proliferation Treaty signed in 1968, solved in a business-like fashion the problem with the allies. The question of nuclear sharing faded away with the acceptance of more deep consultative role in the nuclear affairs by the allies, the burden for the defense of Europe became more bearable through the offset agreement with the FRG and a new doctrine, the flexible response, put an end, at least formally, to the taboo of the nuclear age. The Johnson’s grand design proved to be different from the Kennedy’s one, but all things considered, it was more workable. The unpredictable result was a real détente with the Soviet Union, which, we can say, was a merit of President Johnson.