Il conflitto fra trasparenza sui mercati finanziari ed esigenza di riservatezza della società

The thesis main topic is the conflict between disclosure in financial markets and the need for confidentiality of the firm. After a recognition of the major dynamics of information production and dissemination in the stock market, the analysis moves to the interactions between the information that a firm is tipically interested in keeping confidential, such as trade secrets or the data usually covered by patent protection, and the countervailing demand for disclosure arising from finacial markets. The analysis demonstrates that despite the seeming divergence between informational contents tipically disclosed to investors and information usually covered by intellectual property protection, the overlapping areas are nonetheless wide and the conflict between transparency in financial markets and the firm’s need for confidentiality arises frequently and sistematically. Indeed, the company’s disclosure policy is based on a continuous trade-off between the costs and the benefits related to the public dissemination of information. Such costs are mainly represented by the competitive harm caused by competitors’ access to sensitive data, while the benefits mainly refer to the lower cost of capital that the firm obtains as a consequence of more disclosure. Secrecy shields the value of costly produced information against third parties’ free riding and constitutes therefore a means to protect the firm’s incentives toward the production of new information and especially toward technological and business innovation. Excessively demanding standards of transparency in financial markets might hinder such set of incentives and thus jeopardize the dynamics of innovation production. Within Italian securities regulation, there are two sets of rules mostly relevant with respect to such an issue: the first one is the rule that mandates issuers to promptly disclose all price-sensitive information to the market on an ongoing basis; the second one is the duty to disclose in the prospectus all the information “necessary to enable investors to make an informed assessment” of the issuers’ financial and economic perspectives. Both rules impose high disclosure standards and have potentially unlimited scope. Yet, they have safe harbours aimed at protecting the issuer need for confidentiality. Despite the structural incompatibility between public dissemination of information and the firm’s need to keep certain data confidential, there are certain ways to convey information to the market while preserving at the same time the firm’s need for confidentality. Such means are insider trading and selective disclosure: both are based on mechanics whereby the process of price reaction to the new information takes place without any corresponding activity of public release of data. Therefore, they offer a solution to the conflict between disclosure and the need for confidentiality that enhances market efficiency and preserves at the same time the private set of incentives toward innovation.

Società di capitali amministratrici di società di persone

The present work focuses on a specific aspect of the general issue concerning the possible consequences of the reform of business corporations (“società di capitali”) on the discipline of partnerships (“società di persone”). After the reform of business law enacted with legislative decree n. 6/2003, the majority of the literature, in the light of the provisions of art. 2361 co. 2 civil code and art. 111-duodecies of the regulatory provisions (“disposizioni di attuazione”) of the civil code itself, maintains the possibility for a business corporation to be executive of a partnership. As a matter of fact, whenever all the members of a partnership are actually business corporations, it shall be possible that either one of the latter becomes the executive, either such role is played by a third party, i. e. a non-partner. After displaying the possible advantages and disadvantages stemming from a business corporation managing a partnership, the analysis investigates the legal feasibility of the case in point. First of all, the reasons supporting the theory under which a legal person cannot be manager of a partnership are examined in depth; an overview of the principal EU Member States’ legal systems and of the discipline of the European Economic Interest Grouping and of European Corporate is then provider for. At the outset of such analysis, the author asserts the legal possibility for a legal person to act as manager of a corporation, including a partnership. Afterwards, the investigation covers the issue of the executive-member in the partnerships. Initially, an overview of the literature concerning the legal nature of the management is offered; then, the three different categories of partnership are analyzed, in order to understand whether such legal persons can be managed by a third party (i.e. a non-member). On the basis of the existing strict connection between executive powers and unlimited liability, the author concludes that only the members shall be manager of the partnerships. Another chapter of the thesis is centred, from the one hand, on the textual data that, after the reform of 2003, support the aforesaid conclusion; from the other hand, on the peculiar features of the corporate business that is executive of a partnership. In particular, the attention is focused on the necessity or on the mere opportunity of an article of association explicitly providing that a corporate business can be executive of the partnership; on the practical ways by which the former shall manage the latter (especially on the necessity of nominating a permanent representative of the legal person and on the possibility to designate the procurators to this end); on the disclosure obligations applicable to the case in point.