Labour, LGBT* rights, and Europe. Discourses in Italy and Serbia

At the time of writing, all three elements that are evoked in the title ��� emancipation and social inclusion of sexual minorities, labour and labour activism, and the idea and substance of ���Europe��� ��� are being invested by deep, long-term, and ��� to varied degrees ��� radical processes of social transformation. The meaning of words like ���equality���, ���rights���, ���inclusion���, and even ���democracy��� is as precarious and uncertain as are the lives of those European citizens who are marginalised by intersecting conditions of gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and class ��� in a constellation of precarities that is both unifying and fragmented (fragmenting). Conflicts are played, in hidden or explicit ways, over material processes of redistribution as well as discursive practices that revolve around these words. Against this backdrop, and roughly ten years after the European Union provided an input for institutional commitment to the protection of LGBT* workers' rights with the Council Directive 2000/78/EC, the dissertation contrasts discourses on workplace equality for LGBT* persons produced by a plurality of actors, seeking to identify values, semantics, and agendas framing and informing organisations��� views and showing how each actor has incorporated LGBT* rights into its own discourse, each time in a way that is functional to the construction and/or confirmation of its organisational identity: transnational union networks, by presenting LGBT* rights as a natural, neutral commitment within the framework of universal human rights protection; left-wing organisations, by collocating activism for LGBT* rights within a wider project of social emancipation that is for all the marginalised, yet is not neutral, but attached to specific values and opposed to specific political adversaries (the right-wing, the nationalists); business networks, by acknowledging diversity as a path to better performance and profits, thus encouraging inclusion and non-discrimination of ���deserving��� LGBT* workers.

Designing Electricity Auctions in the Presence of Transmission Constraints

This paper analyzes the effect that different designs in the access to fnancial transmission rights has on spot electricity auctions. In particular, I characterize the equilibrium in the spot electricity market when financial transmission rights are assigned to the grid operator and when financial transmission rights are assigned to the firm that submits the lowest bid in the spot electricity auction. When financial transmission rights are assigned to the grid operator, my model, in contrast with the models available in the literature, works out the equilibrium for any transmission capacity. Moreover, I have found that an increase in transmission capacity not only increases competition between markets but also within a single market. When financial transmission rights are assigned to the firm that submits the lowest bid in the spot electricity auction, firms compete not only for electricity demand, but also for transmission rights and the arbitrage profits derived from its hold. I have found that introduce competition for transmission rights reduces competition in spot electricity auctions.

Strumenti finanziari partecipativi e "nuovi" canali di finanziamento delle societa' per azioni

Il lavoro affronta il tema degli strumenti finanziari partecipativi e non partecipativi che possono essere emessi dalle societ�� per azioni, alla luce della disciplina introdotta dalla riforma del diritto societario. Lo studio �� diretto a fornire un inquadramento sistematico di queste modalit�� di finanziamento rispetto alla dicotomia azioni-obbligazioni, anche sotto il profilo contabile, per poi individuare le conseguenti implicazioni in termini di disciplina applicabile. Affrontando il dibattito dottrinale sulla collocazione complessiva degli strumenti ibridi rispetto alle forme di finanziamento tradizionali, si sposa l���opinione secondo cui tutti gli strumenti finanziari non possono essere ricompresi in una categoria unitaria, ma occorre mantenere distinti gli strumenti finanziari partecipativi indicati dall���art. 2346, comma 6, c.c., dagli altri strumenti finanziari ex art. 2411, comma 3, c.c., riconoscendo nei primi delle modalit�� di raccolta assimilabili al capitale di rischio e nei secondi delle forme di provvista di capitale di debito. Il connotato distintivo tra strumenti finanziari partecipativi e non partecipativi viene individuato non nell���attribuzione di diritti amministrativi ��� che possono anche non essere assegnati ai titolari di strumenti di cui all���art. 2346, comma 6 ��� bens�� nell���assenza o nella presenza di un obbligo di rimborso dell���apporto fornito all���impresa. Il lavoro esamina inoltre vari profili di disciplina di entrambe le categorie di strumenti, concentrandosi prevalentemente sui diritti patrimoniali ad essi attribuibili, tra cui la partecipazione agli utili e alle perdite e i diritti in sede di liquidazione. Infine si esaminano le previsioni recentemente introdotte dal d.l. n. 83/2012 in tema di titoli obbligazionari, al fine di valutarne l���impatto sull���impianto complessivo della disciplina vigente. In particolare, viene data attenzione alle nuove disposizioni relative alle obbligazioni subordinate e/o partecipative che possono essere emesse dalle societ�� non quotate, mettendo in evidenza le criticit�� dal punto di vista sistematico in tema di possibile partecipazione agli utili degli obbligazionisti.

Essays in Industrial Organization and Information Technology

Chapter 1 studies how consumers��� switching costs affect the pricing and profits of firms competing in two-sided markets such as Apple and Google in the smartphone market. When two-sided markets are dynamic ��� rather than merely static ��� I show that switching costs lower the first-period price if network externalities are strong, which is in contrast to what has been found in one-sided markets. By contrast, switching costs soften price competition in the initial period if network externalities are weak and consumers are more patient than the platforms. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first-period price on the other side. Chapter 2 examines firms��� incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while competition mitigates them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand correlation and the cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap, the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the relationship becomes negative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis also sheds light on some policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing. Chapter 3 develops a theory of sequential investments in cybersecurity. The regulator can use safety standards and liability rules to increase security. I show that the joint use of an optimal standard and a full liability rule leads to underinvestment ex ante and overinvestment ex post. Instead, switching to a partial liability rule can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that to improve security, the regulator should encourage not only firms, but also consumers to invest in security.

A Law and Economics Analysis of Trade Secrets: Optimal Scope of Law, Misappropriation and Alternative Damages Regimes

This thesis is primarily based on three core chapters, focused on the fundamental issues of trade secrets law. The goal of this thesis is to come up with policy recommendations to improve legal structure governing trade secrets. The focal points of this research are the following. What is the optimal scope of trade secrets law? How does it depend on the market characteristics such as degree of product differentiation between competing products? What factors need to be considered to balance the contradicting objectives of promoting innovation and knowledge diffusion? The second strand of this research focuses on the desirability of lost profits or unjust enrichment damage regimes in case of misappropriation of a trade secret. A comparison between these regimes is made and simple policy implications are extracted from the analysis. The last part of this research is an empirical analysis of a possible relationship between trade secrets sharing and misappropriation instances faced by firms.