A novel map-matching procedure for low-sampling GPS data with applications to traffic flow analysis

An extensive sample (2%) of private vehicles in Italy are equipped with a GPS device that periodically measures their position and dynamical state for insurance purposes. Having access to this type of data allows to develop theoretical and practical applications of great interest: the real-time reconstruction of traffic state in a certain region, the development of accurate models of vehicle dynamics, the study of the cognitive dynamics of drivers. In order for these applications to be possible, we first need to develop the ability to reconstruct the paths taken by vehicles on the road network from the raw GPS data. In fact, these data are affected by positioning errors and they are often very distanced from each other (~2 Km). For these reasons, the task of path identification is not straightforward. This thesis describes the approach we followed to reliably identify vehicle paths from this kind of low-sampling data. The problem of matching data with roads is solved with a bayesian approach of maximum likelihood. While the identification of the path taken between two consecutive GPS measures is performed with a specifically developed optimal routing algorithm, based on A* algorithm. The procedure was applied on an off-line urban data sample and proved to be robust and accurate. Future developments will extend the procedure to real-time execution and nation-wide coverage.

Essays on the Axiomatic Theory of Matching

This dissertation mimics the Turkish college admission procedure. It started with the purpose to reduce the inefficiencies in Turkish market. For this purpose, we propose a mechanism under a new market structure; as we prefer to call, semi-centralization. In chapter 1, we give a brief summary of Matching Theory. We present the first examples in Matching history with the most general papers and mechanisms. In chapter 2, we propose our mechanism. In real life application, that is in Turkish university placements, the mechanism reduces the inefficiencies of the current system. The success of the mechanism depends on the preference profile. It is easy to show that under complete information the mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings for a given profile. In chapter 3, we refine our basic mechanism. The modification on the mechanism has a crucial effect on the results. The new mechanism is, as we call, a middle mechanism. In one of the subdomain, this mechanism coincides with the original basic mechanism. But, in the other partition, it gives the same results with Gale and Shapley's algorithm. In chapter 4, we apply our basic mechanism to well known Roommate Problem. Since the roommate problem is in one-sided game patern, firstly we propose an auxiliary function to convert the game semi centralized two-sided game, because our basic mechanism is designed for this framework. We show that this process is succesful in finding a stable matching in the existence of stability. We also show that our mechanism easily and simply tells us if a profile lacks of stability by using purified orderings. Finally, we show a method to find all the stable matching in the existence of multi stability. The method is simply to run the mechanism for all of the top agents in the social preference.