Cooperation and competition in the air transport market: current scenario, possible evolutions and analytical tools

dall'avvento della liberalizzazione, aeroporti e vettori hanno vissuto cambiamenti. Il maggior miglioramneto nella gestione degli aeroporti è una gestione più commerciale ed efficiente. Le forme di regolazione economica e le caratteristiche della gestione manageriale sono state indagate. Dodici paesi sono stati scelti per indagare la situazione del trasporto aereo mondiale, fra questi sia paesi con un sistema maturo sia paesi emergenti. La distribuzione del traffico è stata analizzata con l'indice HHI per evidenziare aeroporti con concentrazione maggiore di 0,25 (in accordo con la normativa statunitense); il sistema aeroportuale è stato analizzato con l'indice di Gini e con l'indice di dominanza. Infine, la teoria dei giochi si è dimostrata un valido supporto per studiare il mercato del trasporto aereo anche con l'uso di giochi di tipo DP

Shareholder protection and stock market development

The dissertation contains five parts: An introduction, three major chapters, and a short conclusion. The First Chapter starts from a survey and discussion of the studies on corporate law and financial development literature. The commonly used methods in these cross-sectional analyses are biased as legal origins are no longer valid instruments. Hence, the model uncertainty becomes a salient problem. The Bayesian Model Averaging algorithm is applied to test the robustness of empirical results in Djankov et al. (2008). The analysis finds that their constructed legal index is not robustly correlated with most of the various stock market outcome variables. The second Chapter looks into the effects of minority shareholders protection in corporate governance regime on entrepreneurs' ex ante incentives to undertake IPO. Most of the current literature focuses on the beneficial part of minority shareholder protection on valuation, while overlooks its private costs on entrepreneur's control. As a result, the entrepreneur trade-offs the costs of monitoring with the benefits of cheap sources of finance when minority shareholder protection improves. The theoretical predictions are empirically tested using panel data and GMM-sys estimator. The third Chapter investigates the corporate law and corporate governance reform in China. The corporate law in China regards shareholder control as the means to the ends of pursuing the interests of stakeholders, which is inefficient. The Chapter combines the recent development of theories of the firm, i.e., the team production theory and the property rights theory, to solve such problem. The enlightened shareholder value, which emphasizes on the long term valuation of the firm, should be adopted as objectives of listed firms. In addition, a move from the mandatory division of power between shareholder meeting and board meeting to the default regime, is proposed.

Essays on the Axiomatic Theory of Matching

This dissertation mimics the Turkish college admission procedure. It started with the purpose to reduce the inefficiencies in Turkish market. For this purpose, we propose a mechanism under a new market structure; as we prefer to call, semi-centralization. In chapter 1, we give a brief summary of Matching Theory. We present the first examples in Matching history with the most general papers and mechanisms. In chapter 2, we propose our mechanism. In real life application, that is in Turkish university placements, the mechanism reduces the inefficiencies of the current system. The success of the mechanism depends on the preference profile. It is easy to show that under complete information the mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings for a given profile. In chapter 3, we refine our basic mechanism. The modification on the mechanism has a crucial effect on the results. The new mechanism is, as we call, a middle mechanism. In one of the subdomain, this mechanism coincides with the original basic mechanism. But, in the other partition, it gives the same results with Gale and Shapley's algorithm. In chapter 4, we apply our basic mechanism to well known Roommate Problem. Since the roommate problem is in one-sided game patern, firstly we propose an auxiliary function to convert the game semi centralized two-sided game, because our basic mechanism is designed for this framework. We show that this process is succesful in finding a stable matching in the existence of stability. We also show that our mechanism easily and simply tells us if a profile lacks of stability by using purified orderings. Finally, we show a method to find all the stable matching in the existence of multi stability. The method is simply to run the mechanism for all of the top agents in the social preference.