Il conflitto fra trasparenza sui mercati finanziari ed esigenza di riservatezza della società

The thesis main topic is the conflict between disclosure in financial markets and the need for confidentiality of the firm. After a recognition of the major dynamics of information production and dissemination in the stock market, the analysis moves to the interactions between the information that a firm is tipically interested in keeping confidential, such as trade secrets or the data usually covered by patent protection, and the countervailing demand for disclosure arising from finacial markets. The analysis demonstrates that despite the seeming divergence between informational contents tipically disclosed to investors and information usually covered by intellectual property protection, the overlapping areas are nonetheless wide and the conflict between transparency in financial markets and the firm’s need for confidentiality arises frequently and sistematically. Indeed, the company’s disclosure policy is based on a continuous trade-off between the costs and the benefits related to the public dissemination of information. Such costs are mainly represented by the competitive harm caused by competitors’ access to sensitive data, while the benefits mainly refer to the lower cost of capital that the firm obtains as a consequence of more disclosure. Secrecy shields the value of costly produced information against third parties’ free riding and constitutes therefore a means to protect the firm’s incentives toward the production of new information and especially toward technological and business innovation. Excessively demanding standards of transparency in financial markets might hinder such set of incentives and thus jeopardize the dynamics of innovation production. Within Italian securities regulation, there are two sets of rules mostly relevant with respect to such an issue: the first one is the rule that mandates issuers to promptly disclose all price-sensitive information to the market on an ongoing basis; the second one is the duty to disclose in the prospectus all the information “necessary to enable investors to make an informed assessment” of the issuers’ financial and economic perspectives. Both rules impose high disclosure standards and have potentially unlimited scope. Yet, they have safe harbours aimed at protecting the issuer need for confidentiality. Despite the structural incompatibility between public dissemination of information and the firm’s need to keep certain data confidential, there are certain ways to convey information to the market while preserving at the same time the firm’s need for confidentality. Such means are insider trading and selective disclosure: both are based on mechanics whereby the process of price reaction to the new information takes place without any corresponding activity of public release of data. Therefore, they offer a solution to the conflict between disclosure and the need for confidentiality that enhances market efficiency and preserves at the same time the private set of incentives toward innovation.

Essays on firm efficiency with imperfectly competitive input markets: an empirical analysis

In the thesis I exploit an empirical analysis on firm'’s productivity. I relate the efficiency at plant level with the input market features and I suggest an estimation technique for production function that takes into account firm'’s liquidity constraints. The main results are three. When I consider services as inputs for manufacturing firm’'s production process, I find that more competition in service sector affects positively plant’s productivity and export decision. Secondly liquidity constraints are important for the calculation of firm'’s productivity because they are a second source of firm's heterogeneity. Third liquidity constraints are important for firm'’s internationalization

The secondary market for life insurance policies in the United States market evolution and product valuation

In this work we discuss the secondary market for life insurance policies in the United States of America. First, we give an overview of the life settlement market: how it came into existence, its growth prospects and the ethical issues it arises. Secondly, we discuss the characteristics of the different life insurance products present in the market and describe how life settlements are originated. Life settlement transactions tend to be long and complex transactions that require the involvement of a number of parties. Also, a direct investment into life insurance policies is fraught with a number of practical issues and entails risks that are not directly related to longevity. This may reduce the efficiency of a direct investment in physical policies. For these reasons, a synthetic longevity market has evolved. The number of parties involved in a synthetic longevity transaction is typically smaller and the broker-dealer transferring the longevity exposure will be retaining most or all of the risks a physical investment entails. Finally, we describe the main methods used in the market to evaluate life settlement investments and the role of life expectancy providers.

On the Efficiency of the Benchmarks Used in the Asset Management

In this work we studied the efficiency of the benchmarks used in the asset management industry. In chapter 2 we analyzed the efficiency of the benchmark used for the government bond markets. We found that for the Emerging Market Bonds an equally weighted index for the country weights is probably the more suited because guarantees maximum diversification of country risk but for the Eurozone government bond market we found a GDP weighted index is better because the most important matter is to avoid a higher weight for highly indebted countries. In chapter 3 we analyzed the efficiency of a Derivatives Index to invest in the European corporate bond market instead of a Cash Index. We can state that the two indexes are similar in terms of returns, but that the Derivatives Index is less risky because it has a lower volatility, has values of skewness and kurtosis closer to those of a normal distribution and is a more liquid instrument, as the autocorrelation is not significant. In chapter 4 it is analyzed the impact of fallen angels on the corporate bond portfolios. Our analysis investigated the impact of the month-end rebalancing of the ML Emu Non Financial Corporate Index for the exit of downgraded bond (the event). We can conclude a flexible approach to the month-end rebalancing is better in order to avoid a loss of valued due to the benchmark construction rules. In chapter 5 we did a comparison between the equally weighted and capitalization weighted method for the European equity market. The benefit which results from reweighting the portfolio into equal weights can be attributed to the fact that EW portfolios implicitly follow a contrarian investment strategy, because they mechanically rebalance away from stocks that increase in price.

The market manipulation regime in the European Union

Market manipulation is an illegal practice that enables a person can profit from practices that artificially raise or lower the prices of an instrument in the financial markets. Its prohibition is based on the 2003 Market Abuse Directive in the EU. The current market manipulation regime was broadly considered as a big success except for enforcement and supervisory inconsistencies in the Member States at the initial. A review of the market manipulation regime began at the end of 2007, which became quickly incorporated into the wider EU crisis-era reform program. A number of weaknesses of current regime have been identified, which include regulatory gaps caused by the development of trading venues and financial products, regulatory gaps concerning cross-border and cross-markets manipulation (particular commodity markets), legal uncertainty as a result of various implementation, and inefficient supervision and enforcement. On 12 June 2014, a new regulatory package of market abuse, Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse, has been adopted. And several changes will be made concerning the EU market manipulation regime. A wider scope of the regime and a new prohibition of attempted market manipulation will ensure the prevention of market manipulation at large. The AMPs will be subject to strict scrutiny of ESMA to reduce divergences in implementation. In order to enhance efficiency of supervision and enforcement, powers of national competent authorities will be strengthened, ESMA is imposed more power to settle disagreement between national regulators, and the administrative and criminal sanctioning regimes are both further harmonized. In addition, the protection of fundamental rights is stressed by the new market manipulation regime, and some measures are provided to guarantee its realization. Further, the success EU market manipulation regime could be of significant reference to China, helping China to refine its immature regime.