Essays in nonlinear pricing and rent seeking

This thesis consists of three self-contained essays on nonlinear pricing and rent-seeking. In the first chapter of the thesis, I provide new theoretical insights about non-linear pricing in monopoly and common agency by combining the principal-agent framework with other-regarding preferences. I introduce a new theoretical model that separately characterizes status-seeker and inequity-averse buyers. I show how the buyer’s optimal choice of quality and market inefficiency change when the buyer has other-regarding preferences. In the second chapter, I find the optimal productive rent-seeking and sabotaging efforts when the prize is endogenous. I show that due to the existence of endogeneity, sabotaging the productive rent-seeking efforts causes sabotaging the endogenous part of the prize, which can affect the rent-seeking efforts. Moreover, I introduce social preferences into my model and characterize symmetric productive rent-seeking and sabotaging efforts. In the last chapter, I propose a new theoretical model regarding information disclosure with Bayesian persuasion in rent-seeking contests when the efforts are productive. I show that under one-sided incomplete information, information disclosure decision depends on both the marginal costs of efforts and the marginal benefit of aggregate exerted effort. I find that since the efforts are productive and add a positive surplus on the fixed rent, my model narrows down the conditions for the information disclosure compared to the exogenous model. Under the two-sided incomplete information case, I observe that there is a non-monotone relationship between optimal effort and posterior beliefs. Thus, it might be difficult to conclude whether a contest organizer should disclose any information to contestants.

Three Essays in Spatial Economics

This work contributes to the field of spatial economics by embracing three distinct modelling approaches, belonging to different strands of the theoretical literature. In the first chapter I present a theoretical model in which the changes in urban system’s degree of functional specialisation are linked to (i) firms’ organisational choices and firms’ location decisions. The interplay between firms’ internal communication/managing costs (between headquarters and production plants) and the cost of communicating with distant business services providers leads the transition process from an “integrated” urban system where each city hosts every different functions to a “functionally specialised” urban system where each city is either a primary business center (hosting advanced business services providers, a secondary business center or a pure manufacturing city and all this city-types coexist in equilibrium.The second chapter investigates the impact of free trade on welfare in a two-country world modelled as an international Hotelling duopoly with quadratic transport costs and asymmetric countries, where a negative environmental externality is associated with the consumption of the good produced in the smaller country. Countries’ relative sizes as well as the intensity of negative environmental externality affect potential welfare gains of trade liberalisation. The third chapter focuses on the paradox, by which, contrary to theoretical predictions, empirical evidence shows that a decrease in international transport costs causes an increase in foreign direct investments (FDIs). Here we propose an explanation to this apparent puzzle by exploiting an approach which delivers a continuum of Bertrand- Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing. In our setting, two Bertrand firms, supplying a homogeneous good with a convex cost function, enter the market of a foreign country. We show that allowing for a softer price competition may indeed more than offset the standard effect generated by a decrease in trade costs, thereby restoring FDI incentives.

The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: Lessons from Corporate Governance

This dissertation seeks to improve the usage of direct democracy in order to minimize agency cost. It first explains why insights from corporate governance can help to improve constitutional law and then identifies relevant insights from corporate governance that can make direct democracy more efficient. To accomplish this, the dissertation examines a number of questions. What are the key similarities in corporate and constitutional law? Do these similarities create agency problems that are similar enough for a comparative analysis to yield valuable insights? Once the utility of corporate governance insights is established, the dissertation answers two questions. Are initiatives necessary to minimize agency cost if referendums are already provided for? And, must the results of direct democracy be binding in order for agency cost to be minimized?