Local home bias: Theory and new empirical evidence from Italy

This thesis examines the literature on local home bias, i.e. investor preference towards geographically nearby stocks, and investigates the role of firm’s visibility, profitability, and opacity in explaining such behavior. While firm’s visibility is expected to proxy for the behavioral root originating such a preference, firm’s profitability and opacity are expected to capture the informational one. I find that less visible, and more profitable and opaque firms, conditionally to the demand, benefit from being headquartered in regions characterized by a scarcity of listed firms (local supply of stocks). Specifically, research estimates suggest that firms headquartered in regions with a poor supply of stocks would be worth i) 11 percent more if non-visible, non-profitable and non-opaque; ii) 16 percent more if profitable; and iii) 28 percent more if both profitable and opaque. Overall, as these features are able to explain most, albeit not all, of the local home bias effect, I reasonably argue and then assess that most of the preference for local is determined by a successful attempt to exploit local information advantage (60 percent), while the rest is determined by a mere (irrational) feeling of familiarity with the local firm (40 percent). Several and significant methodological, theoretical, and practical implications come out.

Essays on the Axiomatic Theory of Matching

This dissertation mimics the Turkish college admission procedure. It started with the purpose to reduce the inefficiencies in Turkish market. For this purpose, we propose a mechanism under a new market structure; as we prefer to call, semi-centralization. In chapter 1, we give a brief summary of Matching Theory. We present the first examples in Matching history with the most general papers and mechanisms. In chapter 2, we propose our mechanism. In real life application, that is in Turkish university placements, the mechanism reduces the inefficiencies of the current system. The success of the mechanism depends on the preference profile. It is easy to show that under complete information the mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings for a given profile. In chapter 3, we refine our basic mechanism. The modification on the mechanism has a crucial effect on the results. The new mechanism is, as we call, a middle mechanism. In one of the subdomain, this mechanism coincides with the original basic mechanism. But, in the other partition, it gives the same results with Gale and Shapley's algorithm. In chapter 4, we apply our basic mechanism to well known Roommate Problem. Since the roommate problem is in one-sided game patern, firstly we propose an auxiliary function to convert the game semi centralized two-sided game, because our basic mechanism is designed for this framework. We show that this process is succesful in finding a stable matching in the existence of stability. We also show that our mechanism easily and simply tells us if a profile lacks of stability by using purified orderings. Finally, we show a method to find all the stable matching in the existence of multi stability. The method is simply to run the mechanism for all of the top agents in the social preference.