Le politiche giudiziarie inglesi degli anni 2000: mutamento di paradigma e rafforzamento dell'incisività politica dei giudici

The Ph.D. dissertation analyses the reasons for which political actors (governments, legislatures and political parties) decide consciously to give away a source of power by increasing the political significance of the courts. It focuses on a single case of particular significance: the passage of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 in the United Kingdom. This Act has deeply changed the governance and the organization of the English judicial system, has provided a much clearer separation of powers and a stronger independence of the judiciary from the executive and the legislative. What’s more, this strengthening of the judicial independence has been decided in a period in which the political role of the English judges was evidently increasing. I argue that the reform can be interpreted as a «paradigm shift» (Hall 1993), that has changed the way in which the judicial power is considered. The most diffused conceptions in the sub-system of the English judicial policies are shifted, and a new paradigm has become dominant. The new paradigm includes: (i) stronger separation of powers, (ii) collective (as well as individual) conception of the independence of the judiciary, (iii) reduction of the political accountability of the judges, (iv) formalization of the guarantees of judicial independence, (v) principle-driven (instead of pragmatic) approach to the reforms, and (vi) transformation of a non-codified constitution in a codified one. Judicialization through political decisions represent an important, but not fully explored, field of research. The literature, in particular, has focused on factors unable to explain the English case: the competitiveness of the party system (Ramseyer 1994), the political uncertainty at the time of constitutional design (Ginsburg 2003), the cultural divisions within the polity (Hirschl 2004), federal institutions and division of powers (Shapiro 2002). All these contributes link the decision to enhance the political relevance of the judges to some kind of diffusion of political power. In the contemporary England, characterized by a relative high concentration of power in the government, the reasons for such a reform should be located elsewhere. I argue that the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 can be interpreted as a result of three different kinds of reasons: (i) the social and demographical transformations of the English judiciary, which have made inefficient most of the precedent mechanism of governance, (ii) the role played by the judges in the policy process and (iii) the cognitive and normative influences originated from the European context, as a consequence of the membership of the United Kingdom to the European Union and the Council of Europe. My thesis is that only a full analysis of all these three aspects can explain the decision to reform the judicial system and the content of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Only the cultural influences come from the European legal complex, above all, can explain the paradigm shift previously described.

The Council of Ministers of the European Union After the Lisbon Treaty

The Treaty of Lisbon has brought remarkable changes and innovations to the European Union. As far as the Council of Ministers of the European Union (“the Council” hereinafter) is concerned, there are two significant innovations: double qualified majority voting and new rotating Presidency scheme, which are considered to make the working of the Council more efficiently, stably and consistently. With the modification relating to other key institutions, the Commission and the European Parliament, and with certain procedures being re-codified, the power of the Council varies accordingly, where the inter-institutional balance counts for more research. As the Council is one of the co-legislatures of the Union, the legislative function of it would be probably influenced, positively or negatively, by the internal innovations and the inter-institutional re-balance. Has the legislative function of the Council been reinforced or not? How could the Council better reach its functional goal designed by the Treaties’ drafter? How to evaluate the Council’s evolution after Lisbon Treaty in the light of European integration? This thesis is attempting to find the answers by analyzing two main internal innovations and inter-institutional re-balance thereinafter.