The Effectiveness of the Clean Development Mechanism – A law and economics analysis

Climate change has been acknowledged as a threat to humanity. Most scholars agree that to avert dangerous climate change and to transform economies into low-carbon societies, deep global emission reductions are required by the year 2050. Under the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the only market-based instrument that encourages industrialised countries to pursue emission reductions in developing countries. The CDM aims to pay the incremental finance necessary to operationalize emission reduction projects which are otherwise not financially viable. According to the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM should finance projects that are additional to those which would have happened anyway, contribute to sustainable development in the countries hosting the projects, and be cost-effective. To enable the identification of such projects, an institutional framework has been established by the Kyoto Protocol which lays out responsibilities for public and private actors. This thesis examines whether the CDM has achieved these objectives in practice and can thus be considered an effective tool to reduce emissions. To complete this investigation, the book applies economic theory and analyses the CDM from two perspectives. The first perspective is the supply-dimension which answers the question of how, in practice, the CDM system identified additional, cost-effective, sustainable projects and, generated emission reductions. The main contribution of this book is the second perspective, the compliance-dimension, which answers the question of whether industrialised countries effectively used the CDM for compliance with their Kyoto targets. The application of the CDM in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is used as a case-study. Where the analysis identifies inefficiencies within the supply or the compliance dimension, potential improvements of the legal framework are proposed and discussed.

The Law and Economics of Eco-labels

Eco-labels and certification are one of the many environmental policy tools that have been under scrutiny in recent years. This is because the damages of environmental degradation are becoming more apparent over time. Hence there is a pressure to come up with tools that help solve even small parts of the problem. Eco-labels have been around for over 30 years. However the market, the environment and eco-labels have changed drastically during this period. Moreover, in the last 5 years there has been a sudden increase in eco-labels making them more visible in the market and to the average consumer. All this has made evident that little is known about the effectiveness of eco-labels as environmental policy tools. Hence, there is a call to find answers regarding the actual effects of eco-labels on the market and on the environment. While this work cannot address whether eco-labels have an environmental impact it addresses the effects of eco-labels on the markets. Moreover, this work aimed to find the role of law in eco-labelling. In addition, it aims to find a legal solution that would improve the performance of eco-labelling and certification.

Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in European Banking

This dissertation investigates corporate governance and dividend policy in banking. This topic has recently attracted the attention of numerous scholars all over the world and currently remains one of the most discussed topics in Banking. The core of the dissertation is constituted by three papers. The first paper generalizes the main achievements in the field of relevant study using the approach of meta-analysis. The second paper provides an empirical analysis of the effect of banking corporate governance on dividend payout. Finally, the third paper investigates empirically the effect of government bailout during 2007-2010 on corporate governance and dividend policy of banks. The dissertation uses a new hand-collected data set with information on corporate governance, ownership structure and compensation structure for a sample of listed banks from 15 European countries for the period 2005-2010. The empirical papers employ such econometric approaches as Within-Group model, difference-in-difference technique, and propensity score matching method based on the Nearest Neighbor Matching estimator. The main empirical results may be summarized as follows. First, we provide evidence that CEO power and connection to government are associated with lower dividend payout ratios. This result supports the view that banking regulators are prevalently concerned about the safety of the bank, and powerful bank CEOs can afford to distribute low payout ratios, at the expense of minority shareholders. Next, we find that government bailout during 2007-2010 changes the banks’ ownership structure and helps to keep lending by bailed bank at the pre-crisis level. Finally, we provide robust evidence for increased control over the banks that receive government money. These findings show the important role of government when overcoming the consequences of the banking crisis, and high quality of governance of public bailouts in European countries.

Sanctions and public enforcement of insider trading laws in Europe

The recent financial crisis triggered an increasing demand for financial regulation to counteract the potential negative economic effects of the evermore complex operations and instruments available on financial markets. As a result, insider trading regulation counts amongst the relatively recent but particularly active regulation battles in Europe and overseas. Claims for more transparency and equitable securities markets proliferate, ranging from concerns about investor protection to global market stability. The internationalization of the world’s securities market has challenged traditional notions of regulation and enforcement. Considering that insider trading is currently forbidden all over Europe, this study follows a law and economics approach in identifying how this prohibition should be enforced. More precisely, the study investigates first whether criminal law is necessary under all circumstances to enforce insider trading; second, if it should be introduced at EU level. This study provides evidence of law and economics theoretical logic underlying the legal mechanisms that guide sanctioning and public enforcement of the insider trading prohibition by identifying optimal forms, natures and types of sanctions that effectively induce insider trading deterrence. The analysis further aims to reveal the economic rationality that drives the potential need for harmonization of criminal enforcement of insider trading laws within the European environment by proceeding to a comparative analysis of the current legislations of height selected Member States. This work also assesses the European Union’s most recent initiative through a critical analysis of the proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for Market Abuse. Based on the conclusions drawn from its close analysis, the study takes on the challenge of analyzing whether or not the actual European public enforcement of the laws prohibiting insider trading is coherent with the theoretical law and economics recommendations, and how these enforcement practices could be improved.

Judges and Mass Litigation - a (Behavioural) Law and Economics Perspective

Judicial duties have for decades extended far beyond the scope of traditional adjudication, judges being progressively called upon to occupy the role of social engineers. Meanwhile, contexts in which judges evolve have transformed: mass damage nowadays tends to multiply and create new challenges not only for legal actors, but also for society at large. In spring 2011, the replies received by the European Commission to its public consultation on collective redress indicated European stakeholders’ strong interest in seeing judiciaries play prominent and leading roles in the supervision and monitoring of procedures which enable groups of claimants to seek together compensation for damage caused by mass events. Judges are thus expected to be neutral and robust agents while assuming heavy responsibilities under a considerable burden. Insights from social sciences however invite us to revisit policymakers expectations and may shed new light on current debates about mass litigation.

A Law and Economics Analysis of Trade Secrets: Optimal Scope of Law, Misappropriation and Alternative Damages Regimes

This thesis is primarily based on three core chapters, focused on the fundamental issues of trade secrets law. The goal of this thesis is to come up with policy recommendations to improve legal structure governing trade secrets. The focal points of this research are the following. What is the optimal scope of trade secrets law? How does it depend on the market characteristics such as degree of product differentiation between competing products? What factors need to be considered to balance the contradicting objectives of promoting innovation and knowledge diffusion? The second strand of this research focuses on the desirability of lost profits or unjust enrichment damage regimes in case of misappropriation of a trade secret. A comparison between these regimes is made and simple policy implications are extracted from the analysis. The last part of this research is an empirical analysis of a possible relationship between trade secrets sharing and misappropriation instances faced by firms.

Fighting corruption with pyramids: A Law and Economics approach to combating corruption in post-socialist countries

Corruption is, in the last two decades, considered as one of the biggest problems within the international community, which harms not only a particular state or society but the whole world. The discussion on corruption in law and economics approach is mainly run under the veil of Public choice theory and principal-agent model. Based on this approach the strong international initiatives taken by the UN, the OECD and the Council of Europe, provided various measures and tools in order to support and guide countries in their combat against corruption. These anti-corruption policies created a repression -prevention-transparency model for corruption combat. Applying this model, countries around the world adopted anti-corruption strategies as part of their legal rules. Nevertheless, the recent researches on the effects of this move show non impressive results. Critics argue that “one size does not fit all” because the institutional setting of countries around the world varies. Among the countries which experience problems of corruption, even though they follow the dominant anti-corruption trends, are transitional, post-socialist countries. To this group belong the countries which are emerging from centrally planned to an open market economy. The socialist past left traces on institutional setting, mentality of the individuals and their interrelation, particularly in the domain of public administration. If the idiosyncrasy of these countries is taken into account the suggestion in this thesis is that in public administration in post-socialist countries, instead of dominant anti-corruption scheme repression-prevention-transparency, corruption combat should be improved through the implementation of a new one, structure-conduct-performance. The implementation of this model is based on three regulatory pyramids: anti-corruption, disciplinary anti-corruption and criminal anti-corruption pyramid. This approach asks public administration itself to engage in corruption combat, leaving criminal justice system as the ultimate weapon, used only for the very harmful misdeeds.

Transitional Justice as a Post-Revolution Constitutional Arrangement: A Law and Economics Approach

This dissertation addresses the timely questions of transitional justice (TJ) in the aftermath of revolutions against autocratic regimes, dealing with TJ as a constitutional arrangement through the lenses of constitutional economics. After an introductory chapter, chapter 2 deals with why nations rarely adopt meaningful TJ processes in the first place, it then explains the limitations of civil society as the arbiter, facilitator, and enforcer of TJ policies. Chapter 3 tackles the question of which mechanisms to choose? It uses the UN Guidelines on TJ that sets five principal TJ mechanisms. It provides a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of each mechanism and suggests policy implications accordingly. The CBA inspires chapter 4 analysis, suggesting a tradeoff between restrictive fair trial standards under constitutional laws and justice considerations. The tradeoff explains the suggested efficiency of the balanced TJ approaches that combine trials and amnesties. This approach is used for the case study analysis of TJ in Tunisia after the 2011 revolution in chapter 5. The chapter presents the first index of TJ mechanisms in Tunisia through novel data collected by the author. It shows an ultimate TJ design that ended with a modest harvest in the application. The lack of cooperation between the Tunisian parties, added to the absence of transparency in many TJ measures, threatens any possible positive outcomes of the partial TJ process. It is also alarming regarding constitutional compliance in a system that – until recently - was considered the only democracy in the Arab region. Chapter 6 is a summary

Reconciling the Irreconcilable? Sovereign Debt Restructuring and the Principles of International Law. A Law and Economics Perspective

This Thesis focuses on the principles of international law relevant to the resolution of legal disputes arising from sovereign insolvency conflicts. It attempts to contribute to the “incremental” approach literature by identifying principles, justifying their application in litigation and assessing whether they may help to reconcile the trade-offs prevalent in that context. For that purpose, this Thesis distinguishes between two different types of principles. First, it investigates the “Principles of Public International Law” (henceforth, “PIL principles”). Said category refers to norms of the law of nations which can be considered functionally and structurally similar to domestic constitutional principles (i.e., that can be regarded as “optimization” or “prima facie” requirements). This Thesis underscores the PIL principles protecting the interests of the creditors and citizens as well as the “public interest”, arguing that decision makers face a trade-off between these principles in the context of restructurings. Secondly, this Thesis inquires into the “general principles of domestic law” (henceforth, “GPDs”) which can be applied in sovereign debt restructuring. Two GPDs are identified: a “stay” on litigation and a “cram down” on dissenting creditors’ claims. Although both principles have been identified by the prior literature, this work advances a small but significant “twist” in the methodology used for that purpose: it relies exclusively on functional and comparative analysis. Moreover, this work justifies the application of said GPDs for two jurisdictions: New York and Germany. Finally, it posits that those GPDs can help to mitigate the trade-offs between PIL principles, thus reconciling the interests at stake.

Ex ante contracts to arbitrate tort claims - A law and economics perspective

This research addresses the use of ex ante contracts to arbitrate tort claims in domestic settings using law and economics research methodologies. Potential economic benefits from using arbitration, particularly between informed and knowledgeable parties and in international business transactions, are not guaranteed in domestic disputes. Arbitration can potentially be used to manipulate the adjudication process. This research has several findings. There is a lack of information available concerning the use of arbitration to adjudicate tort claims. Proxy measurements concerning the demand for third party adjudication and other legal indicators are a poor substitute for the information hidden behind the veil of arbitration. There is the potential for the strategic use of ex ante contracts to arbitrate tort claims by repeat player tortfeasors to domestic tort claims, both individually and in concert with other repeat player firms. These strategic efforts aim to: manipulate enforcement errors for tort claims, avoid procedural rules which have the effect of lowering enforcement errors, enable a unique type of domestic forum arbitrage, shirk from taking due care, capture the economic benefit of using arbitration, manipulate the stock of precedents and production of public goods from courts, collude in these underlying efforts, restrain competition, indirectly fix prices, and other aims which increase the repeat player tortfeasor’s or their industries economic gains related to their underlying contracts and tort disputes. This research also demonstrates how this subject is appropriate for further academic research and why states should be cautious of giving carte blanche to arbitrate all domestic tort claims.