Le politiche giudiziarie inglesi degli anni 2000: mutamento di paradigma e rafforzamento dell'incisività politica dei giudici

The Ph.D. dissertation analyses the reasons for which political actors (governments, legislatures and political parties) decide consciously to give away a source of power by increasing the political significance of the courts. It focuses on a single case of particular significance: the passage of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 in the United Kingdom. This Act has deeply changed the governance and the organization of the English judicial system, has provided a much clearer separation of powers and a stronger independence of the judiciary from the executive and the legislative. What’s more, this strengthening of the judicial independence has been decided in a period in which the political role of the English judges was evidently increasing. I argue that the reform can be interpreted as a «paradigm shift» (Hall 1993), that has changed the way in which the judicial power is considered. The most diffused conceptions in the sub-system of the English judicial policies are shifted, and a new paradigm has become dominant. The new paradigm includes: (i) stronger separation of powers, (ii) collective (as well as individual) conception of the independence of the judiciary, (iii) reduction of the political accountability of the judges, (iv) formalization of the guarantees of judicial independence, (v) principle-driven (instead of pragmatic) approach to the reforms, and (vi) transformation of a non-codified constitution in a codified one. Judicialization through political decisions represent an important, but not fully explored, field of research. The literature, in particular, has focused on factors unable to explain the English case: the competitiveness of the party system (Ramseyer 1994), the political uncertainty at the time of constitutional design (Ginsburg 2003), the cultural divisions within the polity (Hirschl 2004), federal institutions and division of powers (Shapiro 2002). All these contributes link the decision to enhance the political relevance of the judges to some kind of diffusion of political power. In the contemporary England, characterized by a relative high concentration of power in the government, the reasons for such a reform should be located elsewhere. I argue that the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 can be interpreted as a result of three different kinds of reasons: (i) the social and demographical transformations of the English judiciary, which have made inefficient most of the precedent mechanism of governance, (ii) the role played by the judges in the policy process and (iii) the cognitive and normative influences originated from the European context, as a consequence of the membership of the United Kingdom to the European Union and the Council of Europe. My thesis is that only a full analysis of all these three aspects can explain the decision to reform the judicial system and the content of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Only the cultural influences come from the European legal complex, above all, can explain the paradigm shift previously described.

Caratteristiche innovative nell'acquisizione di dati di informatica forense in ambienti virtuali

Come risposta positiva alle richieste provenienti dal mondo dei giuristi, spesso troppo distante da quello scientifico, si vuole sviluppare un sistema solido dal punto di vista tecnico e chiaro dal punto di vista giurico finalizzato ad migliore ricerca della verità. L’obiettivo ci si prefigge è quello di creare uno strumento versatile e di facile utilizzo da mettere a disposizione dell’A.G. ed eventualmente della P.G. operante finalizzato a consentire il proseguo dell’attività d’indagine in tempi molto rapidi e con un notevole contenimento dei costi di giustizia rispetto ad una normale CTU. La progetto verterà su analisi informatiche forensi di supporti digitali inerenti vari tipi di procedimento per cui si dovrebbe richiedere una CTU o una perizia. La sperimentazione scientifica prevede un sistema di partecipazione diretta della P.G. e della A.G. all’analisi informatica rendendo disponibile, sottoforma di macchina virtuale, il contenuto dei supporti sequestrati in modo che possa essere visionato alla pari del supporto originale. In questo modo il CT diventa una mera guida per la PG e l’AG nell’ambito dell’indagine informatica forense che accompagna il giudice e le parti alla migliore comprensione delle informazioni richieste dal quesito. Le fasi chiave della sperimentazione sono: • la ripetibilità delle operazioni svolte • dettare delle chiare linee guida per la catena di custodia dalla presa in carico dei supporti • i metodi di conservazione e trasmissione dei dati tali da poter garantire integrità e riservatezza degli stessi • tempi e costi ridotti rispetto alle normali CTU/perizie • visualizzazione diretta dei contenuti dei supporti analizzati delle Parti e del Giudice circoscritte alle informazioni utili ai fini di giustizia

Medical Malpractice in Public Healthcare Systems: An Empirical Investigation of Scheduled Damages

In the last decades, medical malpractice has been framed as one of the most critical issues for healthcare providers and health policy, holding a central role on both the policy agenda and public debate. The Law and Economics literature has devoted much attention to medical malpractice and to the investigation of the impact of malpractice reforms. Nonetheless, some reforms have been much less empirically studied as in the case of schedules, and their effects remain highly debated. The present work seeks to contribute to the study of medical malpractice and of schedules of noneconomic damages in a civil law country with a public national health system, using Italy as case study. Besides considering schedules and exploiting a quasi-experimental setting, the novelty of our contribution consists in the inclusion of the performance of the judiciary (measured as courts’ civil backlog) in the empirical analysis. The empirical analysis is twofold. First, it investigates how limiting compensations for pain and suffering through schedules impacts on the malpractice insurance market in terms of presence of private insurers and of premiums applied. Second, it examines whether, and to what extent, healthcare providers react to the implementation of this policy in terms of both levels and composition of the medical treatments offered. Our findings show that the introduction of schedules increases the presence of insurers only in inefficient courts, while it does not produce significant effects on paid premiums. Judicial inefficiency is attractive to insurers for average values of schedules penetration of the market, with an increasing positive impact of inefficiency as the territorial coverage of schedules increases. Moreover, the implementation of schedules tends to reduce the use of defensive practices on the part of clinicians, but the magnitude of this impact is ultimately determined by the actual degree of backlog of the court implementing schedules.