The changing politics of preference formation in international trade negotiations: the European Union in the Doha Round

This research seeks to provide an explanation for variations of “politics” of preference formation in international trade negotiations. Building on the ‘policy determines politics’ argument, I hypothesize the existence of a causal relationship between issue-characteristics and their variations with politics dynamics and their variations. More specifically, this study seeks to integrate into a single analytical framework two dimensions along which variations in the “politics of preference formation” can be organized: configurations of power relationships among the relevant actors in the structures within which they interact as well as the logic and the motivations of the actors involved in the policy making process. To do so, I first construct a four-cell typology of ‘politics of preference formation’ and, then, I proceed by specifying that the type of state-society configurations as well as the type of actors’ motivations in the “politics of preference formation” depend, respectively, on the degree to which a policy issue is perceived as politically salient and on the extent to which the distributional implications of such an issue can be calculated by the relevant stakeholders in the policy making process. The empirical yardstick against which the validity of the theoretical argument proposed is tested is drawn from evidence concerning the European Union’s negotiating strategy in four negotiating areas in the context of the so-called WTO’s Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations: agriculture, competition, environment and technical assistance and capacity building.

The Essays in International Trade and Finance

The first chapter provides the first evidence on the gross capital flows reactions to the financial sector reform. I establish four new stylized facts. First, the reform is associated with an average increase of 0.03pp in both gross capital flows. Second, immediately after the reform both flows decrease, in the long term they stabilize at a higher than the pre-liberalization levels. Third, the short term dynamics is governed by debt flows, while the long term dynamics are driven by all of the components. Finally, only a complex reform leads to a positive effect. The results are robust to a wide range of robustness checks. In the second chapter we develop a novel theory to explain the recent phenomenon of reshoring, i.e. firms moving back their previously offshored business activities. We firstly provide the evidence for the importance of the quality behind the reshoring decision and then, building on Antoniades (2015) we develop a dynamic heterogeneous firms model with quality choice and offshoring. In the dynamic setting the location decision entails a tradeoff between payroll and quality-related costs. In equilibrium reshoring arises as some firms initially offshore, exploit the increase in profits due to lower wages and finally return to the domestic country in order to further increase the quality. The third chapter provides the new evidence suggesting that selling through global production networks might lead to export upgrade. I relate the sector-level GVCs participation indicators derived from the international Input-Output Tables to the data on the unit values of exports at the product-exporter level. We find a strong association between the export prices and forward participation, in particular for the developing countries. We document also a less robust negative relationship between the GVCs backward participation and unit values of exports.

An analysis of the regulatory chill hypothesis: environmental protection in international investment law

The goal of this thesis has been to find out whether ISDS and international investment law exert a chilling effect on more stringent environmental standards at the domestic level. Due to the lack of consistent empirical and statistical evidence uncovered during the analysis, this thesis largely dismisses the regulatory chill hypothesis. However, two exceptions are identified: first, there is evidence of the efforts made by domestic industrial groups and trade unions to prevent the implementation of stricter environmental standards; second, it has become apparent that unfounded beliefs, e.g. about ISDS, held by lawmakers and regulators can play an important role in chilling stricter environmental standards. For these reasons, a new and narrower definition of the regulatory chill phenomenon has been proposed, one that only encompasses those instances in which lawmakers, governments and government agencies refrain from adopting the laws and regulations that they deem the most appropriate because they believe that doing so would lead to adverse consequences at the international trade and investment level, despite a lack of consistent and robust evidence supporting their concerns. The second part of this thesis focusses on what could be done in international economic law to promote environmentally friendly FDI, while preventing the few instances in which regulatory chill may take place due to ill-founded beliefs held by lawmakers and regulators. Following an analysis that highlights the paramount role played by public participation and responsive institutions to achieve an appropriate level of environmental protection, this study ends with a proposal that recommends the adoption of a clause within IIAs that makes pre-investment environmental screening mandatory and free from ISDS oversight.