The changing politics of preference formation in international trade negotiations: the European Union in the Doha Round

This research seeks to provide an explanation for variations of “politics” of preference formation in international trade negotiations. Building on the ‘policy determines politics’ argument, I hypothesize the existence of a causal relationship between issue-characteristics and their variations with politics dynamics and their variations. More specifically, this study seeks to integrate into a single analytical framework two dimensions along which variations in the “politics of preference formation” can be organized: configurations of power relationships among the relevant actors in the structures within which they interact as well as the logic and the motivations of the actors involved in the policy making process. To do so, I first construct a four-cell typology of ‘politics of preference formation’ and, then, I proceed by specifying that the type of state-society configurations as well as the type of actors’ motivations in the “politics of preference formation” depend, respectively, on the degree to which a policy issue is perceived as politically salient and on the extent to which the distributional implications of such an issue can be calculated by the relevant stakeholders in the policy making process. The empirical yardstick against which the validity of the theoretical argument proposed is tested is drawn from evidence concerning the European Union’s negotiating strategy in four negotiating areas in the context of the so-called WTO’s Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations: agriculture, competition, environment and technical assistance and capacity building.

The European External Action Service and the Implementation of the 'Union Method' in European Foreign Policy

The European External Action Service (EEAS or Service) is one of the most significant and most debated innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. This analysis intends to explain the anomalous design of the EEAS in light of its function, which consists in the promotion of external action coherence. Coherence is a principle of the EU legal system, which requires synergy in the external actions of the Union and its Members. It can be enforced only through the coordination of European policy-makers' initiatives, by bridging the gap between the 'Communitarian' and intergovernmental approaches. This is the 'Union method' envisaged by A. Merkel: "coordinated action in a spirit of solidarity - each of us in the area for which we are responsible but all working towards the same goal". The EEAS embodies the 'Union method', since it is institutionally linked to both Union organs and Member States. It is also capable of enhancing synergy in policy management and promoting unity in international representation, since its field of action is delimited not by an abstract concern for institutional balance but by a pragmatic assessment of the need for coordination in each sector. The challenge is now to make sure that this pragmatic approach is applied with respect to all the activities of the Service, in order to reinforce its effectiveness. The coordination brought by the EEAS is in fact the only means through which a European foreign policy can come into being: the choice is not between the Community method and the intergovernmental method, but between a coordinated position and nothing at all.