Mutualità, governance e gestione delle cooperative ortofrutticole

The objective of the research is to analyze the functioning of the fruit and vegetables cooperatives at regional level (Emilia Romagna), with particular reference to the mutuality purpose that distinguishes them, the institutional structure and the management. On the one hand the research intends to provide a definition and an explanation of the real operation/functioning of the mechanism of the mutualism and governance and on the other hand, to study the internal managerial mechanisms and the levels of functioning of the fruit and vegetable cooperatives with the purpose to provide significant indications on their real economic performance. Following a brief analysis of the market context in which the agricultural cooperatives operate, the works will proceed with a deep analysis of a sample of cooperatives regarding the structure and the forms of organization of the members and those aspects can be connected to the following dynamics: - valorisation of the social contribution (effective levels of internal mutuality); - economic efficiency (and consequent economic-financial trends); - levels of internal efficiency and productivity. The applied methodology is based in a first phase on the reclassification, elaboration and analysis of the balance of the sample enterprises. In this phase the research will give a first insight into the economic-financial and capital investment situation of the fruit and vegetable cooperatives trying to concentrate on the implemented and on the possible financing mechanisms and on the levels of efficiency and effectiveness of the productivity achieved. Subsequently the works will proceed with the realization of a direct survey in form of questionnaires to submit to the responsible persons of the sample cooperatives, in order to highlight/emphasize the critical points in respect to the three main arguments of research: mutuality, governance, management.

La distribuzione del potere tra le Istituzioni Europee e la procedura di co-decisione. Il caso della riforma della Politica Agricola Comune

Questa ricerca analizza le implicazioni derivanti dall’introduzione della procedura di co-decisione come procedura legislativa ordinaria nel processo di riforma della politica agricola comune. La diversa distribuzione dei poteri tra le istituzioni europee modifica gli assetti istituzionali e fornisce al Parlamento il ruolo di colegislatore in materia agricola. La forma assunta dalla nuova politica agricola europea scaturisce dalla configurazione dei poteri di contrattazione che ciascun attore ha mostrato nella sede dei triloghi negoziali. La ricerca tenta di verificare la accuratezza predittiva di diversi modelli di contrattazione legislativa attraverso il confronto e la verifica degli errori di predizione sui risultati finali di alcune questioni salienti della riforma della Politica Agricola Comune e allo stesso tempo, cerca di identificare il peso del potere del Parlamento europeo in veste di co-legislatore nel processo di riforma della PAC post-2013.

The Structure of Financial Supervision: Consolidation or Fragmentation for Financial Regulators?

This research was designed to answer the question of which direction the restructuring of financial regulators should take – consolidation or fragmentation. This research began by examining the need for financial regulation and its related costs. It then continued to describe what types of regulatory structures exist in the world; surveying the regulatory structures in 15 jurisdictions, comparing them and discussing their strengths and weaknesses. This research analyzed the possible regulatory structures using three methodological tools: Game-Theory, Institutional-Design, and Network-Effects. The incentives for regulatory action were examined in Chapter Four using game theory concepts. This chapter predicted how two regulators with overlapping supervisory mandates will behave in two different states of the world (where they can stand to benefit from regulating and where they stand to lose). The insights derived from the games described in this chapter were then used to analyze the different supervisory models that exist in the world. The problem of information-flow was discussed in Chapter Five using tools from institutional design. The idea is based on the need for the right kind of information to reach the hands of the decision maker in the shortest time possible in order to predict, mitigate or stop a financial crisis from occurring. Network effects and congestion in the context of financial regulation were discussed in Chapter Six which applied the literature referring to network effects in general in an attempt to conclude whether consolidating financial regulatory standards on a global level might also yield other positive network effects. Returning to the main research question, this research concluded that in general the fragmented model should be preferable to the consolidated model in most cases as it allows for greater diversity and information-flow. However, in cases in which close cooperation between two authorities is essential, the consolidated model should be used.