Evolutionary methods for self-organizing cooperation in peer-to-peer networks

The Peer-to-Peer network paradigm is drawing the attention of both final users and researchers for its features. P2P networks shift from the classic client-server approach to a high level of decentralization where there is no central control and all the nodes should be able not only to require services, but to provide them to other peers as well. While on one hand such high level of decentralization might lead to interesting properties like scalability and fault tolerance, on the other hand it implies many new problems to deal with. A key feature of many P2P systems is openness, meaning that everybody is potentially able to join a network with no need for subscription or payment systems. The combination of openness and lack of central control makes it feasible for a user to free-ride, that is to increase its own benefit by using services without allocating resources to satisfy other peers’ requests. One of the main goals when designing a P2P system is therefore to achieve cooperation between users. Given the nature of P2P systems based on simple local interactions of many peers having partial knowledge of the whole system, an interesting way to achieve desired properties on a system scale might consist in obtaining them as emergent properties of the many interactions occurring at local node level. Two methods are typically used to face the problem of cooperation in P2P networks: 1) engineering emergent properties when designing the protocol; 2) study the system as a game and apply Game Theory techniques, especially to find Nash Equilibria in the game and to reach them making the system stable against possible deviant behaviors. In this work we present an evolutionary framework to enforce cooperative behaviour in P2P networks that is alternative to both the methods mentioned above. Our approach is based on an evolutionary algorithm inspired by computational sociology and evolutionary game theory, consisting in having each peer periodically trying to copy another peer which is performing better. The proposed algorithms, called SLAC and SLACER, draw inspiration from tag systems originated in computational sociology, the main idea behind the algorithm consists in having low performance nodes copying high performance ones. The algorithm is run locally by every node and leads to an evolution of the network both from the topology and from the nodes’ strategy point of view. Initial tests with a simple Prisoners’ Dilemma application show how SLAC is able to bring the network to a state of high cooperation independently from the initial network conditions. Interesting results are obtained when studying the effect of cheating nodes on SLAC algorithm. In fact in some cases selfish nodes rationally exploiting the system for their own benefit can actually improve system performance from the cooperation formation point of view. The final step is to apply our results to more realistic scenarios. We put our efforts in studying and improving the BitTorrent protocol. BitTorrent was chosen not only for its popularity but because it has many points in common with SLAC and SLACER algorithms, ranging from the game theoretical inspiration (tit-for-tat-like mechanism) to the swarms topology. We discovered fairness, meant as ratio between uploaded and downloaded data, to be a weakness of the original BitTorrent protocol and we drew inspiration from the knowledge of cooperation formation and maintenance mechanism derived from the development and analysis of SLAC and SLACER, to improve fairness and tackle freeriding and cheating in BitTorrent. We produced an extension of BitTorrent called BitFair that has been evaluated through simulation and has shown the abilities of enforcing fairness and tackling free-riding and cheating nodes.

Self-Organizing Mechanisms for Task Allocation in a Knowledge-Based Economy

A prevalent claim is that we are in knowledge economy. When we talk about knowledge economy, we generally mean the concept of “Knowledge-based economy” indicating the use of knowledge and technologies to produce economic benefits. Hence knowledge is both tool and raw material (people’s skill) for producing some kind of product or service. In this kind of environment economic organization is undergoing several changes. For example authority relations are less important, legal and ownership-based definitions of the boundaries of the firm are becoming irrelevant and there are only few constraints on the set of coordination mechanisms. Hence what characterises a knowledge economy is the growing importance of human capital in productive processes (Foss, 2005) and the increasing knowledge intensity of jobs (Hodgson, 1999). Economic processes are also highly intertwined with social processes: they are likely to be informal and reciprocal rather than formal and negotiated. Another important point is also the problem of the division of labor: as economic activity becomes mainly intellectual and requires the integration of specific and idiosyncratic skills, the task of dividing the job and assigning it to the most appropriate individuals becomes arduous, a “supervisory problem” (Hogdson, 1999) emerges and traditional hierarchical control may result increasingly ineffective. Not only specificity of know how makes it awkward to monitor the execution of tasks, more importantly, top-down integration of skills may be difficult because ‘the nominal supervisors will not know the best way of doing the job – or even the precise purpose of the specialist job itself – and the worker will know better’ (Hogdson,1999). We, therefore, expect that the organization of the economic activity of specialists should be, at least partially, self-organized. The aim of this thesis is to bridge studies from computer science and in particular from Peer-to-Peer Networks (P2P) to organization theories. We think that the P2P paradigm well fits with organization problems related to all those situation in which a central authority is not possible. We believe that P2P Networks show a number of characteristics similar to firms working in a knowledge-based economy and hence that the methodology used for studying P2P Networks can be applied to organization studies. Three are the main characteristics we think P2P have in common with firms involved in knowledge economy: - Decentralization: in a pure P2P system every peer is an equal participant, there is no central authority governing the actions of the single peers; - Cost of ownership: P2P computing implies shared ownership reducing the cost of owing the systems and the content, and the cost of maintaining them; - Self-Organization: it refers to the process in a system leading to the emergence of global order within the system without the presence of another system dictating this order. These characteristics are present also in the kind of firm that we try to address and that’ why we have shifted the techniques we adopted for studies in computer science (Marcozzi et al., 2005; Hales et al., 2007 [39]) to management science.