Customer Evolution in Sales Channel Migration

This research has been triggered by an emergent trend in customer behavior: customers have rapidly expanded their channel experiences and preferences beyond traditional channels (such as stores) and they expect the company with which they do business to have a presence on all these channels. This evidence has produced an increasing interest in multichannel customer behavior and it has motivated several researchers to study the customers’ channel choices dynamics in multichannel environment. We study how the consumer decision process for channel choice and response to marketing communications evolves for a cohort of new customers. We assume a newly acquired customer’s decisions are described by a “trial” model, but the customer’s choice process evolves to a “post-trial” model as the customer learns his or her preferences and becomes familiar with the firm’s marketing efforts. The trial and post-trial decision processes are each described by different multinomial logit choice models, and the evolution from the trial to post-trial model is determined by a customer-level geometric distribution that captures the time it takes for the customer to make the transition. We utilize data for a major retailer who sells in three channels – retail store, the Internet, and via catalog. The model is estimated using Bayesian methods that allow for cross-customer heterogeneity. This allows us to have distinct parameters estimates for a trial and an after trial stages and to estimate the quickness of this transit at the individual level. The results show for example that the customer decision process indeed does evolve over time. Customers differ in the duration of the trial period and marketing has a different impact on channel choice in the trial and post-trial stages. Furthermore, we show that some people switch channel decision processes while others don’t and we found that several factors have an impact on the probability to switch decision process. Insights from this study can help managers tailor their marketing communication strategy as customers gain channel choice experience. Managers may also have insights on the timing of the direct marketing communications. They can predict the duration of the trial phase at individual level detecting the customers with a quick, long or even absent trial phase. They can even predict if the customer will change or not his decision process over time, and they can influence the switching process using specific marketing tools

Committed to reform? Pragmatic antitrust enforcement in electricity markets

This thesis is a collection of essays about the instrumental use of commitment decisions to facilitate the completion of the European internal electricity market. European policy can shape markets in many ways, two most evident being regulation and competition enforcement. The interplay between these two instruments attracts a lot of scholarly attention. One of the major concerns in the competition vs. regulation debate is the instrumental use of competition rules. It has been observed that competition enforcement is triggered not only as a response to an anticompetitive harm occurring in the market, but that it sometimes becomes a powerful tool in the European Commission’s hands to pursue regulatory goals. This thesis looks for examples of such instrumentalisation in the context of electricity markets and finds that the Commission is very pragmatic in using all the possible instruments it has at hand to push forward its project of creating the internal electricity market. This includes regulation, competition enforcement and all sorts of political pressure. To the extent that commitment decisions accelerate sector-specific regulation and overcome political deadlocks, they contribute to the Commission’s energy policy goals. However, instrumentalisation of competition rules comes at a certain cost to competition policy, energy policy and, most importantly, to electricity markets themselves. Markets might be negatively affected either indirectly, by application of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inadequate commitments in individual cases. Concluding, commitment decisions generally contributed to achieving the policy objectives of the internal electricity market, but their use for that purpose does not come without cost. Given that this cost is ultimately borne by the internal electricity market, the Commission should take a more balanced approach to the instrumental use of commitment decisions so that it does not do more harm than good.

Designing Electricity Auctions in the Presence of Transmission Constraints

This paper analyzes the effect that different designs in the access to fnancial transmission rights has on spot electricity auctions. In particular, I characterize the equilibrium in the spot electricity market when financial transmission rights are assigned to the grid operator and when financial transmission rights are assigned to the firm that submits the lowest bid in the spot electricity auction. When financial transmission rights are assigned to the grid operator, my model, in contrast with the models available in the literature, works out the equilibrium for any transmission capacity. Moreover, I have found that an increase in transmission capacity not only increases competition between markets but also within a single market. When financial transmission rights are assigned to the firm that submits the lowest bid in the spot electricity auction, firms compete not only for electricity demand, but also for transmission rights and the arbitrage profits derived from its hold. I have found that introduce competition for transmission rights reduces competition in spot electricity auctions.