La Previsione dei Consumi Elettrici nel Mercato Energetico Italiano : un nuovo modello empirico con struttura triangolare

L'obiettivo principale della tesi è lo sviluppo di un modello empirico previsivo di breve periodo che sia in grado di offrire previsioni precise ed affidabili dei consumi di energia elettrica su base oraria del mercato italiano. Questo modello riassume le conoscenze acquisite e l'esperienza fatta durante la mia attuale attività lavorativa presso il Romagna Energia S.C.p.A., uno dei maggiori player italiani del mercato energetico. Durante l'ultimo ventennio vi sono stati drastici cambiamenti alla struttura del mercato elettrico in tutto il mondo. Nella maggior parte dei paesi industrializzati il settore dell'energia elettrica ha modificato la sua originale conformazione di monopolio in mercato competitivo liberalizzato, dove i consumatori hanno la libertà di scegliere il proprio fornitore. La modellazione e la previsione della serie storica dei consumi di energia elettrica hanno quindi assunto un ruolo molto importante nel mercato, sia per i policy makers che per gli operatori. Basandosi sulla letteratura già esistente, sfruttando le conoscenze acquisite 'sul campo' ed alcune intuizioni, si è analizzata e sviluppata una struttura modellistica di tipo triangolare, del tutto innovativa in questo ambito di ricerca, suggerita proprio dal meccanismo fisico attraverso il quale l'energia elettrica viene prodotta e consumata nell'arco delle 24 ore. Questo schema triangolare può essere visto come un particolare modello VARMA e possiede una duplice utilità, dal punto di vista interpretativo del fenomeno da una parte, e previsivo dall'altra. Vengono inoltre introdotti nuovi leading indicators legati a fattori meteorologici, con l'intento di migliorare le performance previsive dello stesso. Utilizzando quindi la serie storica dei consumi di energia elettrica italiana, dall'1 Marzo 2010 al 30 Marzo 2012, sono stati stimati i parametri del modello dello schema previsivo proposto e valutati i risultati previsivi per il periodo dall'1 Aprile 2012 al 30 Aprile 2012, confrontandoli con quelli forniti da fonti ufficiali.

A Multilevel Model with Time Series Components for the Analysis of Tribal Art Prices

In the present work we perform an econometric analysis of the Tribal art market. To this aim, we use a unique and original database that includes information on Tribal art market auctions worldwide from 1998 to 2011. In Literature, art prices are modelled through the hedonic regression model, a classic fixed-effect model. The main drawback of the hedonic approach is the large number of parameters, since, in general, art data include many categorical variables. In this work, we propose a multilevel model for the analysis of Tribal art prices that takes into account the influence of time on artwork prices. In fact, it is natural to assume that time exerts an influence over the price dynamics in various ways. Nevertheless, since the set of objects change at every auction date, we do not have repeated measurements of the same items over time. Hence, the dataset does not constitute a proper panel; rather, it has a two-level structure in that items, level-1 units, are grouped in time points, level-2 units. The main theoretical contribution is the extension of classical multilevel models to cope with the case described above. In particular, we introduce a model with time dependent random effects at the second level. We propose a novel specification of the model, derive the maximum likelihood estimators and implement them through the E-M algorithm. We test the finite sample properties of the estimators and the validity of the own-written R-code by means of a simulation study. Finally, we show that the new model improves considerably the fit of the Tribal art data with respect to both the hedonic regression model and the classic multilevel model.

Committed to reform? Pragmatic antitrust enforcement in electricity markets

This thesis is a collection of essays about the instrumental use of commitment decisions to facilitate the completion of the European internal electricity market. European policy can shape markets in many ways, two most evident being regulation and competition enforcement. The interplay between these two instruments attracts a lot of scholarly attention. One of the major concerns in the competition vs. regulation debate is the instrumental use of competition rules. It has been observed that competition enforcement is triggered not only as a response to an anticompetitive harm occurring in the market, but that it sometimes becomes a powerful tool in the European Commission’s hands to pursue regulatory goals. This thesis looks for examples of such instrumentalisation in the context of electricity markets and finds that the Commission is very pragmatic in using all the possible instruments it has at hand to push forward its project of creating the internal electricity market. This includes regulation, competition enforcement and all sorts of political pressure. To the extent that commitment decisions accelerate sector-specific regulation and overcome political deadlocks, they contribute to the Commission’s energy policy goals. However, instrumentalisation of competition rules comes at a certain cost to competition policy, energy policy and, most importantly, to electricity markets themselves. Markets might be negatively affected either indirectly, by application of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inadequate commitments in individual cases. Concluding, commitment decisions generally contributed to achieving the policy objectives of the internal electricity market, but their use for that purpose does not come without cost. Given that this cost is ultimately borne by the internal electricity market, the Commission should take a more balanced approach to the instrumental use of commitment decisions so that it does not do more harm than good.

A new global wheat marketmodel (GLOWMM) for the analysis of wheat export prices

Food commodity prices fluctuations have important impacts on poverty and food insecurity across the world. Conventional models have not provided a complete picture of recent price spikes in agricultural commodity markets, while there is an urgent need for appropriate policy responses. Perhaps new approaches are needed in order to better understand international spill-overs, the feedback between the real and the financial sectors and also the link between food and energy prices. In this paper, we present results from a new worldwide dynamic model that provides short and long-run impulse responses of wheat international prices to various real shocks.

Designing Electricity Auctions in the Presence of Transmission Constraints

This paper analyzes the effect that different designs in the access to fnancial transmission rights has on spot electricity auctions. In particular, I characterize the equilibrium in the spot electricity market when financial transmission rights are assigned to the grid operator and when financial transmission rights are assigned to the firm that submits the lowest bid in the spot electricity auction. When financial transmission rights are assigned to the grid operator, my model, in contrast with the models available in the literature, works out the equilibrium for any transmission capacity. Moreover, I have found that an increase in transmission capacity not only increases competition between markets but also within a single market. When financial transmission rights are assigned to the firm that submits the lowest bid in the spot electricity auction, firms compete not only for electricity demand, but also for transmission rights and the arbitrage profits derived from its hold. I have found that introduce competition for transmission rights reduces competition in spot electricity auctions.