Low Correlated Sequences & Architectures and Algorithms for Analog-to-Information Converters: Theory, Design, Implementation and Applications.

Most electronic systems can be described in a very simplified way as an assemblage of analog and digital components put all together in order to perform a certain function. Nowadays, there is an increasing tendency to reduce the analog components, and to replace them by operations performed in the digital domain. This tendency has led to the emergence of new electronic systems that are more flexible, cheaper and robust. However, no matter the amount of digital process implemented, there will be always an analog part to be sorted out and thus, the step of converting digital signals into analog signals and vice versa cannot be avoided. This conversion can be more or less complex depending on the characteristics of the signals. Thus, even if it is desirable to replace functions carried out by analog components by digital processes, it is equally important to do so in a way that simplifies the conversion from digital to analog signals and vice versa. In the present thesis, we have study strategies based on increasing the amount of processing in the digital domain in such a way that the implementation of analog hardware stages can be simplified. To this aim, we have proposed the use of very low quantized signals, i.e. 1-bit, for the acquisition and for the generation of particular classes of signals.

Essays in Industrial Organization and Information Technology

Chapter 1 studies how consumers’ switching costs affect the pricing and profits of firms competing in two-sided markets such as Apple and Google in the smartphone market. When two-sided markets are dynamic – rather than merely static – I show that switching costs lower the first-period price if network externalities are strong, which is in contrast to what has been found in one-sided markets. By contrast, switching costs soften price competition in the initial period if network externalities are weak and consumers are more patient than the platforms. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first-period price on the other side. Chapter 2 examines firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while competition mitigates them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand correlation and the cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap, the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the relationship becomes negative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis also sheds light on some policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing. Chapter 3 develops a theory of sequential investments in cybersecurity. The regulator can use safety standards and liability rules to increase security. I show that the joint use of an optimal standard and a full liability rule leads to underinvestment ex ante and overinvestment ex post. Instead, switching to a partial liability rule can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that to improve security, the regulator should encourage not only firms, but also consumers to invest in security.