Data, Competition, and Consumer Privacy in Digital Markets

In digital markets personal information is pervasively collected by firms. In the first chapter I study data ownership and product customization when there is exclusive access to non rival but excludable data about consumer preferences. I show that an incumbent firm does not have an incentive to sell an exclusively held dataset with a rival firm, but instead it has an incentive to trade a customizing technology with the other firm. In the second chapter I investigate the effects of consumer information on the intensity of competition. In a two dimensional model of product differentiation, firms use information on preferences to practice price discrimination. I contrast a full privacy and a no privacy benchmark with a regime in which firms are able to target consumers only partially. When data is partially informative, firms are always better-off with price discrimination and an exclusive access to user data is not necessarily a competition policy concern. From a consumer protection perspective, the policy recommendation is that the regulator should promote either no privacy or full privacy. In the third chapter I introduce a data broker that observes either only one or both dimensions of consumer information and sells this data to competing firms for price discrimination purposes. When the seller exogenously holds a partially informative dataset, an exclusive allocation arises. Instead, when the dataset held is fully informative, the data broker trades information non exclusively but each competitor acquires consumer data on a different dimension. When data collection is made endogenous, non exclusivity is robust if collection costs are not too high. The competition policy suggestion is that exclusivity should not be banned per se, but it is data differentiation in equilibrium that rises market power in competitive markets. Upstream competition is sufficient to ensure that both firms get access to consumer information.

Consumer Perception and Willingness to Pay for Local Food

A growing number of empirical studies recently investigated consumers' valuation for local food products. However, different aspects related to the local food consumption still remain vague or unexplored. As such, the objective of the present research is to fulfill the existing literature using a mixed methodological approach for the investigation of consumers' preferences and Willingness to Pay (WTP) for local food products. First of all, local food is still a blurred concept and this factor might be source of individuals' misperception for the local origin meaning. Therefore, a qualitative research has been performed in order to investigate the meaning and the perception of the local food in the Italian food market. Results from this analysis have been used as inputs for the building of a non-hypothetical Real Choice Experiment (RCE) to estimate consumers' WTP for locally and organically produced apple sauce. The contribution of this study is three-fold: (1) consumers' valuation for the local origin is interpreted in terms of regional borders, over the organic food claim in case of an unusual food product in the area of interest, (2) the interaction between individuals' personality traits and consumers’ preferences for local and organic foods is analyzed, (3) the role of Commitment Cost creation in consumers' choice making in case of uncertainty due to the use of a novel food product and of an unconventional food claim is investigated. Results suggest that consumers are willing to pay a higher price premium for organic over locally produced apple sauce, possibly because of the presence of a regulated certification. In accordance with Commitment Cost theory, the organic label might thus decrease consumers' uncertainty for the features of the product in question. Results also indicate that individuals' personality can be source of heterogeneity in consumers' preferences.