Interactions between normative systems and software cognitive agents. A formalization in temporal modal defeasible logic and its implementation

Sustainable computer systems require some flexibility to adapt to environmental unpredictable changes. A solution lies in autonomous software agents which can adapt autonomously to their environments. Though autonomy allows agents to decide which behavior to adopt, a disadvantage is a lack of control, and as a side effect even untrustworthiness: we want to keep some control over such autonomous agents. How to control autonomous agents while respecting their autonomy? A solution is to regulate agents’ behavior by norms. The normative paradigm makes it possible to control autonomous agents while respecting their autonomy, limiting untrustworthiness and augmenting system compliance. It can also facilitate the design of the system, for example, by regulating the coordination among agents. However, an autonomous agent will follow norms or violate them in some conditions. What are the conditions in which a norm is binding upon an agent? While autonomy is regarded as the driving force behind the normative paradigm, cognitive agents provide a basis for modeling the bindingness of norms. In order to cope with the complexity of the modeling of cognitive agents and normative bindingness, we adopt an intentional stance. Since agents are embedded into a dynamic environment, things may not pass at the same instant. Accordingly, our cognitive model is extended to account for some temporal aspects. Special attention is given to the temporal peculiarities of the legal domain such as, among others, the time in force and the time in efficacy of provisions. Some types of normative modifications are also discussed in the framework. It is noteworthy that our temporal account of legal reasoning is integrated to our commonsense temporal account of cognition. As our intention is to build sustainable reasoning systems running unpredictable environment, we adopt a declarative representation of knowledge. A declarative representation of norms will make it easier to update their system representation, thus facilitating system maintenance; and to improve system transparency, thus easing system governance. Since agents are bounded and are embedded into unpredictable environments, and since conflicts may appear amongst mental states and norms, agent reasoning has to be defeasible, i.e. new pieces of information can invalidate formerly derivable conclusions. In this dissertation, our model is formalized into a non-monotonic logic, namely into a temporal modal defeasible logic, in order to account for the interactions between normative systems and software cognitive agents.

Integration of cognitive and affective processes in perception and decision-making

The relationship between emotion and cognition is a topic that raises great interest in research. Recently, a view of these two processes as interactive and mutually influencing each other has become predominant. This dissertation investigates the reciprocal influences of emotion and cognition, both at behavioral and neural level, in two specific fields, such as attention and decision-making. Experimental evidence on how emotional responses may affect perceptual and attentional processes has been reported. In addition, the impact of three factors, such as personality traits, motivational needs and social context, in modulating the influence that emotion exerts on perception and attention has been investigated. Moreover, the influence of cognition on emotional responses in decision-making has been demonstrated. The current experimental evidence showed that cognitive brain regions such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are causally implicated in regulation of emotional responses and that this has an effect at both pre and post decisional stages. There are two main conclusions of this dissertation: firstly, emotion exerts a strong influence on perceptual and attentional processes but, at the same time, this influence may also be modulated by other factors internal and external to the individuals. Secondly, cognitive processes may modulate emotional prepotent responses, by serving a regulative function critical to driving and shaping human behavior in line with current goals.

Seeing emotions in others: Improving cognitive and neuronal mechanisms of facial expression processing

In the conceptual framework of affective neuroscience, this thesis intends to advance the understanding of the plasticity mechanisms of other’s emotional facial expression representations. Chapter 1 outlines a description of the neurophysiological bases of Hebbian plasticity, reviews influential studies that adopted paired associative stimulation procedures, and introduces new lines of research where the impact of cortico-cortical paired associative stimulation protocols on higher order cognitive functions is investigated. The experiments in Chapter 2 aimed to test the modulatory influence of a perceptual-motor training, based on the execution of emotional expressions, on the subsequent emotion intensity judgements of others’ high (i.e., full visible) and low-intensity (i.e., masked) emotional expressions. As a result of the training-induced learning, participants showed a significant congruence effect, as indicated by relatively higher expression intensity ratings for the same emotion as the one that was previously trained. Interestingly, although judged as overall less emotionally intense, surgical facemasks did not prevent the emotion-specific effects of the training to occur, suggesting that covering the lower part of other’s face do not interact with the training-induced congruence effect. In Chapter 3 it was implemented a transcranial magnetic stimulation study targeting neural pathways involving re-entrant input from higher order brain regions into lower levels of the visual processing hierarchy. We focused on cortical visual networks within the temporo-occipital stream underpinning the processing of emotional faces and susceptible to plastic adaptations. Importantly, we tested the plasticity-induced effects in a state dependent manner, by administering ccPAS while presenting different facial expressions yet afferent to a specific emotion. Results indicated that the discrimination accuracy of emotion-specific expressions is enhanced following the ccPAS treatment, suggesting that a multi-coil TMS intervention might represent a suitable tool to drive brain remodeling at a neural network level, and consequently influence a specific behavior.

Hierarchical active inference for cognitive architectures

This thesis explores the methods based on the free energy principle and active inference for modelling cognition. Active inference is an emerging framework for designing intelligent agents where psychological processes are cast in terms of Bayesian inference. Here, I appeal to it to test the design of a set of cognitive architectures, via simulation. These architectures are defined in terms of generative models where an agent executes a task under the assumption that all cognitive processes aspire to the same objective: the minimization of variational free energy. Chapter 1 introduces the free energy principle and its assumptions about self-organizing systems. Chapter 2 describes how from the mechanics of self-organization can emerge a minimal form of cognition able to achieve autopoiesis. In chapter 3 I present the method of how I formalize generative models for action and perception. The architectures proposed allow providing a more biologically plausible account of more complex cognitive processing that entails deep temporal features. I then present three simulation studies that aim to show different aspects of cognition, their associated behavior and the underlying neural dynamics. In chapter 4, the first study proposes an architecture that represents the visuomotor system for the encoding of actions during action observation, understanding and imitation. In chapter 5, the generative model is extended and is lesioned to simulate brain damage and neuropsychological patterns observed in apraxic patients. In chapter 6, the third study proposes an architecture for cognitive control and the modulation of attention for action selection. At last, I argue how active inference can provide a formal account of information processing in the brain and how the adaptive capabilities of the simulated agents are a mere consequence of the architecture of the generative models. Cognitive processing, then, becomes an emergent property of the minimization of variational free energy.