Flexibility and firm value: the role of inventories

In the present thesis I study the contribution to firm value of inventories management from a risk management perspective. I find a significant contribution of inventories to the value of risk management especially through the operating flexibility channel. In contrast, I do not find evidence supporting the view of inventories a reserve of liquidity. Inventories substitute, albeit not perfectly, derivatives or cash holdings. The substitution between hedging with derivatives and inventory is moderated by the correlation between cash flow and the underlying asset in the derivative contract. Hedge ratios increase with the effectiveness of derivatives. The decision to hedge with cash holdings or inventories is strongly influenced by the degree of complementarity between production factors and by cash flow volatility. In addition, I provide a risk management based explanation of the secular substitution between inventories and cash holdings documented, among others, in Bates et al. (2009), Journal of Finance. In a sample of U.S. firms between 1980 and 2006, I empirically confirm the negative relation between inventories and cash and provide evidence on the poor performance of investment cash flow sensitivities as a measure of financial constraints also in the case of inventories investment. This result can be explained by firms' scarce reliance on inventories as a reserve of liquidity. Finally, as an extension of my study, I contrast with empirical data the theoretical predictions of a model on the integrated management of inventories, trade credit and cash holdings.

Bank Governance and the Bail-in in the EU. A Law & Finance analysis on the role of bail-inable creditors

This dissertation assesses the impact of the EU Directive on Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRRD) on bank corporate governance and investigates a fundamental question. Can the resolution framework for distressed banks enhance the quality of banks’ decision making? According to the Directive, the Resolution Authority can impose losses on bank’s creditors in case of distress through a bail-in. Bail-inable creditors become residual claimants of the bank, contingent on its distress. The first part of the dissertation establishes an analytical framework for bank governance, starting from the problem of what can be defined as “good governance” in banking. The dissertation hypothesizes that governance regulation represents a necessary link between the incentives of corporate constituencies and the goals of substantive regulation. The second part builds upon this analytical framework and carries out a positive analysis encompassing three channels of debt governance; namely, price internalisation of risk; contractual arrangements and the discrete impact of different type of creditors. The existence of a resolution framework should incentivise bail-inable creditors to better discipline the borrowing bank; yet, the design of both the capital and resolution regulation largely foreclose such possibility to creditors. Against this backdrop, the third part of the dissertation moves to normative considerations. The approach to this normative part combines and complements the study of cash flow rights of the management with the study of the voting rights to bail-inable creditors. On the cash flow side, the dissertation proposes to include bail-inable debt as part of the variable remuneration for bank risk-takers. On the voting right, the proposal is to grant a limited basket of ex-ante governance rights to bail-inable creditors. Such a unified approach is rather uncommon in the literature, where cash flow rights and voting rights are often approached separately whereas those complement each other in the dissertation.