'Defending the rights'. An integrated model of collective action for "public water" in Italy

In many communities, supplying water for the people is a huge task and the fact that this essential service can be carried out by the private sector respecting the right to water, is a debated issue. This dissertation investigates the mechanisms through which a 'perceived rights violation' - which represents a specific form of perceived injustice which derives from the violation of absolute moral principles – can promote collective action. Indeed, literature on morality and collective action suggests that even if many people apparently sustain high moral principles (like human rights), only a minority decides to act in order to defend them. Taking advantage of the political situation in Italy, and the recent mobilization for "public water" we hypothesized that, because of its "sacred value", the perceived violation of the right to water facilitates identification with the social movement and activism. Through five studies adopting qualitative and quantitative methods, we confirmed our hypotheses demonstrating that the perceived violation of the right to water can sustain activism and it can influence vote intentions at the referendum for 'public water'. This path to collective action coexists with other 'classical' predictors of collective action, like instrumental factors (personal advantages, efficacy beliefs) and anger. The perceived rights violation can derive both from personal values (i.e. universalism) and external factors (i.e. a mobilization campaign). Furthermore, we demonstrated that it is possible to enhance the perceived violation of the right to water and anger through a specifically designed communication campaign. The final chapter summarizes the main findings and discusses the results, suggesting some innovative line of research for collective action literature.

Social Welfare and Behavioral Public Policies

In this work I discuss several key aspects of welfare economics and policy analysis and I propose two original contributions to the growing field of behavioral public policymaking. After providing a historical perspective of welfare economics and an overview of policy analysis processes in the introductory chapter, in chapter 2 I discuss a debated issue of policymaking, the choice of the social welfare function. I contribute to this debate by proposing an original methodological contribution based on the analysis of the quantitative relationship among different social welfare functional forms commonly used by policy analysts. In chapter 3 I then discuss a behavioral policy to contrast indirect tax evasion based on the use of lotteries. I show that the predictions of my model based on non-expected utility are consistent with observed, and so far unexplained, empirical evidence of the policy success. Finally, in chapter 4 I investigate by mean of a laboratory experiment the effects of social influence on the individual likelihood to engage in altruistic punishment. I show that bystanders’ decision to engage in punishment is influenced by the punishment behavior of their peers and I suggest ways to enact behavioral policies that exploit this finding.