Cascading events triggering industrial accidents: quantitative assessment of NaTech and domino scenarios

The so called cascading events, which lead to high-impact low-frequency scenarios are rising concern worldwide. A chain of events result in a major industrial accident with dreadful (and often unpredicted) consequences. Cascading events can be the result of the realization of an external threat, like a terrorist attack a natural disaster or of “domino effect”. During domino events the escalation of a primary accident is driven by the propagation of the primary event to nearby units, causing an overall increment of the accident severity and an increment of the risk associated to an industrial installation. Also natural disasters, like intense flooding, hurricanes, earthquake and lightning are found capable to enhance the risk of an industrial area, triggering loss of containment of hazardous materials and in major accidents. The scientific community usually refers to those accidents as “NaTechs”: natural events triggering industrial accidents. In this document, a state of the art of available approaches to the modelling, assessment, prevention and management of domino and NaTech events is described. On the other hand, the relevant work carried out during past studies still needs to be consolidated and completed, in order to be applicable in a real industrial framework. New methodologies, developed during my research activity, aimed at the quantitative assessment of domino and NaTech accidents are presented. The tools and methods provided within this very study had the aim to assist the progress toward a consolidated and universal methodology for the assessment and prevention of cascading events, contributing to enhance safety and sustainability of the chemical and process industry.

Analysis of technological accidents triggered by natural events (Natech) in the perspective of climate change

The severe accidents deriving from the impact of natural events on industrial installations have become a matter of growing concern in the last decades. In the literature, these events are typically referred to as Natech accidents. Several peculiarities distinguish them from conventional industrial accidents caused by internal factors, such as the possible occurrence of multiple simultaneous failures, and the enhanced probability of cascading events. The research project provides a comprehensive overview of Natech accidents that occurred in the Chemical and Process Industry, allowing for the identification of relevant aspects of Natech events. Quantified event trees and probability of ignition are derived from the collected dataset, providing a step forward in the quantitative risk assessment of Natech accidents. The investigation of past Natech accidents also demonstrated that wildfires may cause technological accidents. Climate change and global warming are promoting the conditions for wildfire development and rapid spread. Hence, ensuring the safety of industrial facilities exposed to wildfires is paramount. This was achieved defining safety distances between wildland vegetation and industrial equipment items. In addition, an innovative methodology for the vulnerability assessment of Natech and Domino scenarios triggered by wildfires was developed. The approach accounted for the dynamic behaviour of wildfire events and related technological scenarios. Besides, the performance of the emergency response and the related intervention time in the case of cascading events caused by natural events were evaluated. Overall, the tools presented in this thesis represent a step forward in the Quantitative Risk Assessment of Natech accidents. The methodologies developed also provide a solid basis for the definition of effective strategies for risk mitigation and reduction. These aspects are crucial to improve the resilience of industrial plants to natural hazards, especially considering the effects that climate change may have on the severity of such events.

Synergies among safety and security in the prevention of major accidents related to dangerous substances

Historical evidence shows that chemical, process, and Oil&Gas facilities where dangerous substances are stored or handled are target of deliberate malicious attacks (security attacks) aiming at interfering with normal operations. Physical attacks and cyber-attacks may generate events with consequences on people, property, and the surrounding environment that are comparable to those of major accidents caused by safety-related causes. The security aspects of these facilities are commonly addressed using Security Vulnerability/Risk Assessment (SVA/SRA) methodologies. Most of these methodologies are semi-quantitative and non-systematic approaches that strongly rely on expert judgment, leading to security assessments that are not reproducible. Moreover, they do not consider the synergies with the safety domain. The present 3-year research is aimed at filling the gap outlined by providing knowledge on security attacks, as well as rigorous and systematic methods supporting existing SVA/SRA studies suitable for the chemical, process, and Oil&Gas industry. The different nature of cyber and physical attacks resulted in the development of different methods for the two domains. The first part of the research was devoted to the development and statistical analysis of security databases that allowed to develop new knowledge and lessons learnt on security threats. Based on the obtained background, a Bow-Tie based procedure and two reverse-HazOp based methodologies were developed as hazard identification approaches for physical and cyber threats respectively. To support the quantitative estimation of the security risk, a quantitative procedure based on the Bayesian Network was developed allowing to calculate the probability of success of physical security attacks. All the developed methods have been applied to case studies addressing chemical, process and Oil&Gas facilities (offshore and onshore) proving the quality of the results that can be achieved in improving site security. Furthermore, the outcomes achieved allow to step forward in developing synergies and promoting integration among safety and security management.