The European External Action Service and the Implementation of the 'Union Method' in European Foreign Policy

The European External Action Service (EEAS or Service) is one of the most significant and most debated innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. This analysis intends to explain the anomalous design of the EEAS in light of its function, which consists in the promotion of external action coherence. Coherence is a principle of the EU legal system, which requires synergy in the external actions of the Union and its Members. It can be enforced only through the coordination of European policy-makers' initiatives, by bridging the gap between the 'Communitarian' and intergovernmental approaches. This is the 'Union method' envisaged by A. Merkel: "coordinated action in a spirit of solidarity - each of us in the area for which we are responsible but all working towards the same goal". The EEAS embodies the 'Union method', since it is institutionally linked to both Union organs and Member States. It is also capable of enhancing synergy in policy management and promoting unity in international representation, since its field of action is delimited not by an abstract concern for institutional balance but by a pragmatic assessment of the need for coordination in each sector. The challenge is now to make sure that this pragmatic approach is applied with respect to all the activities of the Service, in order to reinforce its effectiveness. The coordination brought by the EEAS is in fact the only means through which a European foreign policy can come into being: the choice is not between the Community method and the intergovernmental method, but between a coordinated position and nothing at all.

Essays on the political economy of European integration

Recently, a rising interest in political and economic integration/disintegration issues has been developed in the political economy field. This growing strand of literature partly draws on traditional issues of fiscal federalism and optimum public good provision and focuses on a trade-off between the benefits of centralization, arising from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of harmonizing policies as a consequence of the increased heterogeneity of individual preferences in an international union or in a country composed of at least two regions. This thesis stems from this strand of literature and aims to shed some light on two highly relevant aspects of the political economy of European integration. The first concerns the role of public opinion in the integration process; more precisely, how economic benefits and costs of integration shape citizens' support for European Union (EU) membership. The second is the allocation of policy competences among different levels of government: European, national and regional. Chapter 1 introduces the topics developed in this thesis by reviewing the main recent theoretical developments in the political economy analysis of integration processes. It is structured as follows. First, it briefly surveys a few relevant articles on economic theories of integration and disintegration processes (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina et al. 2000, Casella and Feinstein 2002) and discusses their relevance for the study of the impact of economic benefits and costs on public opinion attitude towards the EU. Subsequently, it explores the links existing between such political economy literature and theories of fiscal federalism, especially with regard to normative considerations concerning the optimal allocation of competences in a union. Chapter 2 firstly proposes a model of citizens’ support for membership of international unions, with explicit reference to the EU; subsequently it tests the model on a panel of EU countries. What are the factors that influence public opinion support for the European Union (EU)? In international relations theory, the idea that citizens' support for the EU depends on material benefits deriving from integration, i.e. whether European integration makes individuals economically better off (utilitarian support), has been common since the 1970s, but has never been the subject of a formal treatment (Hix 2005). A small number of studies in the 1990s have investigated econometrically the link between national economic performance and mass support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Kalthenthaler 1996), but only making informal assumptions. The main aim of Chapter 2 is thus to propose and test our model with a view to providing a more complete and theoretically grounded picture of public support for the EU. Following theories of utilitarian support, we assume that citizens are in favour of membership if they receive economic benefits from it. To develop this idea, we propose a simple political economic model drawing on the recent economic literature on integration and disintegration processes. The basic element is the existence of a trade-off between the benefits of centralisation and the costs of harmonising policies in presence of heterogeneous preferences among countries. The approach we follow is that of the recent literature on the political economy of international unions and the unification or break-up of nations (Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina and Wacziarg 1999, Alesina et al. 2001, 2005a, to mention only the relevant). The general perspective is that unification provides returns to scale in the provision of public goods, but reduces each member state’s ability to determine its most favoured bundle of public goods. In the simple model presented in Chapter 2, support for membership of the union is increasing in the union’s average income and in the loss of efficiency stemming from being outside the union, and decreasing in a country’s average income, while increasing heterogeneity of preferences among countries points to a reduced scope of the union. Afterwards we empirically test the model with data on the EU; more precisely, we perform an econometric analysis employing a panel of member countries over time. The second part of Chapter 2 thus tries to answer the following question: does public opinion support for the EU really depend on economic factors? The findings are broadly consistent with our theoretical expectations: the conditions of the national economy, differences in income among member states and heterogeneity of preferences shape citizens’ attitude towards their country’s membership of the EU. Consequently, this analysis offers some interesting policy implications for the present debate about ratification of the European Constitution and, more generally, about how the EU could act in order to gain more support from the European public. Citizens in many member states are called to express their opinion in national referenda, which may well end up in rejection of the Constitution, as recently happened in France and the Netherlands, triggering a European-wide political crisis. These events show that nowadays understanding public attitude towards the EU is not only of academic interest, but has a strong relevance for policy-making too. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the link between European integration and regional autonomy in Italy. Over the last few decades, the double tendency towards supranationalism and regional autonomy, which has characterised some European States, has taken a very interesting form in this country, because Italy, besides being one of the founding members of the EU, also implemented a process of decentralisation during the 1970s, further strengthened by a constitutional reform in 2001. Moreover, the issue of the allocation of competences among the EU, the Member States and the regions is now especially topical. The process leading to the drafting of European Constitution (even if then it has not come into force) has attracted much attention from a constitutional political economy perspective both on a normative and positive point of view (Breuss and Eller 2004, Mueller 2005). The Italian parliament has recently passed a new thorough constitutional reform, still to be approved by citizens in a referendum, which includes, among other things, the so called “devolution”, i.e. granting the regions exclusive competence in public health care, education and local police. Following and extending the methodology proposed in a recent influential article by Alesina et al. (2005b), which only concentrated on the EU activity (treaties, legislation, and European Court of Justice’s rulings), we develop a set of quantitative indicators measuring the intensity of the legislative activity of the Italian State, the EU and the Italian regions from 1973 to 2005 in a large number of policy categories. By doing so, we seek to answer the following broad questions. Are European and regional legislations substitutes for state laws? To what extent are the competences attributed by the European treaties or the Italian Constitution actually exerted in the various policy areas? Is their exertion consistent with the normative recommendations from the economic literature about their optimum allocation among different levels of government? The main results show that, first, there seems to be a certain substitutability between EU and national legislations (even if not a very strong one), but not between regional and national ones. Second, the EU concentrates its legislative activity mainly in international trade and agriculture, whilst social policy is where the regions and the State (which is also the main actor in foreign policy) are more active. Third, at least two levels of government (in some cases all of them) are significantly involved in the legislative activity in many sectors, even where the rationale for that is, at best, very questionable, indicating that they actually share a larger number of policy tasks than that suggested by the economic theory. It appears therefore that an excessive number of competences are actually shared among different levels of government. From an economic perspective, it may well be recommended that some competences be shared, but only when the balance between scale or spillover effects and heterogeneity of preferences suggests so. When, on the contrary, too many levels of government are involved in a certain policy area, the distinction between their different responsibilities easily becomes unnecessarily blurred. This may not only leads to a slower and inefficient policy-making process, but also risks to make it too complicate to understand for citizens, who, on the contrary, should be able to know who is really responsible for a certain policy when they vote in national,local or European elections or in referenda on national or European constitutional issues.

L'anno che non fu? L'anno dell'Europa e la crisi nelle relazioni transatlantiche, 1973/74

The 1970s are in the limelight of a growing historiographic attention, partly due to the recent opening of new archival resources. 1973, in particular, has a special interest in the historian’s eyes, as many are the events that happened that year: to name but a few, the Chilean coup, the October War, the ensuing oil crisis, the Vietnamese peace treaty. So it is may be not entirely surprising that not much attention has been paid to the Year of Europe, a nebulous American initiative destined to sum up to nothing practical - as Kissinger himself put it, it was destined to be the Year that never Was.1 It is my opinion, however, that its failure should not conceal its historical interest. Even though transatlantic relations have sometimes been seen as an uninterrupted history of crisis,2 in 1973 they reached what could then be considered as their unprecedented nadir. I believe that a thorough analysis of the events that during that year found the US increasingly at odds with the countries of Western Europe is worth carrying out not only to cast a new light on the dynamics of transatlantic relations but also to deepen our comprehension of the internal dynamics of the actors involved, mainly the Nixon administration and a unifying Europe. The Nixon administration had not carefully planned what the initiative actually should have amounted to, and its official announcement appears to have been one of Kissinger’s coups de theatre. Yet the Year of Europe responded to the vital priority of revitalising the relations with Western Europe, crucial ally, for too long neglected. But 1973 did not end with the solemn renewal of the Atlantic Declaration that Kissinger had sought. On the contrary, it saw, for the first time, the countries of the newly enlarged EC engaged in a real, if short-lived, solidarity on foreign policy, which highlighted the Nixon administration’s contradictions regarding European integration. Those, in addition to the numerous tensions that already strained transatlantic relations, gave birth to a downward spiral of incomprehensions and misperceptions, which the unexpected deflagration of the October war seriously worsened. However, even though the tensions did not disappear, the European front soon started to disintegrate, mainly under the strains imposed by the oil crisis. Significant changes in the leadership of the main European countries helped to get the tones back to normal. During the course of 1974-5, the substantial failure of the Euro-Arab dialogue, the Gymlich compromise, frequent and serene bilateral meetings bear witness that the worst was over.

Welfare provision in Sweden and the dominant position of the Sap

There have been almost fifty years since Harry Eckstein' s classic monograph, A Theory of Stable Democracy (Princeton, 1961), where he sketched out the basic tenets of the “congruence theory”, which was to become one of the most important and innovative contributions to understanding democratic rule. His next work, Division and Cohesion in Democracy, (Princeton University Press: 1966) is designed to serve as a plausibility probe for this 'theory' (ftn.) and is a case study of a Northern democratic system, Norway. What is more, this line of his work best exemplifies the contribution Eckstein brought to the methodology of comparative politics through his seminal article, “ “Case Study and Theory in Political Science” ” (in Greenstein and Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, 1975), on the importance of the case study as an approach to empirical theory. This article demonstrates the special utility of “crucial case studies” in testing theory, thereby undermining the accepted wisdom in comparative research that the larger the number of cases the better. Although not along the same lines, but shifting the case study unit of research, I intend to take up here the challenge and build upon an equally unique political system, the Swedish one. Bearing in mind the peculiarities of the Swedish political system, my unit of analysis is going to be further restricted to the Swedish Social Democratic Party, the Svenska Arbetare Partiet. However, my research stays within the methodological framework of the case study theory inasmuch as it focuses on a single political system and party. The Swedish SAP endurance in government office and its electoral success throughout half a century (ftn. As of the 1991 election, there were about 56 years - more than half century - of interrupted social democratic "reign" in Sweden.) are undeniably a performance no other Social Democrat party has yet achieved in democratic conditions. Therefore, it is legitimate to inquire about the exceptionality of this unique political power combination. Which were the different components of this dominance power position, which made possible for SAP's governmental office stamina? I will argue here that it was the end-product of a combination of multifarious factors such as a key position in the party system, strong party leadership and organization, a carefully designed strategy regarding class politics and welfare policy. My research is divided into three main parts, the historical incursion, the 'welfare' part and the 'environment' part. The first part is a historical account of the main political events and issues, which are relevant for my case study. Chapter 2 is devoted to the historical events unfolding in the 1920-1960 period: the Saltsjoebaden Agreement, the series of workers' strikes in the 1920s and SAP's inception. It exposes SAP's ascent to power in the mid 1930s and the party's ensuing strategies for winning and keeping political office, that is its economic program and key economic goals. The following chapter - chapter 3 - explores the next period, i.e. the period from 1960s to 1990s and covers the party's troubled political times, its peak and the beginnings of the decline. The 1960s are relevant for SAP's planning of a long term economic strategy - the Rehn Meidner model, a new way of macroeconomic steering, based on the Keynesian model, but adapted to the new economic realities of welfare capitalist societies. The second and third parts of this study develop several hypotheses related to SAP's 'dominant position' (endurance in politics and in office) and test them afterwards. Mainly, the twin issues of economics and environment are raised and their political relevance for the party analyzed. On one hand, globalization and its spillover effects over the Swedish welfare system are important causal factors in explaining the transformative social-economic challenges the party had to put up with. On the other hand, Europeanization and environmental change influenced to a great deal SAP's foreign policy choices and its domestic electoral strategies. The implications of globalization on the Swedish welfare system will make the subject of two chapters - chapters four and five, respectively, whereupon the Europeanization consequences will be treated at length in the third part of this work - chapters six and seven, respectively. Apparently, at first sight, the link between foreign policy and electoral strategy is difficult to prove and uncanny, in the least. However, in the SAP's case there is a bulk of literature and public opinion statistical data able to show that governmental domestic policy and party politics are in a tight dependence to foreign policy decisions and sovereignty issues. Again, these country characteristics and peculiar causal relationships are outlined in the first chapters and explained in the second and third parts. The sixth chapter explores the presupposed relationship between Europeanization and environmental policy, on one hand, and SAP's environmental policy formulation and simultaneous agenda-setting at the international level, on the other hand. This chapter describes Swedish leadership in environmental policy formulation on two simultaneous fronts and across two different time spans. The last chapter, chapter eight - while trying to develop a conclusion, explores the alternative theories plausible in explaining the outlined hypotheses and points out the reasons why these theories do not fit as valid alternative explanation to my systemic corporatism thesis as the main causal factor determining SAP's 'dominant position'. Among the alternative theories, I would consider Traedgaardh L. and Bo Rothstein's historical exceptionalism thesis and the public opinion thesis, which alone are not able to explain the half century social democratic endurance in government in the Swedish case.

1963-1968. Dall'avvento dell'amministrazione di Lyndon B. Johnson al Trattato di Non-Proliferazione. gli Stati Uniti, la Francia, la NATO e l'Europa agli esordi della distensione. Storia di una "non-crisi" transatlantica e della riorganizzazione dell'Alleanza.

The aim of this proposal is to explain the paradigm of the American foreign policy during the Johnson Administration, especially toward Europe, within the NATO framework, and toward URSS, in the context of the détente, just emerged during the decade of the sixties. During that period, after the passing of the J. F. Kennedy, President L. B. Johnson inherited a complex and very high-powered world politics, which wanted to get a new phase off the ground in the transatlantic relations and share the burden of the Cold war with a refractory Europe. Known as the grand design, it was a policy that needed the support of the allies and a clear purpose which appealed to the Europeans. At first, President Johnson detected in the problem of the nuclear sharing the good deal to make with the NATO allies. At the same time, he understood that the United States needed to reassert their leadeship within the new stage of relations with the Soviet Union. Soon, the “transatlantic bargain” became something not so easy to dealt with. The Federal Germany wanted to say a word in the nuclear affairs and, why not, put the finger on the trigger of the atlantic nuclear weapons. URSS, on the other hand, wanted to keep Germany down. The other allies did not want to share the onus of the defense of Europe, at most the responsability for the use of the weapons and, at least, to participate in the decision-making process. France, which wanted to detach herself from the policy of the United States and regained a world role, added difficulties to the manage of this course of action. Through the years of the Johnson’s office, the divergences of the policies placed by his advisers to gain the goal put the American foreign policy in deep water. The withdrawal of France from the organization but not from the Alliance, give Washington a chance to carry out his goal. The development of a clear-cut disarm policy leaded the Johnson’s administration to the core of the matter. The Non-proliferation Treaty signed in 1968, solved in a business-like fashion the problem with the allies. The question of nuclear sharing faded away with the acceptance of more deep consultative role in the nuclear affairs by the allies, the burden for the defense of Europe became more bearable through the offset agreement with the FRG and a new doctrine, the flexible response, put an end, at least formally, to the taboo of the nuclear age. The Johnson’s grand design proved to be different from the Kennedy’s one, but all things considered, it was more workable. The unpredictable result was a real détente with the Soviet Union, which, we can say, was a merit of President Johnson.

L'altro eccezionalismo: William Appleman Williams tra storia, storiografia e impegno civile

La storiografia statunitense, a partire dagli anni Cinquanta, vide l’affermarsi di una nuova interpretazione della politica estera americana. Archiviata la storia diplomatica come storia dei trattati o storia delle interazioni delle élites dominanti, abbandonata una visione incentrata sull’equilibrio di potenza, il dibattito storiografico si arricchì della cosiddetta interpretazione «revisionista», antitetica rispetto a quella che, fino a quel momento, aveva predominato. Soggetto di analisi storica restava sempre lo Stato ma l’enfasi maggiore era posta sui fattori economici che ne influenzavano l’azione: si metteva in rilievo l’interazione tra l’interesse privato e il soggetto statale. Capofila di questa nuova scuola fu William Appleman Williams. Questa ricerca si pone l’obiettivo di delineare il contesto storiografico dal quale emersero gli studi di Williams e di cui egli ne roviesciò alcuni assunti fondamentali. Si intende tracciare il suo percorso intellettuale – storiografico e pubblico – al fine di restituire la complessità di un personaggio che divenne un vero e proprio «intellettuale pubblico». I quesiti, a cui questa ricerca vuole dar risposta riguardano l’evoluzione del percorso intellettuale di Williams tanto in ambito storiografico quanto, più in generale, in quello pubblico; il contributo alla ridefinizione dell’identità statunitense e del suo ruolo internazionale; il lascito della sua riflessione nella storiografia. Prendendo le mosse dall’idea di frontiera proposta da Turner, Williams sostenne che la fine dell’espansione territoriale «interna» aveva obbligato gli Stati Uniti a cercare nuovi mercati per il proprio surplus. Era stata tale necessità a catalizzare la Open Door Diplomacy, guidata da ragioni economiche, che presto identificarono l’interesse nazionale per trasformarsi in una vera e propria ideologia nel XX secolo.L’esito di tale politica estera fu la creazione di un impero non più territoriale ma frutto dell’espansione economica. E proprio questa riflessione sull’impero influenzò, negli anni Sessanta, la protesta studentesca che chiese un ripensamento del ruolo internazionale degli Stati Uniti.

La dimensione esterna della tutela dei dati personali nel diritto dell'Unione Europea

Questa tesi di dottorato ha per oggetto l’analisi della dimensione esterna della tutela dei dati personali, ossia lo studio dei meccanismi attraverso cui il diritto dell’Unione Europea assicura ai dati che vengono trasferiti verso Paesi terzi un elevato livello di protezione. In questo modo la tesi si propone di evidenziare i risultati conseguiti alla luce di quella che si rivela sempre più essere una vera e propria “politica estera legislativa” dell’Unione Europea volta alla protezione del diritto fondamentale alla tutela dei dati personali.

La costruzione delle relazioni politiche ed economiche tra l'Italia e la Germania occidentale dopo la seconda guerra mondiale (1945-1951)

L’autore ricostruisce ed esamina la storia dei rapporti italo-tedeschi negli anni immediatamente precedenti la riapertura ufficiale delle relazioni diplomatiche tra Italia e Repubblica federale tedesca. Un riavvicinamento economico e politico progressivo, ma che suscitò forti contrasti tra i principali attori della diplomazia italiana. Il saggio si basa su una documentazione conservata presso l’Archivio storico del ministero degli Esteri, l’Archivio centrale dello Stato, l’Archivio storico della Banca d’Italia e l’Archivio Politico del ministero degli Esteri della Repubblica federale. L’autore sostiene che le relazioni economiche italo-tedesche assunsero un ruolo centrale nel processo di elaborazione della politica estera italiana sulla questione tedesca nel corso di questi anni. Prima dell’istituzione della Repubblica federale tedesca, l’Italia divenne un partner economico fondamentale per la Germania occidentale. Tra il 1945 e il 1949 l'Italia fu il primo paese europeo favorevole alla rinascita di un nuovo stato tedesco non sottoposto alla diretta influenza dell’Unione Sovietica. Il presidente del Consiglio De Gasperi e il ministro degli Esteri Sforza per sostenere la nuova Germania attuarono una precisa azione diplomatica di riavvicinamento politico, promuovendo diversi scambi di visite e di incontri con i rappresentanti tedeschi.

L'amministrazione Johnson e le origini della distensione. 1964-1968

La tesi analizza una parte della politica estera dell’amministrazione Johnson, e più specificamente l’avvio del dialogo con l’Urss in materia di non proliferazione e controllo degli armamenti e la revisione della China policy, inquadrando entrambe nell’adattamento della cold war strategy all’evoluzione sistema internazionale, argomentando che la distensione intesa come rilassamento delle tensioni e ricerca di terreno comune per il dialogo, fosse perlomeno uno degli strumenti politici che l’amministrazione scelse di usare. Il primo capitolo analizza i cambiamenti che interessarono il Blocco sovietico e il movimento comunista internazionale tra la fine degli anni Cinquanta e l’inizio degli anni Sessanta, soprattutto la rottura dell’alleanza sino-sovietica, e l’impatto che essi ebbero sul sistema bipolare su cui si basava la Guerra Fredda. Il capitolo secondo affronta più specificamente l’evoluzione delle relazioni tra Stati Uniti e Unione Sovietica, il perseguimento di una politica di distensione, dopo la crisi dei missili cubani, e in che relazione si trovasse ciò con lo status della leadership sovietica a seguito dei cambiamenti che avevano avuto luogo. Soffermandosi sulla questione del controllo degli armamenti e sul percorso che portò alla firma del Trattato di Non-proliferazione, si analizza come la nuova rotta intrapresa col dialogo sulle questioni strategiche sia stato anche un cambiamento di rotta in generale nella concezione della Guerra Fredda e l’introduzione della distensione come strumento politico. Il terzo capitolo affronta la questione della modifica della politica verso Pechino e il processo tortuoso e contorto attraverso cui l’amministrazione Johnson giunse a distaccarsi dalla China policy seguita sino ad allora.

Giochi diplomatici. Sport e politica estera nell'Italia del secondo dopoguerra (1943-1953)

Questa tesi di dottorato, partendo dall’assunto teorico secondo cui lo sport, pur essendo un fenomeno periferico e non decisivo del sistema politico internazionale, debba considerarsi, in virtù della sua elevata visibilità, sia come un componente delle relazioni internazionali sia come uno strumento di politica estera, si pone l’obiettivo di investigare, con un approccio di tipo storico-politico, l’attività internazionale dello sport italiano nel decennio che va dal 1943 al 1953. Nello specifico viene dedicata una particolare attenzione agli attori e alle istituzioni della “politica estera sportiva”, al rientro dello sport italiano nel consesso internazionale e alla sua forza legittimante di attrazione culturale. Vengono approfonditi altresì alcuni casi relativi a «crisi politiche» che influirono sullo sport e a «crisi sportive» che influenzarono la politica. La ricerca viene portata avanti con lo scopo primario di far emergere, da un lato se e quanto coscientemente lo sport sia stato usato come strumento di politica estera da parte dei governi e della diplomazia dell’Italia repubblicana, dall’altro quanto e con quale intensità lo sviluppo dell’attività internazionale dello sport italiano abbia avuto significative ripercussioni sull’andamento e dai rapporti di forza della politica internazionale.

La cooperazione dell'UE nella creazione di uno spazio sicuro nella globalizzazione come possibile modello per la regione dell'Asia Centrale

Gli ultimi anni hanno visto importanti cambiamenti positivi nella cooperazione interstatale in Asia centrale. Crescenti minacce come il terrorismo internazionale, l'estremismo religioso e politico, il traffico di droga, ecc, causati dagli interessi geopolitici e geo-economici delle potenze mondiali, hanno contribuito alla formazione di una politica estera più coordinata e coerente degli Stati della regione. Questo processo si manifesta nella partecipazione attiva dell’istituzionalizzazione della Shanghai Organizzazione del Commonwealth (SOC), Conferenza sulle misure di costruzione d’interazione e fiducia in Asia (CICA) e Organizzazione del Trattato di Sicurezza Collettiva (CSTO). Problemi moderni di sicurezza in Asia centrale dovrebbero essere risolti in dei nuovi modi, non convenzionali. Le nuove minacce alla sicurezza richiedono modi non standard per risolvere il problema. Considerate le differenze fondamentali dell'Unione europea e degli Stati dell'Asia centrale nei valori e dal punto di vista in materia di sicurezza. I paesi dell'Asia centrale non sono pronti per l'integrazione politica. Nonostante questo, nell’Asia centrale sono state adottate misure per contrastare le minacce non convenzionali. L’esperienza europea di unire gli sforzi della regione per garantire la sicurezza interna, può essere utilizzata dai paesi dell'Asia centrale, soprattutto, in primo luogo sulla formazione del quadro istituzionale e giuridico per la cooperazione operativa delle forze dell'ordine per le seguenti aree: • prevenzione del traffico di droga attraverso gli Stati dell'Asia centrale; • lotta contro nuove forme di terrorismo ed estremismo; • limitare la dimensione della migrazione clandestina; • migliorare la protezione giuridica dei cittadini. Fino a poco tempo fa, questi temi hanno ricevuto poca attenzione, sia nella teoria sia nella pratica, poiché i problemi di sicurezza della società erano principalmente ridotti per evitare il pericolo di guerra.