New perspectives on A.I. in sentencing. Human decision-making between risk assessment tools and protection of humans rights.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate a field that until a few years ago was foreign to and distant from the penal system. The purpose of this undertaking is to account for the role that technology could plays in the Italian Criminal Law system. More specifically, this thesis attempts to scrutinize a very intricate phase of adjudication. After deciding on the type of an individual's liability, a judge must decide on the severity of the penalty. This type of decision implies a prognostic assessment that looks to the future. It is precisely in this field and in prognostic assessments that, as has already been anticipated in the United, instruments and processes are inserted in the pre-trial but also in the decision-making phase. In this contribution, we attempt to describe the current state of this field, trying, as a matter of method, to select the most relevant or most used tools. Using comparative and qualitative methods, the uses of some of these instruments in the supranational legal system are analyzed. Focusing attention on the Italian system, an attempt was made to investigate the nature of the element of an individual's ‘social dangerousness’ (pericolosità sociale) and capacity to commit offences, types of assessments that are fundamental in our system because they are part of various types of decisions, including the choice of the best sanctioning treatment. It was decided to turn our attention to this latter field because it is believed that the judge does not always have the time, the means and the ability to assess all the elements of a subject and identify the best 'individualizing' treatment in order to fully realize the function of Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Constitution.

Le politiche giudiziarie inglesi degli anni 2000: mutamento di paradigma e rafforzamento dell'incisività politica dei giudici

The Ph.D. dissertation analyses the reasons for which political actors (governments, legislatures and political parties) decide consciously to give away a source of power by increasing the political significance of the courts. It focuses on a single case of particular significance: the passage of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 in the United Kingdom. This Act has deeply changed the governance and the organization of the English judicial system, has provided a much clearer separation of powers and a stronger independence of the judiciary from the executive and the legislative. What’s more, this strengthening of the judicial independence has been decided in a period in which the political role of the English judges was evidently increasing. I argue that the reform can be interpreted as a «paradigm shift» (Hall 1993), that has changed the way in which the judicial power is considered. The most diffused conceptions in the sub-system of the English judicial policies are shifted, and a new paradigm has become dominant. The new paradigm includes: (i) stronger separation of powers, (ii) collective (as well as individual) conception of the independence of the judiciary, (iii) reduction of the political accountability of the judges, (iv) formalization of the guarantees of judicial independence, (v) principle-driven (instead of pragmatic) approach to the reforms, and (vi) transformation of a non-codified constitution in a codified one. Judicialization through political decisions represent an important, but not fully explored, field of research. The literature, in particular, has focused on factors unable to explain the English case: the competitiveness of the party system (Ramseyer 1994), the political uncertainty at the time of constitutional design (Ginsburg 2003), the cultural divisions within the polity (Hirschl 2004), federal institutions and division of powers (Shapiro 2002). All these contributes link the decision to enhance the political relevance of the judges to some kind of diffusion of political power. In the contemporary England, characterized by a relative high concentration of power in the government, the reasons for such a reform should be located elsewhere. I argue that the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 can be interpreted as a result of three different kinds of reasons: (i) the social and demographical transformations of the English judiciary, which have made inefficient most of the precedent mechanism of governance, (ii) the role played by the judges in the policy process and (iii) the cognitive and normative influences originated from the European context, as a consequence of the membership of the United Kingdom to the European Union and the Council of Europe. My thesis is that only a full analysis of all these three aspects can explain the decision to reform the judicial system and the content of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Only the cultural influences come from the European legal complex, above all, can explain the paradigm shift previously described.