Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

Vascular access in patients with peripheral arterial disease undergoing TAVI: the hostile registry

BACKGROUND The optimal access route in patients with severe peripheral artery disease (PAD) undergoing TAVI remains undetermined. OBJECTIVE To compare clinical outcomes with transfemoral access (TFA), transthoracic access (TTA), and non-thoracic alternative access (TAA) in TAVI patients with severe PAD. METHODS Patients with PAD and hostile femoral access (TFA impossible, or possible only after percutaneous treatment) undergoing TAVI at 28 international centers were included in this registry. The primary endpoint was the propensity-adjusted risk of 30-day major adverse events (MAE) defined as the composite of all-cause mortality, stroke/transitory ischemic attack (TIA) or main access site-related VARC 3 major vascular complications. Outcomes were also stratified according to the severity of PAD using a novel risk score (Hostile score). RESULTS Among the 1,707 patients included in the registry, 518 (30.3%) underwent TAVI with TFA after percutaneous treatment, 642 (37.6%) with TTA, and 547 (32.0%) with TAA (mostly transaxillary). Compared with TTA, both TFA (adjusted HR=0.58, 95%CI 0.45-0.75) and TAA (adjusted HR=0.60, 95%CI 0.47-0.78) were associated with lower 30-day rates of MAE, driven by fewer access site-related complications. Composite risks at 1 year were also lower with TFA and TAA compared with TTA. TFA compared with TAA was associated with lower 1-year risks of stroke/TIA (adjusted HR=0.49, 95%CI 0.24-0.98), a finding confined to patients with low Hostile scores (Pinteraction=0.049). CONCLUSIONS Among patients with PAD undergoing TAVI, both TFA and TAA were associated with lower 30-day and 1-year rates of MAE compared with TTA, but 1-year stroke/TIA rates were higher with TAA compared with TFA.