Reasoning with incomplete and imprecise preferences

Preferences are present in many real life situations but it is often difficult to quantify them giving a precise value. Sometimes preference values may be missing because of privacy reasons or because they are expensive to obtain or to produce. In some other situations the user of an automated system may have a vague idea of whats he wants. In this thesis we considered the general formalism of soft constraints, where preferences play a crucial role and we extended such a framework to handle both incomplete and imprecise preferences. In particular we provided new theoretical frameworks to handle such kinds of preferences. By admitting missing or imprecise preferences, solving a soft constraint problem becomes a different task. In fact, the new goal is to find solutions which are the best ones independently of the precise value the each preference may have. With this in mind we defined two notions of optimality: the possibly optimal solutions and the necessary optimal solutions, which are optimal no matter we assign a precise value to a missing or imprecise preference. We provided several algorithms, bases on both systematic and local search approaches, to find such kind of solutions. Moreover, we also studied the impact of our techniques also in a specific class of problems (the stable marriage problems) where imprecision and incompleteness have a specific meaning and up to now have been tackled with different techniques. In the context of the classical stable marriage problem we developed a fair method to randomly generate stable marriages of a given problem instance. Furthermore, we adapted our techniques to solve stable marriage problems with ties and incomplete lists, which are known to be NP-hard, obtaining good results both in terms of size of the returned marriage and in terms of steps need to find a solution.

The Determinants of Individual Performance: Empirical Essays on the Importance of Soft Skills and Monetary Incentives

This dissertation consists of three papers. The first paper "Managing the Workload: an Experiment on Individual Decision Making and Performance" experimentally investigates how decision-making in workload management affects individual performance. I designed a laboratory experiment in order to exogenously manipulate the schedule of work faced by each subject and to identify its impact on final performance. Through the mouse click-tracking technique, I also collected interesting behavioral measures on organizational skills. I found that a non-negligible share of individuals performs better under externally imposed schedules than in the unconstrained case. However, such constraints are detrimental for those good in self-organizing. The second chapter, "On the allocation of effort with multiple tasks and piecewise monotonic hazard function", tests the optimality of a scheduling model, proposed in a different literature, for the decisional problem faced in the experiment. Under specific assumptions, I find that such model identifies what would be the optimal scheduling of the tasks in the Admission Test. The third paper "The Effects of Scholarships and Tuition Fees Discounts on Students' Performances: Which Monetary Incentives work Better?" explores how different levels of monetary incentives affect the achievement of students in tertiary education. I used a Regression Discontinuity Design to exploit the assignment of different monetary incentives, to study the effects of such liquidity provision on performance outcomes, ceteris paribus. The results show that a monetary increase in the scholarships generates no effect on performance since the achievements of the recipients are all centered near the requirements for non-returning the benefit. Secondly, students, who are actually paying some share of the total cost of college attendance, surprisingly, perform better than those whose cost is completely subsidized. A lower benefit, relatively to a higher aid, it motivates students to finish early and not to suffer the extra cost of a delayed graduation.