Synergies among safety and security in the prevention of major accidents related to dangerous substances

Historical evidence shows that chemical, process, and Oil&Gas facilities where dangerous substances are stored or handled are target of deliberate malicious attacks (security attacks) aiming at interfering with normal operations. Physical attacks and cyber-attacks may generate events with consequences on people, property, and the surrounding environment that are comparable to those of major accidents caused by safety-related causes. The security aspects of these facilities are commonly addressed using Security Vulnerability/Risk Assessment (SVA/SRA) methodologies. Most of these methodologies are semi-quantitative and non-systematic approaches that strongly rely on expert judgment, leading to security assessments that are not reproducible. Moreover, they do not consider the synergies with the safety domain. The present 3-year research is aimed at filling the gap outlined by providing knowledge on security attacks, as well as rigorous and systematic methods supporting existing SVA/SRA studies suitable for the chemical, process, and Oil&Gas industry. The different nature of cyber and physical attacks resulted in the development of different methods for the two domains. The first part of the research was devoted to the development and statistical analysis of security databases that allowed to develop new knowledge and lessons learnt on security threats. Based on the obtained background, a Bow-Tie based procedure and two reverse-HazOp based methodologies were developed as hazard identification approaches for physical and cyber threats respectively. To support the quantitative estimation of the security risk, a quantitative procedure based on the Bayesian Network was developed allowing to calculate the probability of success of physical security attacks. All the developed methods have been applied to case studies addressing chemical, process and Oil&Gas facilities (offshore and onshore) proving the quality of the results that can be achieved in improving site security. Furthermore, the outcomes achieved allow to step forward in developing synergies and promoting integration among safety and security management.

Safety, Security And safeguards In GEN IV sodium fast reactors

This work presents first a study of the national and international laws in the fields of safety, security and safeguards. The international treaties and the recommendations issued by the IAEA as well as the national regulations in force in France, the United States and Italy are analyzed. As a result of this, a comparison among them is presented. Given the interest of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency for the aspects of criminal penalties and monetary, also the Japanese case is analyzed. The main part of this work was held at the JAEA in the field of proliferation resistance (PR) and physical protection (PP) of a GEN IV sodium fast reactor. For this purpose the design of the system is completed and the PR & PP methodology is applied to obtain data usable by designers for the improvement of the system itself. Due to the presence of sensitive data, not all the details can be disclosed. The reactor site of a hypothetical and commercial sodium-cooled fast neutron nuclear reactor system (SFR) is used as the target NES for the application of the methodology. The methodology is applied to all the PR and PP scenarios: diversion, misuse and breakout; theft and sabotage. The methodology is applied to the SFR to check if this system meets the target of PR and PP as described in the GIF goal; secondly, a comparison between the SFR and a LWR is performed to evaluate if and how it would be possible to improve the PR&PP of the SFR. The comparison is implemented according to the example development target: achieving PR&PP similar or superior to domestic and international ALWR. Three main actions were performed: implement the evaluation methodology; characterize the PR&PP for the nuclear energy system; identify recommendations for system designers through the comparison.