La Pace Calda. La nascita del movimento antinucleare negli Stati Uniti e in Gran Bretagna, 1957-1963

The aim of this proposal is to offer an alternative perspective on the study of Cold War, since insufficient attention is usually paid to those organizations that mobilized against the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The antinuclear movement began to mobilize between the 1950s and the 1960s, when it finally gained the attention of public opinion, and helped to build a sort of global conscience about nuclear bombs. This was due to the activism of a significant part of the international scientific community, which offered powerful intellectual and political legitimization to the struggle, and to the combined actions of the scientific and organized protests. This antinuclear conscience is something we usually tend to consider as a fait accompli in contemporary world, but the question is to show its roots, and the way it influenced statesmen and political choices during the period of nuclear confrontation of the early Cold War. To understand what this conscience could be and how it should be defined, we have to look at the very meaning of the nuclear weapons that has deeply modified the sense of war. Nuclear weapons seemed to be able to destroy human beings everywhere with no realistic forms of control of the damages they could set off, and they represented the last resource in the wide range of means of mass destruction. Even if we tend to consider this idea fully rational and incontrovertible, it was not immediately born with the birth of nuclear weapons themselves. Or, better, not everyone in the world did immediately share it. Due to the particular climate of Cold War confrontation, deeply influenced by the persistence of realistic paradigms in international relations, British and U.S. governments looked at nuclear weapons simply as «a bullet». From the Trinity Test to the signature of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, many things happened that helped to shift this view upon nuclear weapons. First of all, more than ten years of scientific protests provided a more concerned knowledge about consequences of nuclear tests and about the use of nuclear weapons. Many scientists devoted their social activities to inform public opinion and policy-makers about the real significance of the power of the atom and the related danger for human beings. Secondly, some public figures, as physicists, philosophers, biologists, chemists, and so on, appealed directly to the human community to «leave the folly and face reality», publicly sponsoring the antinuclear conscience. Then, several organizations leaded by political, religious or radical individuals gave to this protests a formal structure. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Great Britain, as well as the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy in the U.S., represented the voice of the masses against the attempts of governments to present nuclear arsenals as a fundamental part of the international equilibrium. Therefore, the antinuclear conscience could be defined as an opposite feeling to the development and the use of nuclear weapons, able to create a political issue oriented to the influence of military and foreign policies. Only taking into consideration the strength of this pressure, it seems possible to understand not only the beginning of nuclear negotiations, but also the reasons that permitted Cold War to remain cold.

1963-1968. Dall'avvento dell'amministrazione di Lyndon B. Johnson al Trattato di Non-Proliferazione. gli Stati Uniti, la Francia, la NATO e l'Europa agli esordi della distensione. Storia di una "non-crisi" transatlantica e della riorganizzazione dell'Alleanza.

The aim of this proposal is to explain the paradigm of the American foreign policy during the Johnson Administration, especially toward Europe, within the NATO framework, and toward URSS, in the context of the détente, just emerged during the decade of the sixties. During that period, after the passing of the J. F. Kennedy, President L. B. Johnson inherited a complex and very high-powered world politics, which wanted to get a new phase off the ground in the transatlantic relations and share the burden of the Cold war with a refractory Europe. Known as the grand design, it was a policy that needed the support of the allies and a clear purpose which appealed to the Europeans. At first, President Johnson detected in the problem of the nuclear sharing the good deal to make with the NATO allies. At the same time, he understood that the United States needed to reassert their leadeship within the new stage of relations with the Soviet Union. Soon, the “transatlantic bargain” became something not so easy to dealt with. The Federal Germany wanted to say a word in the nuclear affairs and, why not, put the finger on the trigger of the atlantic nuclear weapons. URSS, on the other hand, wanted to keep Germany down. The other allies did not want to share the onus of the defense of Europe, at most the responsability for the use of the weapons and, at least, to participate in the decision-making process. France, which wanted to detach herself from the policy of the United States and regained a world role, added difficulties to the manage of this course of action. Through the years of the Johnson’s office, the divergences of the policies placed by his advisers to gain the goal put the American foreign policy in deep water. The withdrawal of France from the organization but not from the Alliance, give Washington a chance to carry out his goal. The development of a clear-cut disarm policy leaded the Johnson’s administration to the core of the matter. The Non-proliferation Treaty signed in 1968, solved in a business-like fashion the problem with the allies. The question of nuclear sharing faded away with the acceptance of more deep consultative role in the nuclear affairs by the allies, the burden for the defense of Europe became more bearable through the offset agreement with the FRG and a new doctrine, the flexible response, put an end, at least formally, to the taboo of the nuclear age. The Johnson’s grand design proved to be different from the Kennedy’s one, but all things considered, it was more workable. The unpredictable result was a real détente with the Soviet Union, which, we can say, was a merit of President Johnson.

La storia del cinema muto a Bologna attraverso la documentazione d'epoca. Protagonisti, imprese, spettacoli e luoghi per la gestione dell'immaginario della società urbana (1896-1925).

Studio storiografico condotto su fonti archivistiche, filmiche e sulla stampa locale e specializzata che ricostruisce dettagliatamente l'ambiente cittadino d'inizio Novecento nel quale si sono diffusi i primi spettacoli cinematografici, determinandone le caratteristiche e tracciandone l'evoluzione fra 1896 e 1925. L'avvento della cinematografia è strettamente connesso a un processo di modernizzazione del volto urbano, degli stili di vita, delle idee e il cinema si salda a queste istanze di rinnovamento, con una precisa ricaduta sull'immagine della città e sull'esperienza dei suoi cittadini appartenenti alle diverse classi sociali.