Civil Liability as an Enforcement Tool of Securities Underwriter Gatekeeping Duty

This book is dedicated to the Law and Economics analysis of civil liability of securities underwriters for the damage caused by material misstatements of corporate information by securities issuers. It seeks to answer a series of important questions. Who the are underwriters and what is their main role in the securities offering? Why there is a need for legal intervention in the underwriting market? What is so special about civil liability as an enforcement tool? How is civil liability used in a real world and does it really reach its goals? Finally, is there a need for a change and, if so, by what means?

Committed to reform? Pragmatic antitrust enforcement in electricity markets

This thesis is a collection of essays about the instrumental use of commitment decisions to facilitate the completion of the European internal electricity market. European policy can shape markets in many ways, two most evident being regulation and competition enforcement. The interplay between these two instruments attracts a lot of scholarly attention. One of the major concerns in the competition vs. regulation debate is the instrumental use of competition rules. It has been observed that competition enforcement is triggered not only as a response to an anticompetitive harm occurring in the market, but that it sometimes becomes a powerful tool in the European Commission’s hands to pursue regulatory goals. This thesis looks for examples of such instrumentalisation in the context of electricity markets and finds that the Commission is very pragmatic in using all the possible instruments it has at hand to push forward its project of creating the internal electricity market. This includes regulation, competition enforcement and all sorts of political pressure. To the extent that commitment decisions accelerate sector-specific regulation and overcome political deadlocks, they contribute to the Commission’s energy policy goals. However, instrumentalisation of competition rules comes at a certain cost to competition policy, energy policy and, most importantly, to electricity markets themselves. Markets might be negatively affected either indirectly, by application of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inadequate commitments in individual cases. Concluding, commitment decisions generally contributed to achieving the policy objectives of the internal electricity market, but their use for that purpose does not come without cost. Given that this cost is ultimately borne by the internal electricity market, the Commission should take a more balanced approach to the instrumental use of commitment decisions so that it does not do more harm than good.

Monitoring Complex Processes to Verify System Conformance: A Declarative Rule-Based Framework

Over the last 60 years, computers and software have favoured incredible advancements in every field. Nowadays, however, these systems are so complicated that it is difficult – if not challenging – to understand whether they meet some requirement or are able to show some desired behaviour or property. This dissertation introduces a Just-In-Time (JIT) a posteriori approach to perform the conformance check to identify any deviation from the desired behaviour as soon as possible, and possibly apply some corrections. The declarative framework that implements our approach – entirely developed on the promising open source forward-chaining Production Rule System (PRS) named Drools – consists of three components: 1. a monitoring module based on a novel, efficient implementation of Event Calculus (EC), 2. a general purpose hybrid reasoning module (the first of its genre) merging temporal, semantic, fuzzy and rule-based reasoning, 3. a logic formalism based on the concept of expectations introducing Event-Condition-Expectation rules (ECE-rules) to assess the global conformance of a system. The framework is also accompanied by an optional module that provides Probabilistic Inductive Logic Programming (PILP). By shifting the conformance check from after execution to just in time, this approach combines the advantages of many a posteriori and a priori methods proposed in literature. Quite remarkably, if the corrective actions are explicitly given, the reactive nature of this methodology allows to reconcile any deviations from the desired behaviour as soon as it is detected. In conclusion, the proposed methodology brings some advancements to solve the problem of the conformance checking, helping to fill the gap between humans and the increasingly complex technology.

Sanctions and public enforcement of insider trading laws in Europe

The recent financial crisis triggered an increasing demand for financial regulation to counteract the potential negative economic effects of the evermore complex operations and instruments available on financial markets. As a result, insider trading regulation counts amongst the relatively recent but particularly active regulation battles in Europe and overseas. Claims for more transparency and equitable securities markets proliferate, ranging from concerns about investor protection to global market stability. The internationalization of the world’s securities market has challenged traditional notions of regulation and enforcement. Considering that insider trading is currently forbidden all over Europe, this study follows a law and economics approach in identifying how this prohibition should be enforced. More precisely, the study investigates first whether criminal law is necessary under all circumstances to enforce insider trading; second, if it should be introduced at EU level. This study provides evidence of law and economics theoretical logic underlying the legal mechanisms that guide sanctioning and public enforcement of the insider trading prohibition by identifying optimal forms, natures and types of sanctions that effectively induce insider trading deterrence. The analysis further aims to reveal the economic rationality that drives the potential need for harmonization of criminal enforcement of insider trading laws within the European environment by proceeding to a comparative analysis of the current legislations of height selected Member States. This work also assesses the European Union’s most recent initiative through a critical analysis of the proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for Market Abuse. Based on the conclusions drawn from its close analysis, the study takes on the challenge of analyzing whether or not the actual European public enforcement of the laws prohibiting insider trading is coherent with the theoretical law and economics recommendations, and how these enforcement practices could be improved.

Law, Informal Institutions and Trust: an Experimental Perspective

This dissertation has studied how legal and non-legal mechanisms affect the levels of trust and trustworthiness in an economy, and whether and when subtle psychological factors are crucial for establishing trust and even for recovering trust from a breach of contract. The first Chapter has addressed the question of whether formal legal enforcement crowds out or crowds in the amount of trust in a society. We find that formal legal mechanisms, especially formal contracts backed by a powerful authority, normally undermine trust except when they are perceived as legitimate, or when there are no strong social norms of fairness (i.e. the population in a society is considerably heterogeneous), or when the environment in which repeated commercial relationships take place becomes highly uncertain. The second Chapter has examined whether the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment institution can help a society coordinate on an efficient outcome, characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness. The experimental results show that the endogenous introduction of collective punishment by means of a majority-voting rule does not significantly improve coordination on the efficient equilibrium. Not all subjects seem to be able to anticipate the change in behavior induced by the introduction of the mechanism, and a majority of them vote against it. The third Chapter has explored whether high-trustors adapt their behavior in response to others’ trustworthiness or untrustworthiness more quickly, which in turn supports them to maintain higher default expectations of others’ trustworthiness relative to low-trustors. Our experimental results reveal that high-trustors are better than low-trustors at predicting others’ trustworthiness because they are less susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and thereby have a higher willingness to acquire the valuable information about their partner’s actions.